Security and Liberty, Transparency and Secrecy, Parliamentary Control of the Secret Services in Canada and Germany: A Comparative Approach by Wiesehofer, Sophie Christine Barbara
 
 
 
 
Security and Liberty, Transparency and Secrecy.  
Parliamentary Control of the Secret Services in Canada and Germany: 
 A Comparative Approach 
 
Sophie Christine Barbara Wiesehöfer 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF LAW 
 
Graduate Program in  
Law 
Osgoode Hall Law School 
 York University 
Toronto, Ontario 
October 2017 
 
© Sophie Christine Barbara Wiesehöfer, 2017  
 ii
Abstract 
After an ongoing 40-year debate, Canada is going to institutionalise its first Committee of Parliamentarians that is 
meant to control the federal agencies’ and departments’ activities in the realm of national security. In contrast, post-
war democratic Germany discussed that kind of control early on, not least because of its totalitarian past, and had 
already established its first parliamentary control body as of 1949; its last major reform was in 2016. Adopting a com-
bined historical and comparative legal perspective, the thesis aims at analysing and comparing the constitutional 
frameworks and the respective debates and institutions in both countries, inter alia, with the help of scholarly works 
and official documents. It poses the question: can Canada make use of the German experience? It concludes that the 
final answer depends on an appreciation of the legitimate constitutional limits that differ between the two countries 
as well as on the reader’s own political philosophy of the relationship between security and liberty, transparency and 
secrecy. 
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Introduction 
"If you always ask for possible additional measures and forget the connection with the con-
stitution of society as a whole, a dangerous gate is opened. [...] ‘Anyone who has nothing to 
hide has nothing to fear’—this is a slogan that has always been used for ‘security reasons’ in 
every totalitarian state of the world. For ‘security’ is an open-ended demand—always 
boundless: it is, if one limits its sense to control and persecution, a totalitarian concept. You 
could still do a lot more [...].”1 – Thomas Fischer, Former Presiding Judge of the 2nd Criminal 
Division of the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice)  
 
 
In recent years, the call for more security and protection against terrorism has become a predominant feature of the 
political debate in all ‘western’ countries. The mass surveillance that became known after the whistle-blowing of 
Edward Snowden changed the national security policies of the governments only very briefly as the collection of data 
and the global collaboration of intelligence services in their hunt for personal data and the tracking of threats to the 
welfare of the states seemed too important. Whereas the rights granted to the intelligence and secret services around 
the world are growing, only small steps have been taken to keep the balance between security and liberty—the prin-
ciple on the other side of the coin. 
On June 2016, however, a step towards liberty and an improved protection of fundamental rights was taken by the 
Canadian Liberal government when it tabled a new Bill: Bill C-22—‘an Act to establish the National Security and In-
telligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts’ [Bill C-22].2  
Whereas in most ‘western’ democracies a body conducting parliamentary control in the realm of national security 
was already established years—if not decades—ago, Canada is only on its way to establishing its first respective Com-
mittee of Parliamentarians and to make the executive accountable to Parliament in this way for the executive’s activ-
ities with regards to national security. Even though the first official recommendation for an inquiry to establish such 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
1 “Wenn man immerzu nur nach dem möglichen Mehr an Maßnahmen fragt 
und dabei den Zusammenhang mit der Verfassung der Gesellschaft insgesamt vergisst, öffnet man ein gefährliches Tor. […] "Wer nichts 
zu verbergen hat, muss auch nichts befürchten" – das ist eine Parole, mit der von jeher in jedem totalitären Staat der Welt für "Sicherheit" 
gesorgt wurde.  
Denn "Sicherheit" ist eine nach oben offene Forderung – immer unermesslich: Sie ist, wenn man ihren Sinn auf Kontrolle und Verfolgung 
beschränkt, ein totalitärer Begriff. Man könnte ja immer noch unendlich viel mehr tun […].“ (Translation mine). Thomas Fischer, 
“Sicherheit und Sinn”, Zeit Online (21 June 2017), online: <www.zeit.de/2017/26/ueberwachung-innere-sicherheit-innenminister-
deutschland>. 
2 Bill C-22 received Royal Assent following the Senate’s adoption of the House Bill in June 2017.  
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a committee was made as early as in 1983 and several bills aiming at the establishment of a body were tabled after 
9/11, it was only after the introduction of one of the most controversial and far-reaching anti-terrorism Laws (Anti-
terrorism Act, 2015) that the general proposal to establish such a Committee had its first real chance of success.  
Germany is an example of a country that established a parliamentary control body long before the threat of the new 
fundamentalist terrorism emerged. Since then, it has reformed its body repeatedly. The first steps to the current 
Parliamentary Control Panel were taken as early as in 1949, when the Committee for the Protection of the Constitu-
tion was established. In 1978, only a few years before the first official recommendation to create a somehow similar 
committee in Canada, the Parliamentary Control Commission was established in Germany—the direct predecessor 
of the current Panel. Since Germany’s experiences with parliamentary control of the national security agencies have 
been both positive and negative in the last 40 to 70 years, those lessons might assist the current debates in Canada 
on Bill C-22. This thesis therefore deals with the following question: (What) can Canada learn from the German 
model and the European standards of parliamentary control of secret services with respect to the composition, 
powers, and roles of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians that has been estab-
lished by Bill C-22? 
The relationship between security and liberty is still a heated public controversy in both states. Besides, it should be 
of interest to every citizen. The introductory quote of Thomas Fischer, who was the Presiding Judge of the 2nd Crim-
inal Division of the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) until April 2017, highlights that the idea 
that anyone who has nothing to hide has nothing to fear from supervision measures may lead to an encroachment 
of the executive branch of the state into every aspect of everyone’s private life. This is something that not only fright-
ens me personally but has also led me to choose this topic for my thesis. 
To be in a position to compare the German Panel and the legislation that underpins the Panel with the Canadian 
Committee and the final version of Bill C-22, it is necessary to describe the different constitutional frameworks in 
which the Committee or Panel will be/is embedded in detail. Additionally, the debates that have led to the current 
ideas and plans in Canada and to the reforms in Germany need to be explained. Only then are we able to assess the 
reasons why certain ideas, plans, advances, reluctances and hesitations came into being in both Canada and Germany. 
Therefore, this thesis starts by giving a detailed overview of the German constitutional and statutory background as 
well as the reforms of and debates on the parliamentary control architecture in Germany (as far as compatible with 
the length of the thesis) (chapter 1). As a second step, the long Canadian path to Bill C-22 will be portrayed by giving 
a short introduction to the relevant Canadian constitutional and statutory framework (chapter 2). Only on the basis 
of these explanations is it possible to compare the Canadian and German model—through an analysis of their respec-
tive characteristics, based, inter alia, on assessments and considerations made by various scholars and politicians. It 
will become clear that despite their differences regarding their Constitutions, (legal) history and experiences with 
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parliamentary control, the debate in both Canada and Germany focusses on the same problems, challenges and ten-
sions. The comparison can therefore also centre on those common issues/questions such as access to secret infor-
mation, review and/or oversight powers, protection of whistle-blowers, minority rights, information sharing and the 
influence of the digital world on the debates (chapter 3). Finally, I will explain why the reader has to draw his/her 
own conclusions and why it is impossible to draw or present a politically neutral conclusion within the limits of what 
is constitutionally acceptable in both countries. I will set forth the reasons why I believe that Bill C-22 still lags behind 
the German model in several respects despite of the latter not being effective and far-reaching enough. I will espe-
cially emphasise the underdeveloped minority rights, the unsolved problems of intelligence sharing, and the lack of 
sanction powers. I will explain why the debate has not yet and will not come to an end, particularly when considering 
the technical/digital developments and other new challenges that the parliamentary control bodies in both countries 
will face—in my opinion, highly unprepared (conclusion).  
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Chapter I: Germany: A Story of Scandals and Reforms. Parliamentary Control and 
National Security Matters between 1949 and 2017 
 “Dadurch, dass er [sc. der Rechtsstaat] auch den Umgang mit seinen Gegnern den allge-
mein geltenden Grundsätzen unterwirft, zeigt sich gerade die Kraft dieses Rechtsstaats […]. 
Das gilt auch für die Verfolgung der fundamentalen Staatszwecke der Sicherheit und des 
Schutzes der Bevölkerung.”3 – German Constitutional Court, First Senate, 20064 
In 2013, the United States National Security Agency (NSA) scandal5 provoked a highly controversial debate in Ger-
many—mostly on digital rights and mass surveillance committed by, as we know now, all major western intelligence 
agencies, including the German ones. Was the NSA spying scandal a sign of failure of the so-called checks and bal-
ances or are the activities of the intelligence agencies backed in any case by the will of the people, not least by their 
fear of terrorism? If so, in which way does/can the will of the people as the sovereign still play an effective part in 
security policies? Through its representative, the parliament? This chapter seeks to give a broad overview and histor-
ical survey of the German security architecture, particularly the role of the Parliamentary Control Panel of the German 
intelligence services. What role has it played so far, how has its role developed and which powers has it had and does 
it have today? 
I. Legal Concepts 
In order to understand the current security structure or ‘security architecture’ in Germany, one needs to, first of all, 
define the legal concepts that determine why, how and within which legal framework the security agencies and the 
(parliamentary) control bodies operate. According to its Basic Law, Germany is a federal republican and democratic 
state governed by the rule of law6. These principles are considered as defining constitutional principles of the German 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
3 “The fact that it [sc. the state governed by the rule of law] also subjects its dealings with its opponents to the generally applicable 
principles is precisely what demonstrates the power of this constitutional state. … This also applies to the pursuit of the fundamental 
state purposes of security and protection of the population.” (Translation mine).  
4 Rasterfahndung II, BVerfGE 115, 320 at 358, cited in Franz Josef Lindner & Johannes Unterreitmeier, “Die ‚Karlsruher Republik‘ – 
wehrlos in Zeiten des Terrors?” (2017) 3 DÖV 90 at 94. 
5 Whistleblower Edward Snowden published documents of the NSA that revealed its practice of keeping citizens all around the world 
under surveillance – tapping particularly the internet and telecommunications, including of foreign leaders, for example German 
chancellor Angela Merkel. 
6 Art. 20 of the Basic Law / Art. 28 of the Basic Law, Grundgesetz, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany in the revised version 
published in the Federal Law Gazette Part III, classification number 100-1, as last amended by Article 1 of the Act of 23 December 2014, 
Federal Law Gazette I, 2014 at 2438 [GG]. 
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state (Staatsstrukturprinzipien). Furthermore, they are protected by the so-called eternity clause (Ewigkeitsklau-
sel)7, meaning that they cannot be amended or abolished by anyone or any institution.   
The concept of democracy is inter alia8 defined more precisely by Art. 20 II of the Basic Law that prescribes that 
 “[a]ll state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through 
specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies.”9  
Considering this wording, Germany is defined as a parliamentary or representative democracy, meaning that the 
“democratic sovereignty of the people […] is executed by the democratically legitimised governmental bodies.”10 
The will of the people should therefore be the foundation of every exertion of power by the state. This also becomes 
obvious when we think of the “continuous democratic chain of legitimacy”11, a notion coined by Böckenförde, which 
states that every state’s act should always be traceable back to the will of the people. A precondition for the people 
acting as the sovereign of the state is their ability to form their opinions and views in an uncoerced and free manner. 
In order to be able to do so, however, the people must be informed about the actions of the government. Therefore, 
one requirement of the democratic process is transparency to a certain degree and publicity of the government’s 
assertions of powers. There is some kind of interdependence between publicity and the will of the people.  
Grzeszick thus describes two steps that need to be distinguished. Firstly, the “general principle of a democratic public 
has to be made concrete and compact to become a legal rule. […] The specification into a relevant legal rule thus 
depends on the democratic public opinion’s view of the significance of the respective governmental activity.”12 If the 
principle of a democratic public is considered as a legal rule for a certain governmental activity, the second step is to 
see whether “partial deviations from the legal rule can be justified for corresponding reasons”.13 This second “step” 
may become very important particularly within the framework of the exertion of powers by the government in the 
field of national security and—arguably—for the review of activities conducted by the state’s intelligence agencies.  
In Germany, the principle of the separation of powers is not enshrined in the constitutional system in Art. 20 II 2 of 
the Basic Law but is considered as part of the principle of a state governed by the rule of law. There is, however, no 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
7 Art. 79 III GG. 
8 The principle of democracy is more closely defined in different articles of the Basic Law, which, however, will not be looked at in the 
context of this thesis.  
9 Art. 20 II GG; English translation, online: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0210>.  
10 “[D]emokratische Volkssouveränität in der grundsätzlichen Ausübung durch demokratisch legitimierte Staatsorgane.” (Translation 
mine). Bernd Grzeszick, “Die Verfassungsentscheidung für die Demokratie” in Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig, eds, Grundgesetz-
Kommentar, 78th edition (Beck Online, January 2010) at paras 11-15. 
11 “Ununterbrochene demokratische Legitimationskette.” (Translation mine). Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Demokratie als 
Verfassungsprinzip” in Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof, eds, Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland at § 24 paras 16ff.  
12 “Das allgemeine Prinzip der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit muss zu einer Rechtsregel konkretisiert und verdichtet werden. […] Die 
Konkretisierung zu einem einschlägigen Rechtsgebot hängt deshalb zunächst davon ab, wie wichtig die jeweilige staatliche Tätigkeit aus 
der Sicht der demokratischen Willensbildung ist.“ (Translation mine). Grzeszick, supra note 10 at paras 11-21. 
13 “[…] partikulare Abweichungen von der Rechtsregel durch entsprechende Gründe zu rechtfertigen.” (Translation mine). Ibid at paras 
21 – 22.  
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strict separation of powers; instead, one talks about the so-called “Gewaltenverschränkung”, meaning that there is 
an interlinking of powers of the three branches of the state—in the form of “mutual influence, control and inhibi-
tion”14. Within the framework of this thesis, the interlinking is particularly important when we have a closer look at 
the relationship between the executive power and the legislative power: “A government that is independent in some 
(core) areas but subject to parliamentary control in others is a mandatory feature of a parliamentary system of gov-
ernment.”15  
This brings us to parliamentary control and its necessary components. When considering parliamentary control, Gusy 
defined it as “an essential link between the separation of powers and the principle of democracy.”16 It is essential to 
achieve firstly, “power limitations”17, secondly, “the participation of the parliament in the democratic decision-making 
process and the ‘Management of the State’”18 as well as thirdly, “an increase in performance and efficiency.”19 Parlia-
mentary control is therefore, in Gusy’s view, not an “expression of a particular mistrust against the executive or 
certain public authorities.”20 Furthermore, Gusy makes another point in favour of the effects and aims of parliamen-
tary control: the legitimacy that originates from formal legislation is rather weak when legislation is using vague legal 
terms. Therefore, parliamentary control of the exercise of power by the executive in the vague field of discretionary 
power may have “an effect that compensates legitimation.”21 It is to be understood not only within the framework of 
the relationship between parliament and government but also as a control mechanism significant for the relations 
between the parliament, which meets openly, and the public22 by emphasising the importance of transparency and 
publicity in a democratic state once again.  
However, there is a scholarly debate on how to locate parliamentary control in the framework of the constitutional 
principles of democracy and the rule of law in Germany. A majority of scholars sees parliamentary control founded 
on both principles (see above). However, it is indeed disputable whether it is a democratic feature because of its 
necessary link to the sovereignty of the people or to the “idealistic form of democracy”, i.e. direct democracy, and 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
14 “[…] gegenseitige Beeinflussung, Kontrolle und Hemmung.” (Translation mine).  
Erik Hansalek, Die parlamentarische Kontrolle der Bundesregierung im Bereich der Nachrichtendienste (Frankfurt: Lang, 2006) at 197. 
15 “Eine sogleich in einigen (Kern-)Bereichen eigenständige, als in anderen Bereichen der parlamentarischen Kontrolle unterworfene 
Regierung ist ein zwingendes Merkmal für ein parlamentarisches Regierungssystem.” (Translation mine). Hannes Berger, Dimensionen 
parlamentarischer Kontrolle: Eine Einführung in Theorie und Empirie (Stuttgart: ibidem, 2014) at 6. 
16“In diesem Sinne ist parlamentarische Kontrolle ein zentrales Bindeglied zwischen Gewaltenteilung und Demokratieprinzip.” 
(Translation mine). Christoph Gusy, “Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste im demokratischen Rechtsstaat” (2008) 41:2 
Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 36 [Gusy, “Parl. Kontrolle”]. 
17 “Machtbegrenzung” (Translation mine). Hansalek, supra note 14 at 150. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Gusy, “Parl. Kontrolle”, supra note 16 at 37.   
21 “legitimationskompensierende Wirkung.” Ibid at 38.  
22 Daniel Nees, “Wieviel Demokratie vertragen unsere Außenbeziehungen?” (2016) 16 DÖV 674 at 676. 
 
 7
thus to the necessity to counterbalance the impacts of having an indirect and representative democracy in the Ger-
man constitution.23 Irrespective of the debate, there have always been certain limits to the powers of the Bundestag 
and thus to the rights of the parliament and the public to be informed of the government’s actions. The Constitutional 
Court has defined these limitations in different cases, which can be classified into three categories: firstly, the Bun-
destag does not have the competence; secondly, the “core area of executive autonomy”24is affected; and thirdly, a 
disclosure would constitute a threat to the public weal/ welfare of the state.25  
II. National Security 
Theoretically, the constitutional principles of democracy, of the partial separation of powers and thus of the parlia-
mentary control of actions of the federal government need to be applied to every possible field of policy and public 
action. However, in the history of parliamentary control in the field of national security, it has often been contended 
that “it is obvious that the nature and tasks of the security agencies exclude the exertion of parliamentary control 
with the otherwise usual operating methods.”26 The question is, therefore: how can we guarantee that the activities 
of the intelligence agencies are properly accountable to parliamentary control and thereby operate with necessary 
legitimacy? How and to what extent should this control and its mechanisms be different from ordinary forms of 
(parliamentary) control? In what follows, I will provide a short overview of the German security agencies as well as 
the diverse review and accountability mechanisms that are in place. Additionally, I will outline the long history of 
parliamentary control of the federal government in the field of national security, its continuities and changes and its 
potentials and shortcomings.  
1. National Security vs. Liberty?  
In Germany, the literal translation of the English term national security (Staatssicherheit/Nationale Sicherheit) is not 
used by scholars or the public. Those terms are negatively connoted to NS27- as well as GDR28-times. Therefore, other 
legal terms are used in Germany and in German law to describe ‘national security’, the most prominent one being 
“internal and external security” (Innere und Äußere Sicherheit). The term Innere Sicherheit is, however, nowhere 
legally defined. Lampe argues that one should use the term “protection of the basic security interests” of the state 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
23 Hansalek, supra note 14 at 174 ff.; The Basic Law does furthermore regulate specific control mechanisms for the government, e.g. in Art. 
13 IV 223, 45 b23 and 45 d.  
24 “Kernbereich exekutiver Eigenverantwortung.” (Translation mine).  
25 Gunter Warg, “Die Grenzen parlamentarischer Kontrolle am Beispiel des Staatswohls” (2014) 19 NVwZ. 
26 “Es liegt jedoch auf der Hand, dass Wesen und Aufgaben der Nachrichtendienste die Ausübung der parlamentarischen Kontrolle mit den 
sonst üblichen Methoden und Arbeitsweisen ausschließen.” (Translation mine). Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Enquete-Kommission, 
Verfassungsreform, 7th Parl, BT-Drucksache 7/5924 (09 December 1976) at 61 [BT-Drucksache 7/5924], cited in Hansalek, supra note 14 
at 3.  
27 National Socialism.  
28 German Democratic Republic.  
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instead (as already set out in Art. 65 (4), Art. 346 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, “TFEU”), since 
this term would not only include internal and external security but also the “security policy interests of the state”.29 
Yet the main constitutional problem is not terminology but the balancing of security and civil liberty. As Gusy puts it, 
“security is a condition of the constitution, freedom is its content.”30 Nonetheless, they are often “working in opposite 
directions. Security is the absence of risks; freedom, however, causes and increases risks.”31 The biggest threat to 
limiting the liberty of each and every citizen in the name of security is the slow dismantling of standards of the rule 
of law and permanent encroachments on fundamental rights: “it is the authoritarian police state that does not regard 
its citizen as a subject of freedom but as a potential threat, as a ‘wolf amongst wolves’, who has to be tamed by a 
superior Leviathan. You find this political need in the constitutional disguise of a ‘fundamental right to security’”32 of 
the people.  
And indeed, there are many discussions about the necessity of having this ‘fundamental right to security’. Thus, 
Borgs-Maciejewski lists the so-called “citizen demand for security”33 as an unwritten fundamental right.34 But what are 
we supposed to think about a new unwritten fundamental right that has never been articulated by the Constitutional 
Court or the Constitutional Legislative?35Instead, the Constitutional Court has even ruled in several major decisions 
in favour of the liberal fundamental rights of the citizens and has emphasised the importance of limiting the powers 
of the agencies to intrude into each citizen’s life. But as Gusy puts it, “state tasks are no longer defined solely by the 
rule of law, but also democratically. Thus, the need for security and the aspirations of the people can hardly be 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
29 Joachim Lampe, “Die Schwierigkeiten mit der Rechtfertigung nachrichtendienstlicher Tätigkeit” (2015) 7 NStZ 361 at 363. 
30 “Sicherheit ist Verfassungsvoraussetzung. Freiheit ist Verfassungsinhalt.” (Translation mine). Gusy, Christoph, Grundrechte und 
Verfassungsschutz (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011) at 1 [Gusy, “Grundrechte“]. 
31 Ibid. 
32 “Es ist der autoritäre Polizeistaat, der den Bürger nicht als Subjekt der Freiheit, sondern als potentielle Gefahr, als ‚Wolf unter Wölfen‘ 
ansieht, der durch einen übermächtigen Leviathan gebändigt werden muss. Verfassungsrechtlich verkleidet wird dieses politische 
Bedürfnis als ‘Grundrecht auf Sicherheit‘.” (Translation mine). Peter-Alexis Albrecht, “Die Bedrohung der dritten Gewalt durch irrationale 
Sicherheitspolitik” (1998) DRiZ 329, cited in Fredrik Roggan, Handbuch zum Recht der Inneren Sicherheit (Bonn: Pahl-Rugenstein, 2003). 
33 “Bürgeranspruch auf Sicherheit.” (Translation mine).  
34 Hermann Borgs-Maciejewski, “Vertrauensbildung durch Kontrolle der Polizei und der Geheimdienste” (2006) 2 ZRP 41 at 43. 
35 In 2016, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in a judgement regarding the Directive on the Retention of Data, mentioned in passing a 
fundamental right to security by referring to Art. 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR). It remains, 
however, unclear whether the ECJ thereby wanted to give "security" in Art. 6 CFR an independent meaning and interpretation and thus to 
refer to it as a seperate fundamental right. This would indeed be problematic as it would contradict the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regarding Art. 5 (1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) notwithstanding the existence 
of a so-called “convergence clause” (Konvergenzklausel) in Art. 52 (3) (1) CFR. Indeed, the ECtHR has so far not given the notion of 
security in Art. 5 ECHR a seperate and independent interpretation from the notion of “freedom” in the same article. Security in the context 
of Art. 5 ECHR is “not to be understood in the sense of protection by but only against the state”. Therefore, no state may rely on the 
notion of security in the context of Art. 5 ECHR to encroach upon fundamental rights of the ECHR. (Sebastian Leuschner, “EuGH und 
Vorratsdatenspeicherung: Erfindet Europa ein Unionsgrundrecht auf Sicherheit?” (2016) EuR 431 at 433 (Leuschner's emphasis), referring 
to ECtHR, Altun v Turkey, 24561/94, 01 June 2004 at para 57 and ECtHR, Nikolaishvili v Georgia, 37048/04, RJD 2009, 13 January 2009).  
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ignored in the competition of ideas and parties.”36 This, however, is particularly dangerous when the “tasks of the 
state follow the logic of risk management and security thinking which tends to be indefinitely expansive. The consti-
tutional starting point is thereby left behind.”37Instead of focusing on citizens as possible threats to security, there is 
good reason, as Singer argues, for acting on an assumption that “citizens are loyal to the Constitution”, as the “rela-
tionship between citizens and the state in a state governed by the rule of law is based on mutual trust.”38 Thus, he 
concludes that one should not accept that intelligence services—because of the “tense relationship between liberty 
and security” — “are partially not controllable”.39 Instead, since those agencies work in secrecy, it is even more im-
portant to have an effective control in place.40 In order to be able to elaborate on the control mechanisms that the 
German laws provide for, it is important to know what kind of agencies need to be checked and controlled.  
2. German Intelligence Agencies 
The German intelligence services are considered to be, inter alia, a “manifestation of the basic decision of the Basic 
Law for a well-fortified democracy.”41 The intelligence architecture in Germany is called an “intelligence triad“42, since 
there are three kinds of agencies: the Federal Intelligence Service (“BND”: “Bundesnachrichtendienst”), the Federal 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (“BfV”: “Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz”) and the Military Counter-
intelligence Service (“MAD”: “Amt für den Militärischen Abschirmdienst”).  
It is noticeable that the German police or law enforcement agencies are not part of this triad. In Germany, the police 
have to be a separate agency (organisational separation) and are not supposed to take any action in intelligence 
matters, whereas the intelligence agencies do not have coercive powers like the police (functional separation) (Prin-
ciple of Separation/ Trennungsgebot). The principle is based on the so-called “Police Letter” of 1949, when the Allies 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
36 “Staatsaufgaben werden nicht mehr allein rechtsstaatlich, sondern auch demokratisch bestimmt. Sicherheitsbedürfnisse und -ansprüche 
der Menschen können im demokratischen Wettbewerb von Ideen und Parteien kaum ignoriert werden.” (Translation mine). Gusy, 
“Grundrechte“, supra note 30 at 6.   
37 “[…] vielmehr folgen die Staatsaufgaben der tendenziell unbegrenzt expansiven Logik von Risiko- und Sicherheitsdenken. Der 
rechtsstaatliche Ausgangspunkt ist damit verlassen.” (Translation mine). Ibid. 
38 “[…] geht der demokratische Rechtsstaat im Verhältnis Bürger-Staat-Beziehung von wechselseitigem Vertrauen aus. Es gilt 
grundsätzlich die Verfassungstreue des Bürgers.” (Translation mine). 
 Jens Singer, Praxiskommentar zum Gesetz über die parlamentarische Kontrolle nachrichtendienstlicher Tätigkeit des Bundes: 
Kontrollgremiumgesetz - PKGrG (Berlin/ Heidelberg: Springer, 2015) at 9. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid.   
41 Lampe, supra note 29 at 363; the notion of the “well-fortified democracy” (wehrhafte Demokratie) describes one of the basic principles 
of the German Basic Law. Its main objective is the protection of the democratic principle in Germany (learning from past experiences in 
the Weimar Republic). The Constitutional Court calls it a “basic constitutional decision” (Grundentscheidung der Verfassung). Articles that 
describe the well-fortified democracy more closely are for example the eternity clause in Art. 79 III or the right of the Constitutional Court 
to prohibit a political party if its main objective is to end the democratic order in Germany (Art 21 II). Other Articles that are part of this 
basic decision of the Basic Law are the following: Art. 2 I, Art. 9 II, Art. 18, Art. 20 IV, Art. 21 II, Art. 79 III, Art. 91, Art. 98 II of the Basic Law. 
(Radikalenbeschluss, BVerfGE 39, 334). 
42 Bernadette Droste, Handbuch des Verfassungsschutzrechts (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 2007) at 27. 
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allowed for the establishment of a national security agency that was, however, forbidden to have police powers.43 
Thereby, the concentration of power in one agency was to be prevented—having learned from the abuse of power 
in the Third Reich.  
After the Census Judgement of the Constitutional Court44, the legitimacy of data and information exchanges of the 
security agencies and the police was an area of debate before the requirements for those collaborations were man-
dated in the different acts of Parliament on the intelligence services.45 The compliance with the so-called principle of 
purpose limitation (Grundsatz der Zweckbindung) has always to be ensured46: “personal data should be collected 
and processed for specified and explicit purposes and their subsequent use may only be authorised in accordance 
with very strict conditions.”47 
Therefore, although it is disputed whether the principle of separation of intelligence and police is of a constitutional 
nature and thus not changeable by sub-constitutional law, the principle has prevailed in the 21st century and is now 
being mandated in §2 I 2 of the Act on the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (“BVerfSch Act”), § 1 I 2 of the 
Act on the Federal Intelligence Service (“BND Act”) and in § 1 IV of the Act on the Military Counterintelligence 
Service (“MAD Act”). However, due to several joint co-operations of different intelligence services (see below), it is 
more than ever doubtful whether the principle of separation has been complied with in the last twenty years and 
whether it will also prevail in the face of the global threats of terror and their implications for the German security 
architecture. There are increasingly voices48 that also emphasise the importance of a strict distribution of tasks and 
of an arrangement of competences regarding the powers of the police and the intelligence agencies and their in-
creasing cooperation. The massive problems of an unorganised division of authority and a non-efficient distribution 
of tasks became particularly apparent in the review of the NSU49-scandal by a Committee of Inquiry.50 In the following, 
I will give a short overview of the major federal intelligence services.  
a) Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, “BND”) 
The BND is the oldest German intelligence agency. Its roots were the so-called “Organisation Gehlen” (Gehlen Or-
ganisation), an intelligence service that worked under American responsibility from 1946 onwards and had the task 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
43 Kay Nehm, “Das nachrichtendienstliche Trennungsgebot und die neue Sicherheitsarchitektur” (2004) NJW 3289.  
44 Volkszählung, BVerfGE 65, 1 [Volkszählung]. 
45 Nehm, supra note 43.  
46 Volkszählung, supra note 44.   
47 European Communities, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the draft Council Regulation (EC) laying down the 
form of the laissez-passer to be issued to members and servants of the institutions (2006/C 313/13). 
48 E.g. Christoph Gusy, “Reform der Sicherheitsbehörden” (2012) 8 ZRP 230 [Gusy, “Sicherheitsbehörden”]. 
49 Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU) – a right wing trio committing several murders and arson attacks between 1999 and 2007.  
50 Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, 2. Untersuchungsausschuss, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht, 17th Parl, BT-Drucksache 17/14600 (22 
August 2013) [BT-Drucksache 17/14600].  
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of delivering Ostaufklärung (espionage against the Eastern bloc).51 The BND was established in 1955 (by a secret 
cabinet decision) and took over the Gehlen Organisation. Until 1990, the tasks, rights and powers of the BND were 
only “laid down in the form of service instructions52”.53 In 1990, the Bundestag adopted the Federal Intelligence 
Service Act, which has since then been reformed several times. The BND is mostly considered as a higher federal 
authority, for which the division of the Federal Chancellery is responsible.  
According to § 1 II 1 of the BND Act, the BND “shall collect and analyse information required for obtaining foreign 
intelligence, which is of importance for the foreign and security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany.” Although 
the BND is thus to be considered a foreign intelligence service, in certain instances it can also be active in collecting 
and analysing internal security data.54 It is furthermore the responsible agency in Germany in the field of organised 
crimes (for intelligence, not law enforcement); however, its main focus is now on international terrorism.55 After the 
formal enactment of the BND Act, the rights of the BND were increased massively in 2002 through the “Terroris-
musbekämpfungsgesetz” (“Law against Terrorism”), enacted inter alia as a response to the attacks on the Twin 
Towers in 2001. It is, however, not only the pure existence of the rights and powers of the BND that worry many 
commentators. They consider it especially problematic that the “law is written so broadly that it offers very little 
concrete guidance regarding the legal limits of surveillance programs.”56 In recent times, the BND has come under 
public criticism several times, not only for scandals concerning the Iraq war (which triggered the establishment of a 
committee of inquiry)57, but also for its high amount of data exchanges with the NSA58 that I will describe in more 
detail below.   
In 2016, despite the scandals, and against major opposition from the parliamentary groups Die Linke (Left Party) and 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Green Party) as well as civil rights advocates, etc., the Bundestag adopted a new law on the 
BND59 with increased powers (“Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes”). 
Netzpolitik.org concluded that the effect of the law is that “everything that had been exposed as illegal by Snowden 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
51 Hansalek, supra note 14 at 16; However, spying went well beyond Ostaufklärung: “According to the German journal DER SPIEGEL 
(15/2017), which refers to secret files of the Federal Government and the BND, the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, in 1960, ordered 
the BND under its head Gehlen to spy upon the SPD party executive and some of the leading Social Democrats, not the least the later 
chancellor Willy Brandt.” (Translation mine). 
52 No formal legal norms without any external effects.  
53 Ibid at 19. “Dienstanweisungen.”  
54 “Tätigkeiten vom Staatsgebiet der Bundesrepublik oder eine Zusammenarbeit mit Personen im Inland können eine Zuständigkeit des 
BND im Innern begründen.” (Translation mine). 
 Droste, supra note 42 at 29.   
55 Singer, supra note 38 at 48 49.  
56 Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, New America Foundation & Open Technology Institute, “Law and Policy in Internet Surveillance 
Programs: United States, Great Britain and Germany” (September 2013) 25/13 at 10 [Stiftung Neue Verantwortung].  
57 E.g.: Katharina Schuler, “Irakkrieg: Wie weit ging die deutsche Hilfe?”, Die Zeit (18 December 2008), online: 
<www.zeit.de/online/2008/38/bnd-untersuchungsausschuss>. 
58 Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, supra note 56 at 13. 
59 Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, Federal Law Gazette I, 2016 at 3346. 
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and the Committee of Inquiry will now just be declared as legal”60. The BND may now monitor foreigners from Ger-
man territory who are communicating with people abroad. As Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (a former Minister of 
Justice) recalled, the government justified the discrimination against foreigners by stating that the BND/the state was 
not bound by the Basic Law in this case (and therefore fundamental rights such as Art. 10 that would not be applied 
to this case). In her view, this reasoning was intolerable since particularly Art. 10 of the Basic Law was not a funda-
mental right that applied only to Germans but rather a right of everyone. The law does furthermore not know any 
exceptions for foreign journalists; the surveillance of journalists could thus also constitute a serious encroachment 
upon the fundamental right to a free press.61 The Act and the bypassing of the application of Art. 10 and thus the G10 
Commission (see below) also contradicts a judgement of the Constitutional Court in 1999 that determined that, 
although “[t]he territorial scope of protection of telecommunications privacy is not restricted to the domestic terri-
tory […], Article 10 of the Basic Law is also applicable if an act of telecommunication that takes place abroad is, due 
to the fact that it is screened and evaluated on the domestic territory, sufficiently linked with domestic action of the 
state.”62  
The reasons and thus the legal justifications for surveillance measures and therefore for the interference with funda-
mental rights are even broader now, notably “to detect early any possible dangers for the internal or external security 
of the Federal Republic of Germany and to be able to counter them [or] to preserve the Federal Republic of Ger-
many’s ability to act”.63 The law only makes some exceptions for, for example, EU citizens. It furthermore explicitly 
legitimises the transferral of metadata to the NSA (see § 15 of the Act) and drastically increases the overall amount of 
tapped data by legitimising its collection. As a safeguard, the Federal Chancellery must authorize any surveillance that 
is conducted from national territory, and also make sure that the responsibility is clearly assigned to the Ministry. 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
60 Andre Meister, “Das neue BND-Gesetz: Alles, was der BND macht, wird einfach legalisiert. Und sogar noch ausgeweitet.”, netzpolitik.org 
(30 June 2016), online: <https://netzpolitik.org/2016/das-neue-bnd-gesetz-alles-was-der-bnd-macht-wird-einfach-legalisiert-und-sogar-
noch-ausgeweitet>.  
61 Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, “Stoppt das BND-Gesetz!”, Handelsblatt (21 October 2016), online: 
<www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/ueberwachung-stoppt-das-bnd-gesetz/14716120.html>. 
62Telekommunikationsüberwachung I, BVerfGE 100, 313 at headnote 2. English translation, online: 
<www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/1999/07/rs19990714_1bvr222694en.html> 
63 “[…] frühzeitig Gefahren für die innere oder äußere Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland erkennen und diesen begegnen zu 
können, [oder] die Handlungsfähigkeit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu wahren.” (Translation mine). § 6 I Gesetz zur Ausland-
Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, supra note 59. 
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b) Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst, “MAD”) 
The MAD is part of the Federal Armed Forces, “organizationally as well as functionally. […] It was established in 1956 
by an organisational Act of the Minister of Defence within the framework of his constitutional capacities as com-
mander-in-chief.”64 Therefore, he is responsible for the MAD. The MAD is responsible for the collection and analysis 
of information about extremism, terrorism, espionage and counterintelligence in the field of defence. Furthermore, 
the MAD “takes part in the deployments abroad” to monitor and analyse information about the security of the Ger-
man Federal Armed Forces abroad65 (“assessment of security situations”66). It is, however, not responsible for military 
reconnaissance since this is one of the BND’s task fields.67  
A formal Act (MAD Act) was only enacted in 1990. After the census judgement of the Constitutional Court in 1983 
determining that each interference with the right to informational self-determination needed a legal basis in formal 
law and after a scandal involving illegal activities by the MAD in the 1970s, it had become apparent that a formal Act 
was necessary.68 The rights of the MAD were expanded significantly by the Law Against Terrorism in 2002. The MAD 
has a special obligation to report to the German Parliamentary Control Panel (see § 14 VII MAD Act). Before it starts 
a strategic mission abroad it has to inform the Panel.  
c) Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, “BfV”) 
The BfV was established in 1950 by the Act regulating the “Cooperation between the Federation and the Federal 
States in Matters Relating to the Protection of the Constitution and on the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution” (“BVerfSch Act”). The BfV is subject to the Ministry of the Interior (§ 2 I 2 BVerfSch Act). The BfV is 
responsible for the collection and analysis of internal security data that point to a danger or threat to the free and 
democratic order, the security and thus to the existence of the state itself (see § 3 BVerfSchG). The BfV may also be 
active abroad.69 It is also responsible for “intelligence activities carried out on behalf of a foreign power (counter-
intelligence)” as well as “contribut[ing] to counter-sabotage and personnel/physical security.”70 Its rights were also 
increased by the Law against Terrorism in 2002. “The BfV is now also requested to gather and analyse information 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
64 “[…] ist ein organisatorischer und funktionaler Bestandteil der Bundeswehr und wurde im Jahr 1956 durch einen Organisationsakt des 
Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung im Rahmen der verfassungsrechtlichen Befehls-und Kommandogewalt [ …] eingerichtet.” 
(Translation mine). Hansalek, supra note 14 at 26.  
65 Germany, Military Counterintelligence Service, online: MAD 
<www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/kdoskb/start/weitdstst/mad/ueberuns/>.  
66 Singer, supra note 38 at 45.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Thomas Siems, “Aufgaben eines militärischen Nachrichtendienstes” (2012) DÖV 425 at 426,427. 
69 Droste, supra note 42 at 29.  
70 Germany, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Tasks, online: Bundesverfassungsschutz <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/about-
the-bfv/tasks/what-exactly-are-the-tasks-of-the-domestic-intelligence-services>. 
 
 14
on efforts directed against the idea of international understanding, in particular the peaceful co-existence of peo-
ples.”71 Furthermore, the BfV is now allowed to request information from telecommunication and financial as well as 
aviation companies.  
d) GETZ, GTAZ, GIZ  
The Joint Centre for Countering Extremism and Terrorism (Gemeinsames Extremismus- und Terrorismusabwehr-
zentrum, “GETZ“), the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum, “GTAZ”) and 
the Joint Internet Centre (Gemeinsames Internetzentrum, “GIZ”) were all established in the years 2004-2012 to en-
sure better and simplified ways of coordination and co-operation of the German intelligence agencies.  
The GETZ was established in 2012 “for countering right-wing extremism/terrorism, left-wing extremism/terrorism, 
extremism/terrorism of foreigners and espionage/proliferation”72, after the major scandal of the NSU terror group 
had disclosed significant mistakes of the (federal states’) security agencies.73 The GTAZ was established in 2004 as a 
response to fundamentalist Islamist terror attacks. It is “not an autonomous authority but a joint co-operation and 
communication platform used by 40 internal security agencies.”74 The GIZ was established in 2007; it involves the 
three major intelligence agencies in Germany, as well as the Office of the Federal Public Prosecutor General and the 
Federal Criminal Police Office. Its main task is the surveillance of websites with extremist Islamist content.75  
These cooperation centres are special in the German security architecture in that the different intelligence services 
(on federal and federal state level) are cooperating and coordinating work with the German police force despite the 
principle of separation in those special areas of security threats. All kinds of departments have been part of this 
cooperation so far. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) as 
well as the Central Office of the German Customs Investigation Service (Generalzolldirektion) have, for example, 
already been part of the cooperation system within the GETZ.76 The aim of the Centres is to gather expertise and 
knowledge and to increase and improve the information sharing process of the different authorities. None of the 
three joint Centres is based on legislation specific to them but rather “[t]he cooperation between the authorities 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
71 “Nunmehr gehört es auch zu den Aufgaben des BfV, Informationen über Bestrebungen zu sammeln und auszuwerten, die gegen den 
Gedanken der Völkerverständigung […] und insbesondere gegen das friedliche Zusammenleben der Völker […] gerichtet sind.” 
(Translation mine). Hansalek, supra note 14 at 25. 
72 Germany, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, About the GETZ, online: Bundesverfassungsschutz 
<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/about-the-bfv/getz-en>. 
73 Michael Kutscher, “Die Antinomie des Verfassungsschutzes” (2013) NVwZ 324 at 325. 
74 Germany, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, About the GTAZ, online: Bundesverfassungsschutz < 
<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/fields-of-work/islamism-and-islamist-terrorism/gtaz-en>>.  
75 Germany, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, online: Bundesverfassungsschutz <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en>.  
76 Germany, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, About the GETZ, online: Bundesverfassungsschutz 
<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/about-the-bfv/getz-en>. 
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involved is based on the rules applicable to the individual authorities governing the issuing and the request for infor-
mation (rules of transmission/ transfer).”77 Formal acts have so far supposedly not been considered necessary because 
“the organisational separation of the actors and the existing rules regarding the transfer of information should be 
maintained and no binding decisions be taken by the Centres themselves.”78 Thus, to give just an example, according 
to the BfV website, the GTAZ, “did not require a new legal basis, because no agency was given additional competences 
or had to share sovereignty.”79 Such a view is, however, highly disputable and has been the subject of many constitu-
tional debates.80 Its detailed description would, however, unfortunately go beyond the scope of this thesis. Other 
cooperation initiatives include the Intelligence Information and Analysis Unit for Right-Wing Extremism/Terrorism 
(Nachrichtendienstliche Informations- und Analysestelle für Rechtsextremismus/-terrorismus, “NIAS-R”), and the 
Police Information and Analysis Unit for Right-Wing Extremism/Terrorism (Polizeiliche Informations- und Anal-
ysestelle für Rechtsextremismus/-terrorismus, “PIAS-R”).81 
Furthermore, in 2006, as a reaction to the World Trade Centre terror attacks, the Parliament adopted a law on the 
establishment of shared data of the police and the intelligence agencies (Antiterrordateigesetz, “ATD Act”) to “inten-
sify and expedite the information sharing in the domain of international counterterrorism”.82 The Constitutional 
Court had to rule on the legitimacy of this law. It did, however, surprise by not addressing the problem of the possible 
interference with the principle of separation. Instead, in 2013, it ruled on an “informational principle of separation”83 
by deciding: 
“From the fundamental right to informational self-determination follows a principle of separation of infor-
mation (informationelles Trennungsprinzip). Under this principle, data may generally not be exchanged be-
tween the intelligence services and the police. […] Transfers of data between the intelligence services and 
the police for use in potential operational actions must therefore normally serve a particularly important public 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
77 “Die Zusammenarbeit der beteiligten Behörden stützt sich auf die für die einzelnen Behörden jeweils geltenden Vorschriften, die die 
Erteilung von und das Ersuchen um Auskünfte regeln (Übermittlungsvorschriften).” (Translation mine). Germany, Ministry of Justice/ 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. Bericht der Regierungskommission zur Überprüfung der Sicherheitsgesetzgebung in Deutschland, by Mathias 
Bäcker, et al (28 August 2013) at 168, online: <https://publikationen.uni-
tuebingen.de/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10900/63016/regierungskommission-sicherheitsgesetzgebung.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, 
cited in Matthias Dombert & Kaya Räuker, “Am Beispiel der deutschen Sicherheitsarchitektur: Zum Grundrechtsschutz durch 
Organisation” (2014) DÖV 414 at 415. 
78 Ibid at 415. 
79 Germany, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, About the GTAZ, online: Bundesverfassungsschutz  
<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/fields-of-work/islamism-and-islamist-terrorism/gtaz-en>.  
80 No case has yet been brought before the Constitutional Court by any political party (that would be authorised to do so in the court 
proceedings between governmental bodies–Organstreitverfahren).  
81 Germany, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, About the BfV, online: Bundesverfassungsschutz 
<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/about-the-bfv/getz-en>. 
82 Clemens Arzt, “Antiterrordatei verfassungsgemäß – Trennungsgebot tot?” (2013) NVwZ 1328 at 1329. 
83 Ibid.  
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interest which justifies the access to information under the laxer requirements that apply to the intelligence 
services.”84 
 
The National Cyberdefence Centre (Nationales Cyber-Abwehrzentrum, “NCAZ”) was established in 2011 to improve 
the cooperation between different federal authorities including the German intelligence agencies to deal with in-
creasing cybercrimes. Its aims are “quick and uncomplicated ways of information sharing about security gaps in hard-
ware and software, abstract forms of attacks and images of perpetrators as well as other risks and threats for the 
information and communication technology or the integrity and confidentiality of data.”85 Typical for a purely infor-
mational coordination program, the NCAZ does not have any competences or rights of its own and is not considered 
a separate authority. Germany thus has three major intelligence services on the Federal level, which were given more 
and more powers since the terror attacks in 2001. Several joint cooperation centres have emerged and raise issues 
with respect to the principle of separation.  
3. Control Mechanisms  
In general, the function of a control mechanism can have two different starting points: firstly, the control can take 
the function of reviewing or verifying certain activities when those activities of legal relevance are already completed 
(review/“Nachprüfung”). Secondly, the executed control may also accompany the activities; thus, the control is being 
executed simultaneously with the activity. It may then have influence on the activity and its outcome (oversight/ 
“Überwachung”); therefore, it may either be simply accompanying or alternatively trend-setting. Hansalek also men-
tions a factor beyond temporality and the form of control that needs to be considered as part of the control: the 
controlling body must have the capability to impose sanctions on the controlled actor. In his view, control is “working 
in a relationship of superiority and subordination with regards to the display of power”86, and the possibility of im-
posing sanctions is a required element of such an assertion of this power. Additionally, a control body or mechanism 
might concentrate on evaluating the efficiency and/or the lawfulness of certain activities.87 
In Germany, the intelligence services are under the shared control of the Executive itself, the Parliament as well as 
the Judiciary. In the following, I will give a very short and broad overview of the different control mechanisms that 
are in place in Germany. It will, unfortunately, not be possible to go into detail, but in order to understand the role 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
84 Antiterrordatei, BVerfGE 133, 277 at 123, English version online: 
Bundesverfassungsgericht<https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2013/04/rs20130424_1bvr121507
en.html> [Antiterrordatei]. 
85 “Erklärtes Ziel der Zusammenarbeit im NCAZ ist der zügige und unkomplizierte Informationsaustauch über Sicherheitslücken in Hard- 
und Software, abstrakte Angriffsformen und Täterbilder sowie sonstige Risiken und Gefahren für die IKT oder die Integrität und 
Vertraulichkeit von Daten.” (Translation mine). Tobias Linke, “Rechtsfragen der Einrichtung und des Betriebs eines Nationalen Cyber-
Abwehrzentrums als informelle institutionalisierte Sicherheitskooperation” (2015) 4 DÖV 128 at 129.   
86 “Das Wirken in einem Über-und Unterordnungsverhältnis zur Entfaltung von Macht.” (Translation mine). Hansalek, supra note 14.  
87 Singer, supra note 38 at 35.  
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of parliamentary control in the German system of checks and balances, one should understand the basic framework 
of which it is a part.  
a) Different Mechanisms of Executive Control 
Legal, Administrative and Subject-specific Supervision88 
According to Singer, “the major part of the control activity is being performed by the Executive”89, not only through 
the different kinds of supervision by the respective responsible federal authorities (the Ministries, the Federal Chan-
cellery), but also by the Federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof) and the Federal Commissioner for Data Protec-
tion and Freedom of Information (Bundesbeauftragte(r) für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit) (see 
below).90 In general, the intelligence services are under administrative und subject-specific supervision by their 
higher-ranking authorities, just like every other authority in Germany. In the case of the intelligence services, the 
higher-ranking authority is the respective minister who has the so-called “Ressortkompetenz” over the respective 
service.  
Art 65 of the Basic Law reads as follows:  
“The Federal Chancellor shall determine and be responsible for the general guidelines of policy [Richtlinienkompetenz]. Within 
these limits each Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his department independently and on his own responsibility 
[Ressortkompetenz] [...].”91 
The effectiveness is, however, limited since the executive control is indeed very general. Specific cases and questions 
are only part of the control if “according to the assessment of the secret agencies these [individual issues] have […] 
political impact. Therefore, the control depends on the respective ‘willingness’ of the services to ‘present such is-
sues’.”92Furthermore, even the former President of the BND especially criticized the fact that the Federal Chancellery 
was responsible for the BND, since “[t]he administrative and technical supervision in the Federal Chancellery (Divi-
sion 6) consists mainly of displaced or seconded members of the Federal Intelligence Service.”93 This may indeed 
seem problematic in terms of a possible conflict of interest.  
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
88 Dienst- und Fachaufsicht/Rechtsaufsicht.  
89 “Der weit überwiegende Teil der Kontrolltätigkeit wird jedoch durch die Exekutive geleistet.” (Translation mine). Singer, supra note 38 
at 10.  
90 Ibid.  
91 Art. 65 GG; English translation online: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0210>.  
92 “Problematischerweise sind allerdings Einzelfragen, soweit sie nach eigener Einschätzung der geheimen 
Dienste keine politischen Auswirkungen haben, hiervon nicht erfasst. Mithin hängt die Kontrolle von 
der jeweiligen ‘Vorlagewilligkeit‘ der Dienste ab.” (Translation mine). Niclas-Frederic Weisser, “Der Richtervorbehalt im 
Nachrichtendienstrecht” (2014) 19 DÖV 831. 
93 “[…] die Dienst- und Fachaufsicht im Bundeskanzleramt (Abteilung 6) überwiegend aus versetzten oder abgeordneten Angehörigen 
des Bundesnachrichtendienstes bestünde.” (Translation mine). Reiko Pinkert & Ronen Steinke, “Früherer BND-Chef kritisiert 
Kontrollsystem des deutschen Geheimdiensts”, Süddeutsche Zeitung (22 September 2016), online: 
<www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundesnachrichtendienst-angriff-auf-die-lauscher-1.3174459>. 
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Federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof) 
The Federal Audit Office is responsible for the control of the budget management of the intelligence services, thus 
the control of the annual accounts of the intelligence services. The Federal Audit Office reports to the Parliamentary 
Control Panel, the Parliamentary Trust Body, the Federal Chancellery and the Ministry of Finance. The Federal Audit 
Office is not subject to a control by any other authority of the Executive.  
Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Bundesbeauftragte(r) für den 
Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit)  
The Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information is responsible for the assurance that the 
state authorities are working in line with legislative provisions on data protection. The Commissioner is elected by 
the Bundestag on a proposal of the government. Until 2016, he/she was organisationally considered to be part of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and was therefore also subject of Executive control. Now, he/she is an independent su-
preme Federal Authority. The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) had decided in 2010 that the independence of the 
Data Commissioner could not be safeguarded if the position was being subjected to control by higher Executive 
authorities.94 The Commissioner is now solely subject to parliamentary control by the Bundestag.95 The Commis-
sioner has repeatedly spoken out against data infringements and illegal activities of the intelligence agencies, most 
recently in 2016, when she (current Commissioner Andrea Voßhoff) complained that the “BND collected and sys-
tematically continued to use personal data without a legal basis”.96 Thereby, she referred to the practice of using so-
called “lists of selectors”, a topic that I will come back to below. Another example of the Commissioner’s role of not 
only taking care of the necessary data protection but also of rousing public awareness of the general topic of national 
security was her annual report in 2015, in which she expressed her serious concerns about the intelligence services: 
“I would also like to emphasise once again that the system of ‘checks and balances’ in the area of the intelligence services has run 
into massive difficulties. In particular since 2001, the tasks and powers of the security authorities as well as their personnel and 
material resources have been considerably expanded, cross-border cooperation between police forces and intelligence services have 
been intensified nationally and internationally, centralized large databases have been set up, and a new security structure has been 
created. … There has been no corresponding development within the control bodies, which means that there are also serious 
legislative deficits which must be removed as quickly as possible in the interest of the citizens.”97 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
94 European Commission v Germany, C-518/07 [2010] ECR-I 1885 (09 March 2010) [European Commission v. Germany]. 
95 Beauftragter für die Nachrichtendienste, online:<https://www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/Home/home_node.html>.  
96 Antonius Kempmann, Reiko Pinkert & Jan Lukas Strozyk, “‘Systematische Gesetzesverstöße’ des BND”, Tagesschau.de (09 September 
2016), online: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bnd-315.html>. 
97 “ Ich möchte aber auch an dieser Stelle noch einmal betonen, dass das System der „Checks and Balances“ im Bereich der 
Nachrichtendienste in eine massive Schieflage geraten ist. So sind, insbesondere seit dem Jahr 2001, die Aufgaben und Befugnisse der 
Sicherheitsbehörden sowie deren Personal- und Sachmittel erheblich ausgebaut, die verbundübergreifende Zusammenarbeit von Polizeien 
und Nachrichtendiensten national und international intensiviert, zentrale Großdatenbanken errichtet und eine neue Sicherheitsstruktur 
geschaffen worden […] Auf Seiten der Kontrollorgane ist keine entsprechende Entwicklung erfolgt, d. h. auch insoweit bestehen 
gravierende gesetzgeberische Defizite, die im Interesse der Bürgerinnen und Bürger schnellstmöglich beseitigt werden müssen.“ 
(Translation mine). Anna Biselli, “Bundesdatenschutzbeauftragte fordert in Tätigkeitsbericht bessere Geheimdienstkontrolle und mehr 
Einfluss”, netzpolitik.org (17 June 2015), online: <https://netzpolitik.org/2015/bundesdatenschutzbeauftragte-fordert-in-
taetigkeitsbericht-bessere-geheimdienstkontrolle-und-mehr-einfluss/>. 
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In the leaked report of the Data Commissioner about the activities of the BND, she furthermore in particular empha-
sised that the BND had, contrary to law, heavily constrained control (for example, the control exercised by the Data 
Commissioner herself) and had been engaged in several severe illegalities and infringements of fundamental rights.98 
The Commissioner for the Federal Intelligence Services (Beauftragter für die Nachrichtendienste) 
The Commissioner for the Federal Intelligence Services takes the role of a so-called “coordinator” of the different 
intelligence agencies in Germany. The position was established in 1975, as a response to the Guillaume-scandal99 
and the non-efficient collaboration of the intelligence agencies. The Commissioner is chosen by the Chancellor and 
works in the Federal Chancellery as a Secretary of State. Currently, the Commissioner is the Vice-head of the Federal 
Chancellery. The Commissioner is not only responsible for an effective coordination and cooperation of the three 
Federal agencies; he is also required to support the Parliamentary Control Panel.100 He, furthermore, has “rights of 
information against the ministries and the intelligence services, the right to make proposals for cooperation, the right 
to participate in legislative acts concerning the intelligence services, the right to attend discussions at the executive 
level of the intelligence services, rights of information against the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of De-
fence.”101 According to Hirsch, the Commissioner should not be regarded as a separate control body though, since 
he does not have any particular control power other than respective authorities that exercise the administrative and 
subject-specific supervision of the agencies.102 
b) Parliamentary Control Mechanisms 
Parliamentary Claims to Information  
Art. 38 I 2 in conjunction with Art. 20 II 2 of the Basic Law confers upon the Parliamentarians the right to ask questions 
and an entitlement to information. The MPs are often not informed fully about the government’s activities to be able 
to legislate and control the Executive. Therefore, the Constitution confers upon them not only the right to ask the 
Executive questions but also stipulates the latter’s obligation to answer them. The Rules of Procedure of the German 
Bundestag regulate the rights and different kinds of possible questions more closely; it can, however, not limit the 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
98 Andre Meister, “Secret Report: German Federal Intelligence Service BND Violates Laws And Constitution By The Dozen”, netzpolitik.org 
(2 September 2016), online: <https://netzpolitik.org/2016/secret-report-german-federal-intelligence-service-bnd-violates-laws-by-the-
dozen/>. 
99 Hansalek, supra note 14 at 13; explanatory note: Guillaume was an intelligence agent for East Germany's secret service who had become 
West German chancellor Willy Brandt's secretary. The Guillaume affair caused Brandt’s political downfall. 
100 Germany, Bundesregierung, Chef des Bundeskanzleramts, online: Bundeskanzleramt 
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/element-chef-des-bundeskanzleramtes.html>. 
101 Germany, Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Deutschen Bundestags, “Bundesbeauftragte und Beauftragte der Bundesregierung” by Steffi 
Menzenbach; Jan Kersten & Arne Thomas (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 2008) at 15, online: 
<www.bundestag.de/blob/494258/ceda55b2693bdf42850ad8f9bfcf9a4a/bundesbeauftragte-data.pdf>. 
102 Alexander Hirsch, Die Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste- Vergleichende Bestandsaufnahme, Praxis und Reform (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1996) at 131. 
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rights of the MPs or increase the government’s obligations in a legally binding way since it would then interfere with 
the constitutionally conferred rights and obligations.   
There are, also, certain limits to the MPs’ entitlement to information. These limitations were developed in several 
decisions by the Constitutional Court. The government must not, inter alia, disclose information that would interfere 
with someone’s fundamental rights or information that needs to stay confidential. However, “the refusal to answer a 
question at all should remain an exception.”103At the moment, the Constitutional Court is dealing with the scope of 
the parliamentarians’ right to ask questions and get them answered sufficiently. Bündnis90/Die Grünen claimed that 
the government was withholding important information and thus, was denying them their rights as parliamentari-
ans.104 
The questions of the MPs do have to fall into the scope of the government’s area of competence; the government 
does not have to answer questions that belong to the area of competence of another constitutional body, its core 
area of executive autonomy or that refer to private issues of individual members of the government. There are differ-
ent kinds of questions that may be asked with different kinds of requirements (for example the number of parlia-
mentarians asking etc.).105 Due to its limited space, this paper won’t go into detail on this point.  
Another right of the Bundestag (and even its parliamentary groups) that might be mentioned in connection with the 
right of questioning, since it simplifies the latter’s effectiveness, is the so-called “right to require presence” (Art 43 I 
of the Basic Law). The Bundestag and its committees can “demand the presence of any member of the govern-
ment”106, although they can actually only bring down the Chancellor (“constructive vote of no confidence”, Art. 67 of 
the Basic Law) and not the ministers (although they lose their positions as well if the Chancellor is brought down).107 
The Parliament can thus publicly question the government and criticise it for actions of the Executive (“parliamentary 
responsibility”108). Since the members of the government know about these possibilities, one might argue that the 
right to require presence has even some kind of pre-effect, possibly influencing the decisions of the government’s 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
103 Jürgen Lennartz & Günther Kiefer, “Parlamentarische Anfragen im Spannungsfeld von Regierungskontrolle und 
Geheimhaltungsinteressen” (2006) DÖV 185 at 186, referring to VerfGH NRW, OVGE NRW 43, 274 (275), SaarlVerfGH, LVerfGE 13, 303 
(308). 
104 The case is, however, not dealing with intelligence services. The case is furthermore about the so-called “Kleine Anfragen” (‘minor 
interpellations’) that may be asked by 5 % of the members of the Bundestag or a single parliamentary group and are answered in written 
form. “Große Anfragen” (‘major interpellations’) are debated in the Bundestag. 
105 A short summary of the different kind of questions can be found online: 
<https://www.bundestag.de/en/parliament/function/scrutiny/instruments_scrutiny/245710>. 
106 Berger, supra note 15 at 51.  
107 Hans Klein, “Zitier- und Fragerecht des Bundestages, Mehrheitsrecht“, Artikel 43 in Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig, Grundgesetz-
Kommentar, 78th edition, (Beck Online, March 2014) at paras 37,38. 
108 Ibid.  
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members. Furthermore, the right “expresses the far-reaching claim of the Bundestag on participation in the political 
decision-making process of the federal level.”109 
The Defence Committee, the Committee on Internal Affairs, the Budget Committee of the Bundestag 
(Verteidigungsausschuss, Innenausschuss, Haushaltsausschuss des Bundestages)  
The Bundestag establishes different committees in each legislative period. The Defence Committee is in fact a so-
called compulsory committee (Art. 45a of the Basic Law). The Committee on Internal Affairs is not compulsory, but 
has so far been established in every legislative period. With regards to the security services, the Defence Committee 
focuses on the work of the MAD, whereas the Committee on Internal Affairs concentrates on the BfV. The Parliamen-
tary Trust Body of the Budget Committee controls the overall budget of all three major federal intelligence services 
(see below).  
The Committees normally hold closed sessions (§ 69 of the Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag). They may, how-
ever, decide on making certain parts of their meetings public. Due to the big size of the Committees (the Defence 
Committee has 32 members at the moment110, the Committee on Internal Affairs 37111), their control function is quite 
limited. The Executive is mostly very reluctant to hand out confidential information to committees of that size. There-
fore, the Committees mostly rely on reports and briefings presented by the Executive.112 It is also problematic that 
there is no Committee that is truly responsible for the BND in that no mandatory committee has that role. Further-
more, each Committee is informed about one agency only113, thereby losing sight of the larger context. 
Committee on Petitions (Petitionsausschuss) 
The Committee on Petitions of the Bundestag is mandated in Art. 17 of the Basic Law: “Every person shall have the 
right individually or jointly with others to address written requests or complaints to competent authorities and to the 
legislature.”114 The Committee on Petitions then (monthly) issues a “recommendation for a decision” to the Bundes-
tag concerning the petitions.115 In the last years, the Committee on Petitions has dealt with different kinds of petitions 
concerning the intelligence agencies.116 The citizens may therefore “force” the Bundestag to deal with certain issues 
and therefore exercise some kind of control. In 2015, for example, someone submitted a petition to the Committee 
that—inter alia—the budget of the BND should be decreased to the amount it had in 2012, explaining that “the [BND] 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
109 “Ausdruck des weit ausgreifenden Anspruchs des Bundestages auf Teilhabe am politischen Entscheidungsprozess auf Bundesebene.” 
(Translation mine). Ibid at 36. 
110 Germany, Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuss, online: Verteidigungsausschuss <https://www.bundestag.de/verteidigung>. 
111 Germany, Bundestag, Innenausschuss, online: Innenausschuss <https://www.bundestag.de/inneres>. 
112 Hirsch, supra note 102 at 135. 
113 Ibid.  
114 Art. 17 GG, English translation online: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0210>. 
115 See § 112 of the Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag.  
116 E.g. Pet 1-18-06-299-014395. 
 
 22
had proved to be an authority which could not be controlled by parliamentary bodies.”117The Committee of Petitions 
referred in its recommendation for a decision to—inter alia—the important role and work of the Parliamentary Con-
trol Panel, the constitutional provision that ensured its existence as well as the coalition agreement of the governing 
parties to support and increase the parliamentary control of the intelligence services. It therefore recommended to 
terminate this petition.118 Nevertheless, the power of the Committee of Petitions regarding parliamentary control is 
rather limited, not least due to the fact that the government parties outvote the Committee as well as the Bundestag. 
Committee of Inquiry (Untersuchungsausschuss)  
According to Art. 44 of the Basic Law, the “Bundestag shall have the right, and on the motion of one quarter of its 
Members the duty, to establish a committee of inquiry, which shall take the requisite evidence at public hearings. 
The public may be excluded.”119 The right of the Parliament to establish a committee of inquiry is therefore a minority 
right. It is, however, not possible to establish a committee of inquiry in the field of defence. Instead, the Committee 
of Defence has to conduct an inquiry (on request of one-fourth of its members) and will then have the same powers 
as a committee of inquiry would have.120  
A committee of inquiry is “no longer dependent on foreign information alone, but has a right to self-information, i.e. 
it may gather its own information by way of proof-gathering.”121 A committee of inquiry may, for example, question 
witnesses122 and employees and civil servants of the Executive, which is obliged to give permission to these wit-
nesses123. The rules of criminal procedure shall apply with the necessary modifications to the taking of evidence. The 
Executive often refers to the core area of executive autonomy to circumvent certain testimonies.124 The committee 
may furthermore for example request all documents and files of the authorities concerning the inquiry matter.125 All 
the rights are, however, “subject to the constitutional limitations”126, for example, the “constitutional requirement of 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
117 “[…]habe sich als Behörde erwiesen, die sich nicht durch parlamentarische Gremien kontrollieren lasse.” (Translation mine). 
Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Petititionsausschuss, Pet 2-18-02-1101-018901 (17 December 2015). 
118 Ibid.  
119 Art. 44 GG, English translation online: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0210>. 
120 Art. 45 a II GG. 
121 “[…] nicht (mehr) alle in auf Fremdinformation durch die Regierung angewiesen, sondern hat ein Recht auf Selbstinformation, d.h. auf 
eigene Informationsbeschaffung im Wege der Beweiserhebung.” (Translation mine). Lars Brocker, “§ 31 Untersuchungsausschüsse” in 
Martin Morlok; Utz Schliesky & Dieter Wiefelspütz, eds, Parlamentsrecht. Praxishandbuch (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2016) at 960. 
122 See §§ 20-27 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Untersuchungsausschüsse des Deutschen Bundestages 
(Untersuchungsausschussgesetz), Federal Law Gazette I, 2001 at 1142, as last amended by Article 4 I of the Act of 5 Mai 2014, Federal Law 
Gazette I, 2004 at 718 [PUAG]. 
123 See § 23 PUAG. 
124 Hirsch, supra note 102 at 139. 
125 See § 18 PUAG.  
126 Untersuchungsausschuss Geheimgefängnisse, BVerfGE 124, 78 [Untersuchungsausschuss Geheimgefängnisse]. 
 
 23
the public interest in an investigation, [...], (the) core area of executive autonomy, [and] (the) protection of funda-
mental rights.”127 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court decided that the so-called “Chairmen-Procedure” was legitimate. If the gov-
ernment refuses to disclose certain information, the chairman and the vice-chairman of the Committee may request 
to see the information to decide whether the rejection was based on sufficient grounds.128 In the words of Gusy, 
parliamentary “commissions of inquiry have a dual character”, as both being “organs for fact-findings” and “quasi-
judicial powers.”129 Hirsch takes the view that the Committee is often being used for partisan reasons, for example by 
the Opposition, to gain an advantage in the public perception, instead of being focussed on fact-finding and the 
truth.130 So far, there have been thirteen Committees of Inquiries that have dealt with possible legal infringements by 
the intelligence agencies.131  
In Germany, the Parliamentary Control Panel is not a Committee of Inquiry. It does not have any of the compulsory 
powers of the Committee. A permanent Committee of Inquiry (as in a body like the Control Panel but with committee 
of inquiry powers) in matters of national security is often considered as “constitutionally inadmissible”, in particular 
with regard to the principle of the separation of powers.132 Thus, Singer argues against such a committee because it 
“would not only accompany the activities of the government permanently but it could also force it to disclose each 
individual step of its opinion-forming and decision-making.”133  
Parliamentary Trust Body (Vertrauensgremium) 
According to § 10a BHO, the Parliamentary Trust Body is a parliamentary panel that meets in secret and is responsible 
for the budget (plans) of the intelligence agencies. It is considered as a “parliamentary auxiliary body”134 that tries to 
achieve a balance between the principle of publicity (also for the budget of the agencies) and the need for secrecy 
when it comes to intelligence agencies. It therefore acts “on behalf” of the Bundestag. Its members are elected among 
the members of the Budget Committee for one legislative period. According to § 10a (2) (2) BHO, the Parliamentary 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
127 “[…] verfassungsrechtlichen Erfordernis des öffentlichen Interesses an einer Untersuchung, […], Kernbereich der exekutiven 
Eigenverantwortung, [und] Grundrechtsschutz.” (Translation mine). Brocker, supra note 121 at 964-968. 
128 Paul J Glauben, “Der Schutz staatlicher und privater Geheimnisse im Spannungsfeld parlamentarischer Untersuchungen” (2007) 4 DÖV 
149 at 154, referring to Flick-Untersuchungsausschuss, BVerfGE 67, 100 at 137 [Flick-Untersuchungsausschuss]. 
129 Gusy, “Sicherheitsbehörden”, supra note 48 at 230. 
130 Hirsch, supra note 102 at 140. 
131 Singer, supra note 38 at 56.  
132 Dietmar Peitsch & Christina Polzin, “Die parlamentarische Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste” (2000) 4 NVwZ 387 at 390. 
133 “[…] nicht nur die Tätigkeit der Bundesregierung stetig begleiten würde, sondern sie jederzeit zur Offenlegung der einzelnen Schritte 
ihrer Meinungs-und Willensbildung zwingen könnte.” (Translation mine). 
Singer, supra note 38 at 99. 
134 Ibid at 150. 
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Trust Body has the same rights as the Parliamentary Control Panel in its area of responsibility. The cooperation be-
tween the Parliamentary Trust Body and the Parliamentary Control Panel will be considered in more depth below 
(Reform of Act on the PKGr in 1999).  
The Art. 13 IV-Panel (Gremium nach Art. 13 VI GG) 
Art. 13 of the Basic Law protects the inviolability of the home. Since every wiretapping or surveillance at a person’s 
home constitutes an encroachment upon the fundamental right protected in Art. 13, there have been many consti-
tutional complaints before the Constitutional Court concerning Art. 13. In 1998, the Basic Law was amended, making 
it possible that the Bundestag passes laws that allow acoustical surveillance by technical means not only for the pur-
pose of general risk preventions but also for that of criminal prosecutions. Due to this highly controversial power 
that might lead to even more encroachments on fundamental rights, certain additional safeguards were necessary to 
make sure that this power was not expanded without reason. Therefore, paragraph six of Art 1 requires the govern-
ment to inform the Bundestag about the use of technical measures in an annual report. This report shall then be the 
basis of the work of an Art. 13 IV panel that is elected by the Bundestag and that executes the parliamentary control 
of these “wire-tapping reports”.135 The panel consists of nine members. 
c) Control sui generis  
The G10 Commission (G 10-Kommission)  
The G10 Commission is responsible for the approval of all encroachments upon Art. 10 of the Basic Law that protects 
the “privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications”136. The G10 Commission was established by the “Law 
on the restriction of the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications” (Gesetz zur Beschränkung des 
Brief-, Post- und Fenrmedegeheimnisses, “G10 Act”), an Act that legitimates certain restrictions to that fundamental 
right under certain circumstances.  
Here, it might be useful to give a short historical flashback: Art. 10 of the Basic Law protects “[t]he privacy of corre-
spondence, posts and telecommunications.”137 Up until 1968, only the intelligence services of the US, France and 
Great Britain were allowed to “wiretap phones, control post and read along the telegram circulation” in Germany 
because of what victorious powers had laid down in Art. 5 (2) (1) of the General Treaty, because of their duty to 
protect “the security of the Armed Forces who are based in the Federal Republic”.138 The powers were being upheld 
as long as Germany did not provide for adequate protection for the allied Armed Forces. In 1968, the constitutional 
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legislature therefore introduced the second paragraph of Art. 10 stating that the fundamental right may be restricted 
in order to “protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of the Federation or of a Federal 
State”139. However, “restrictions may be ordered only pursuant to a law, [… which] may provide that the person 
affected shall not be informed of the restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by a review of the 
case by agencies and auxiliary agencies appointed by the legislature.”140 The Parliament therefore introduced the G10 
Act. The G10 Commission is now responsible for “every aspect of the BND’s intrusion upon constitutionally protected 
telecommunications privacy, including the collection, analysis, use and transfer (to German and non-German enti-
ties) of personally-identifying telecommunications data.”141 It also investigates individual claims of citizens that their 
fundamental right of Art. 10 was violated by the Executive. Additionally, it “not only authorizes surveillance programs, 
but also controls [..] how these programs are implemented regarding the collection, storage and analysis of personal 
data.”142 
A few brief remarks concerning the members of the G10 Commission are in order: the chair of that Commission has 
to have the legal qualifications of a judge. The members of the G10 Commission are appointed by the Parliamentary 
Control Panel. In total, there are four permanent members and four deputy members. Despite the members being 
appointed by the Control Panel, the G10 Commission is—according to the prevailing opinion—not part of the parlia-
mentary control system but a control body sui generis.  
Art. 10 II of the Basic Law does not specify whether the “agencies and auxiliary agencies” that are reviewing the cases 
are part of the legislature, part of the executive or part of the judiciary. In 1970, the Constitutional Court ruled its 
famous “Abhörurteil” (“Judgement on Wiretapping”), deciding that, contrary to its former judgements, there were 
exceptions in which there was no possibility of judicial review for interferences into fundamental rights by the exec-
utive. Instead, the review should be done “by independent institutions within the functional area of the Executive 
that were appointed or formed by Parliament.”143 It seemed that the Constitutional Court did not see the G10 Com-
mission as part of the judiciary, but on the contrary as an organ in the “functional area of the Executive”.144 
The G10 Commission partly also acts very similarly to an administrative court “if it decides upon decisions of a Min-
ister, [upon] restrictive measures [... or] … the complaint of a citizen who believes that his fundamental right under 
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Article 10 is infringed.” However, it cannot “give the parties concerned a legal hearing.”145 Indeed, contrary to a court, 
it may go so far as to “abolish legally sound measures for reasons of expediency.”146 
As for the question of whether the Commission may be considered as part of the legislative and thus a parliamentary 
control body, one may take the systematic reading of the Basic Law and compare Art. 10 II to the article concerning 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces (Art. 45b). He is literally described as an “assist[ant to] the 
Bundestag in exercising parliamentary oversight.”147 One may therefore assume that the constitutional legislature 
would have used a similar wording as it did twelve years before if it had planned to constitutionally stipulate that the 
new authority should be considered as part of the parliamentary control architecture.148 Arndt also refers to the leg-
islative procedure of 1968 (see below), when, contrary to the last remarks, the parliamentarians were indeed in favour 
of a parliamentary review body.149 However, it seems as if according to the final version of Art. 10 II it “[...] is not 
permitted by constitutional law to entrust an organ of parliament with the scrutiny of surveillance measures which 
as such would at any time be conceptually at the disposition of the majority of the parliament.”150 
The G10 Commission does furthermore have certain “privileges” that distinguish it from parliamentary control bodies 
such as the Parliamentary Control Panel and the Committees of Inquiries. It may “originally [my emphasis] decide 
on the permissibility of G10-procedures (s 15 V G10-Act in conjunction with Art. 10 II 2 of the Basic Law)”.151 
Therefore, one might draw the conclusion in line with the prevailing view mentioned earlier that the G10 Commis-
sion should be considered as an organ sui generis: it does have certain features of each respective division of gov-
ernment but is also always subject to certain characteristics or limitations that are not typical of that division. 
Independent Body (Unabhängiges Gremium)  
The new independent body that was introduced in 2016 by the Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärungsgesetz will be 
described more closely below in the part on the Parliamentary Control Panel (Reform 2016).  
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d) Control by the Media and Civil Society  
The control of the intelligence agencies is not only being exercised by institutions of the state. The media and, 
thereby, the society also play a major role. Indeed, many scandals that involved the agencies have only come to light 
because of media reports. Even members of the Parliamentary Control Panel have often learned about certain activi-
ties of the agencies only because of media coverage. In addition to the leading newspapers and TV channels, also 
many new online media have started to report comprehensively on matters of national security and activities of the 
intelligence agencies. The website netzpolitik.org for example only concentrates on news regarding digital rights and 
transparency. In 2015, the head of the BfV even brought a charge of the dissemination of state secrets against two 
journalists of netzpolitik.org after the website had published some of the BfV’s internal information. The criminal 
charges later lead to a highly controversial debate on the rights of the free press, the role of the Minister of Justice 
concerning the charges and his role in the scandal and, not the least, even to the dismissal of the Federal Attorney 
General.152 
However, the assessment of the role of the public and, due to their interdependence, also that of the media as 
‘control bodies’ of the intelligence services and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the control mechanisms (not 
the least the parliamentary ones) greatly depend on the public view of the agencies in general. Since the agencies 
were for a long time not or, in the case of the BfV, only partly based on legislative statutes, Borgs-Maciejewski assumed 
that civil society was critical or suspicious of the agencies because of their activities “apparently” being executed in a 
“legal vacuum”.153 In 2006, he thus wrote that society was misjudging the intelligence agencies and that parliamentary 
control should focus on fostering society’s trust in the agencies. Furthermore, he proclaimed that the German intel-
ligence services were never, “not even remotely, associated with ‘Rainbow Warrior’, ‘Guantanamo’ or ‘rendition into 
countries of torture.”154 This was a claim that—in retrospect—almost appears absurd.  
In 2016, Miller, in his chapter on parliamentary control in Germany (in fact only about the G10 Commission) in a 
book called “Global Intelligence Oversight”, stated that the NSA scandal had only created a stir because “Snowden’s 
spark hit the dry tinder of a persistent, widespread, but mostly low-grade Anti-Americanism in Germany”.155 He then 
referred to the “Germans’ privacy fetish”156 before harshly criticising the (“unconstitutional”) G10 Commission and 
its effectiveness.157 What becomes apparent by these short examples is in fact that the role of the public in the control 
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system is not going unnoticed. Instead, it is a matter of great concern, not only—possibly—for the agencies them-
selves but also for academia.  
Rudner talks about the necessity of having a “security culture” in a society in order not to have the media only report 
“sensationalistically”.158 In an area of privacy-sensitive information where any information is only being reluctantly 
released to a small group of people, it is indeed difficult for the media to establish a security culture that would be 
necessary for a public which is meant to play an important role as a direct control ‘body’. Whether desirable or not, 
such a development is not being supported by the state institutions who see parliamentary control as the only option 
to allow the public (via electing their MPs) to have a say in the area of national security law.  
Nonetheless, despite the big difficulties for the media to report on the agencies, often being heavily dependent on 
whistle-blowers and leaks (as well as public reports that often bring light only partway into the darkness), the media 
and thus the public may still be considered a control ‘body’ in a functional sense. In every single case of a scandal 
concerning the agencies, either on a national level, like the NSU-scandal, or on an international one, like the NSA 
scandal, the perception of the citizens, which was vastly shaped by the media coverage, had an effect both as de facto 
control mechanism and an official control mechanisms. For example, it helped mobilising public pressure necessary 
to trigger the Bundestag to establish a parliamentary committee of inquiry. 
e) Judicial Control 
Judicial control is “to be strictly distinguished [from parliamentary control].”159 According to Gusy, parliamentary 
control is focussed on the “issues of the political majority” and whether the democratic requirements were upheld 
by the agencies. In contrast, the courts are “reviewing the rights of the affected minorities”, thus the rights of indi-
vidual citizens.160 Often, however, the citizens do not even know about the fact that their rights have been violated. 
Indeed, the obligation to maintain secrecy in the area of national security often prevents an effective judicial control. 
Since this thesis concentrates on the parliamentary control of intelligence agencies, I will not further elaborate on 
judicial control in general. It is, however, necessary to explain the role of the Constitutional Court in matters of 
national security law a bit more extensively because of its great influence on the development of notions and laws 
concerning the agencies as well as the control bodies (cf.: NSA-Committee of Inquiry”).   
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III. The Role of the Federal Constitutional Court  
1. Constitutional Guarantee of Judicial Review  
Art. 19 (4) of the Basic Law mandates the general guarantee of judicial review for every individual and, thus, a fun-
damental right to justice.161 “Should any person’s rights be violated by public authority, he may have recourse to the 
courts. […] The second sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 10 [(enabling the G10 Commission)] shall not be af-
fected by this paragraph.” Each individual is entitled to bring a constitutional complaint before the court if he/she 
believes that the state encroached upon his/her fundamental rights.162  
2. Requirement of Judicial Decree: Art. 13 III–V of the Basic Law (Richtervorbehalt)  
Art. 13 of the Basic Law protects the inviolability of the private home. A judicial order needs to be obtained before 
the authorities may start with any surveillances by technical means inside the private home. 
3. The Role of the Federal Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court’s decisions are final, binding on all state authorities, and deal with the compliance with the 
constitutional law exclusively. The Court is therefore not an appellate court and does not have the power of initiation. 
Apart from the role in cases of disagreements between the Bund and the Länder, the Constitutional Court is also 
responsible for “[c]onstitutional review of disputes between the highest bodies of the state163; […][j]udicial review 
[…]either as a concrete norm control164 or preliminary ruling […] or as a so-called abstract norm control165; [c]on-
stitutional complaint by citizens and others in cases of violation of basic rights; [i]ndictment and similar procedures 
[…] [as well as] [e]lection dispute procedures.”166 
In general, one might say that the Court “tries in principle to expand its control competence as far and as generously 
as possible”.167 The Court “increased its control primarily in the area of basic rights”, since those rights left space for 
interpretation.168 If dealing with constitutional complaints, “[e]very Act of Parliament can be directly reviewed, so the 
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regulations concerning federal competencies and legislative procedures often come into play. In relation to court 
decisions, constitutional law does not set any limits on review by the Constitutional Court.”169 Kranenpohl talks about 
the function of the Constitutional Court in the German state as a “veto player, reserve legislator, and agenda set-
ter”.170 Thus, he is referring to the right of the Court to “nullify crucial political decisions (see arts. 78; 82 (1) and 95 
(3) of the Federal Constitutional Court Act), [whereas it] started early on to declare norms simply ‘incompatible’ 
with the Basic Law, [it may] specify requirements (sometimes very detailed) to the legislators [and it may] nullify a 
law and set out requirements for constitutionally compliant legislation [or] simply appeal for legislative change, which 
puts the issue on the legislative’s agenda all the same.”171 
4. The Court’s Influence on the Shaping of Parliamentary Control and National Security Law 
The Constitutional Court also severely influenced the role and understanding of Parliamentary control and the status 
quo of the existing security architecture in Germany. Several major decisions and concepts that have been developed 
by the Court’s case law have also shaped today’s understanding of parliamentary control. The law on the German 
Parliamentary Control Panel also explicitly mentions some limitations to the control power of the Panel that were 
developed by the Court. The decisions are now considered as the major guideline for those limitations as well as for 
parliamentary questions and the committees of inquiries. One of these concepts is the so-called core area of executive 
autonomy (Kernbereich der exekutiven Eigenverantwortung), a principle that is based on the separation of powers.  
In one of the Court’s famous decisions on the Flick-Committee of Inquiry, it elaborated that, although the govern-
ment is in general obliged to ensure that the parliament has enough information to fulfil its control function effec-
tively, it may deny the disclosure of information or the handing over of files if the information belongs to the govern-
ment’s core area of executive autonomy, “a confidential initiative, advisory and action area”.172 This area particularly 
includes the “internal will formation, as it manifests itself in cabinet meetings as well as in inter-ministerial and over-
arching deliberations and votes.”173 The obligation to disclose information is therefore somehow graduated (abge-
stuft). The closer the overall information gets to the core area, the less the government has an obligation to disclose. 
It is an attempt to find a kind of balance between the need for protection of the decision-making process and the 
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decision itself with the right of, for example, the legislature to gain access to information. “The principle of the sep-
aration of powers is therefore the basis as well as the legal restriction of the rights of parliamentary control.”174  
Another concept developed by the Court that is being used to set a limit to parliamentary control of the government 
is that of ‘Public Weal’ or ‘Welfare of the State’ (Staatswohl). The parliamentary right to gain access to information 
does have to stand back if the welfare of the state would otherwise be endangered. There is no legal definition of 
welfare of the state, making it a very vague legal concept. Several examples of rules175 that are to be found in the 
different Acts on security agencies as well as on parliamentary control have been developed to grasp the concept 
somewhat better. In general, “the question of what serves the welfare of the state or [...] is detrimental to the state's 
well-being cannot be answered in an abstract and conclusive manner, but only on the basis of the concrete individual 
case and weighing up the legal goods concerned.”176 The Constitutional Court has, however, decided that the welfare 
of the state is a matter of concern for both parliament and government. Therefore, the government may in general 
not refuse to disclose information to the Bundestag or its committees and panels because of a possible threat to the 
welfare of the state, as long as the Bundestag makes sure that the information remains strictly confidential.177 Fur-
thermore, the Court decided in several instances that the parliament only had the right to get access to information 
if the government was the responsible authority in the areas concerned and only after the final decision was made.178 
5. New Leading Case Law in the Field of National Security Law 
In 2016, the Constitutional Court had to deal with the Innere Sicherheit and the conflicting tension between liberty 
and security as well as with the claim of parliamentarians to get access to information contrary to the will of the 
government. I will give a short overview of two leading recent decisions: in the first case the Court ruled in favour of 
“liberty” arguments, in the second in favour of “security” arguments.  
The first important decision by the Constitutional Court in 2016 was the so-called Bundeskriminalamt-decision. The 
Bundeskriminalamt (“BKA”) is the Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany. The parliament had increased its legal 
competences, providing the BKA not only with prosecutorial but also intelligence powers, for example certain covert 
surveillance powers to contain the threat of international terrorism. As a result, the Constitutional Court received 
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several constitutional complaints by individuals who were concerned that the new powers would lead to an encroach-
ment of the executive on fundamental rights. The Constitutional Court decided (5:3) that those powers were gener-
ally compatible with the Basic Law, emphasising, however, the principle of proportionality: 
Powers that constitute a serious interference with privacy must be limited to the protection or legal reinforcement of sufficiently 
weighty legal interests; require that a threat to these interests is sufficiently specifically foreseeable; may, only under limited condi-
tions, also extend to third parties from whom the threat does not emanate and who belong to the target person’s sphere; require, 
for the most part, particular rules for the protection of the core area of private life as well as the protection of persons subject to 
professional confidentiality; are subject to requirements of transparency, individual legal protection, and supervisory control; and 
must be supplemented by deletion requirements with regards to the recorded data.179 
The Court furthermore developed certain prerequisites for information sharing between different intelligence agen-
cies or with the police. It therefore defined the threshold of “the principle of a hypothetical re-collection of data”, 
meaning that an authority may only share information with another authority if it would still be legal to collect the 
data also for the new purpose.180 The Court did also establish certain limitations to the strict application of the prin-
ciple. The Court’s decision prompted different reactions: on the one hand, there were many grateful and relieved 
voices that the BKA Act will have to be amended by the Parliament. On the other hand, some scholars and, in partic-
ular, members of the respective authorities were very critical, pointing out that the Court had transcended its consti-
tutional role, in particular, by impinging on the Parliament’s area of competence, a claim that was also supported by 
two judges who released dissenting opinions.181  
The second decision that had a great impact on the perception of the security architecture of Germany concerned 
the so-called NSA-list of ‘selectors’. In the context of the NSA scandal, revealed by Edward Snowden, it became known 
that the BND had received a list from the NSA, which contained certain search criteria like IP- and E-mail addresses, 
in other words, information that could be used for telecommunication surveillance. The data that were being moni-
tored by the BND would then, in a first step, be checked with the help of a so-called “G10-Filter”182, making sure that 
neither data that were protected by Art. 10 of the Basic Law nor data that needed to be filtered to protect German 
interests were being searched for.183 The BND would then, in a second step, go through the rest of the data by using 
a list of selectors and finally transfer the results back to the NSA.184  
It became, however, apparent to the BND that firstly, the NSA transmitted selectors that were directed against Ger-
man interests and that secondly, the filters did not work reliably enough. Therefore, data of German citizens and 
other sensitive data were being released to the NSA. After the revelations of Snowden, the Parliamentary Control 
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Panel, the G10 Commission as well as the NSA-Committee of Inquiry demanded the disclosure of the list of selectors 
to them. The Government rejected their claim. It emphasised the importance of the cooperation with the NSA and 
the intelligence-sharing alliance known as the Five Eyes (US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). If the infor-
mation became known to the public, foreign intelligence agencies might not want to collaborate with the BND any-
more, which would constitute a great danger to Germany. They furthermore referred to a bilateral security agreement 
with the US and the “Third Party Rule”.185 
The Constitutional Court finally ruled that the government did not have to disclose the list of selectors to the NSA-
Committee of Inquiry. It struck a balance between the right to information that generally also included the disclosure 
of the list of selectors and the Executive’s “interest in an exercise of duties that was adequate to its functions and 
administrative nature”.186 It particularly emphasised the importance of future collaborations with foreign security 
agencies and the fact that, due to international law (the agreement as well as the ‘Third Party Rule’), the US would 
have to agree on disclosing the list. The decision of the Court was—once again—highly controversial. The security 
agreement with the US was not an agreement that the Bundestag had entered into; and in view of the fact that the 
Constitutional Court had decided—on a different matter—that “communications on contacts with foreign intelligence 
services […] may not simply be withdrawn from the information access of a committee of inquiry for reasons of 
threat to the state's weal”187, the Court’s decision came as a surprise to many. Hans-Christian Ströbele, an MP of 
Bündnis90/Die Grünen and member of the Parliamentary Control Panel, called the decision a “disappointment”.188 
As it seemed to become even easier now to bypass parliamentary control by referring to the cooperation with other 
foreign agencies189, he furthermore concluded: “To clarify the activities of the secret services one can at most hope 
for whistleblowers.”190 In the following, in order to appraise Ströbele’s claim, the parliamentary control mechanisms 
and the historical background of the German control system will be described in detail. 
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IV. Parliamentary Control and National Security Agencies 
When the German Federal Republic was founded, there was no specific parliamentary control mechanism put in 
place for the intelligence agencies.191 According to Hansalek, this was due to the fact that the government was now 
legitimised by the majority of the parliament and that the “historical contrast” between the parliament and the gov-
ernment (“the Crown”) had been “overcome”.192 Therefore, this kind of control was not considered as necessary. For 
the following decades, the media reported about several scandals in which the intelligence agencies were somehow 
involved. These reports led to a certain pressure on the parliament and the government for reforms in the areas of 
the agencies themselves and of parliamentary control.193 Finally, Germany got a permanent body exercising parlia-
mentary control over the government in terms of their intelligence activities in 1978.  
I have already given a short overview of the different mechanisms that are part of the parliamentary control of the 
intelligence services as well as of the different kinds of control powers that exist in Germany. In the following chapter, 
I will first reflect in more detail on the theory of parliamentary control before turning to the Parliamentary Control 
Panel and the practical implications of the development of a theory of parliamentary control. My thesis, which seeks 
to compare German and Canadian ways of legislatively controlling intelligence agencies, will concentrate on the Panel 
as the main and most important respective German institution and not go deeply into the other parliamentary control 
bodies that were outlined above. The historical development of the Panel, with an appraisal of its successes and 
weaknesses, is the most informative and meaningful point of comparison when demonstrating the structural weak-
nesses of parliamentary control that have not yet been overcome—in Germany almost 40 years after the Panel’s es-
tablishment, and almost 70 years since its predecessor model was founded. A historical review of the institution’s 
reforms and the slow developments that have taken place up to 2017 will be essential in what follows.  
1. Parliamentary Control – in Theory  
As mentioned above in the chapter about control mechanisms in general, it is interesting to see whether the different 
kinds and forms of control can also be applied to parliamentary control, above all in the field of national security. 
How far is a parliamentary right to oversee a government’s activities possible under a principle of a separation of 
powers? Can parliamentary control include the power to sanction the government? What defines its relationship to 
the judiciary and what are the differences between parliamentary and judicial control? How does supervision by the 
executive itself fit in? And foremost, what about the different forms of ‘control’, for example when should control be 
exercised and what is the scope of the control? 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
191 “[…] Überwindung des historischen Gegensatzes […].” (Translation mine). Hansalek, supra note 14 at 5. 
192 Ibid.  
193 Ibid at 6.  
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In principle, there should be no difference between parliamentary control of national security activities and the gen-
eral parliamentary control. There might only be the need for some special provisions: on the one hand, how to 
control effectively, and, on the other, to respect the sensitive and confidential nature of the topics of national security. 
“The constitutionally relevant question is that of the level of legitimacy and a level of control which may be influenced 
by it.”194 Gusy in particular argues for a “Prinzip der abgestuften Öffentlichkeit” (“principle of a graduated publicness”) 
as a tool to adapt the level of control to the necessary secrecy.195 
Parliamentary control is considered as a form of “political control”.196 It is therefore not directly comparable to exec-
utive supervision or judicial control. It is indeed highly disputed how far the above-mentioned principles of control 
mechanisms can be applied to parliamentary control of activities of the national security agencies and thus to the 
government’s endeavours to strike a balance between the principles of security and liberty.  
For the most part, parliamentary control is executed as a form of “review” mechanism, posing the least limits on the 
government’s activities. In some decisions of the Constitutional Court197, review was indeed even considered as the 
only legitimate way of parliamentary control. However, there are also many dissenting views, not just in terms of what 
is desirable but also in terms of what the legislature in fact does. In particular, as Peitsch and Polzin mention, “[i]n 
fact, parliamentary scrutiny is now an on-going control, as Parliament is involved by it, among other things, in the 
current political debate.”198 Therefore, it would give a too limited impression of the control power of parliament if 
one only talked about its review powers. Parliamentary control can also guide and oversee the government’s and 
thus the intelligence services’ activities (“directing control”199). The parliament may then have to give consent to a 
certain activity or it may set certain rules, limits and rights through legislation. This kind of control of the intelligence 
services is particularly important for the budget decisions of the parliament.200 The latter may also oversee current 
activities.201 Thereby, it may “influence governmental decisions by the expression of the parliament’s will.”202 “The 
effect of the directing control primarily rests upon its public visibility”, which can, however, often not be achieved in 
the field of national security.203 And the parliament is never allowed to get into the position to take over the general 
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competence and responsibility of the government.204 The core area of executive autonomy will and does mostly pre-
vail over the claim to get access to information if the activity or the decision-making process have not yet been com-
pleted.205 Therefore, one may conclude that parliamentary control is mostly focussed on reviewing governmental 
activities and decisions once these activities and decisions have been completed. 
This may lead us to the next important limitations on parliamentary control, the “minimum and maximum degree of 
[parliamentary] control.”206 The maximum degree of parliamentary control has already been outlined above: the lim-
itations that the Constitutional Court has developed as well as the (constitutionally valid) limitations imposed by the 
different Acts. It has additionally been noted that this maximum mostly amounts to control through review and (very) 
limited control that has oversight dimensions. But what standard is to constitute the minimum degree of control? 
Hansalek distinguishes between two steps that may help to understand the constitutionally provided minimum. At 
first, deciding on the powers of committees of inquiries, the Constitutional Court has ruled that it is necessary to 
“interpret Art. 44 of the Basic Law in such a manner that the committee of inquiry has to be regarded as being 
endowed with the powers which it requires in order to be able to effectively deal with the pursued clarification of 
doubts about the lawfulness or fairness of governmental or administrative measures.”207 This decision can be inter-
preted in such a way that it contains a general statement on parliamentary control (rather than just pointing to the 
rights of the committees of inquiries). A minimum degree of parliamentary control is thus, firstly, determined by the 
powers needed to ensure its effectiveness. Secondly, the so-called “materiality principle” (Wesentlichkeitsprinzip) is 
relevant. This principle in general determines “whether a parliamentary law is required” as well as “the necessary 
regulatory density of the law.”208 The legislature is thus not allowed to delegate all its power to the executive; it has 
to stay the regulator in certain policy areas that are being determined on a case-by-case basis. Hansalek argues per-
suasively that “what applies to the legislative function, must also apply to the other functions of parliament, here its 
control function. [...] [Thus], the areas of the intelligence services, which are seen as essential, must be subject to 
parliamentary control.”209 The notion of being subject to parliamentary control would seem primarily to connote a 
legislative power of review; does that mean, however, that there is, to a certain degree, an obligation of parliament 
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to make use of its control powers? If so, can parliamentary control then be, inter alia, exercised as a minority right of 
the opposition? In addition, does a pure review mechanism sufficiently comply with the materiality principle?   
As for the general parliamentary control functions, one additional competence of the institution may be its power to 
impose sanctions. These sanctions may either “constitute a reaction that occurs in the form of coercive measures to 
an unwanted while normally deviant behaviour as well as the legal consequences connected with a legal regulation.”210 
In general, parliamentary control is the “consequence of the […] responsibility of the government to the parlia-
ment.”211 Parliamentary control is furthermore considered as necessary because of “the lack of individual legal aid”212, 
particularly in the field of national security. It is—again—one of the only instruments to curtail the power of the 
national security agencies and thus the government in an area where tremendous powers are transferred to the 
authorities, in particular in an area of politics which is very sensitive as regards civil liberties. However, as a form of 
political control, it does not really operate within the realm of objective criteria, as it is always exposed to partisan 
efforts of the different political parties and views213, both those of the governmental parties and the parliamentary 
oppositional groups.  
2. The Parliamentary Control Panel (Das Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium, “PKGr”) 
As mentioned above, in 1978, the first official Commission of the Bundestag solely focussed on the intelligence triad, 
was established. In order to derive lessons from its weaknesses and its strengths that have become manifest through-
out its history, it is important to look back to its genesis, its aims, the motives of its creators, and the many reforms 
and challenges it has faced throughout time. Therefore, this chapter will now focus on describing, analysing and 
evaluating the history and the mainly political influences that have shaped the PKGr from 1949 to 2017. 
a) Historical Overview 
Committee for the Protection of the Constitution (Ausschuss zum Schutz der Verfassung, “ASchutzV”), 1949  
The ASchutzV was established in 1949 by the Bundestag to suppress unconstitutional extremism in the young Re-
public. Twenty-one parliamentarians were members of the ASchutzV, surprisingly even including one member of the 
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Communist Party (the party later was prohibited by the Constitutional Court in 1956) and one member of an extrem-
ist right-wing party (DRP214), who had no voting power. Its “task area” was defined to include “legislator tasks, con-
trolling functions, monitoring tasks and initiating functions.”215 The Committee’s powers were highly disputed, and 
this was one of the reasons why the ASchutzV was only set up in the first two legislative periods of the Bundestag. 
Afterwards, the Committee of Internal Affairs took over the tasks of the ASchutzV.216 The fact that the ASchutzV in-
cluded two members of extremist parliamentary groups is particularly surprising when reading about the reluctance 
of the popular parties in the 80s/90s to allow MPs of the parliamentary groups of Die Linke as well as Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen to become members of the Control Panel (see below).  
The Parliamentary Board of Trustworthy People (Das Parlamentarische Vertrauensmännergremium, “PVMG”), 
1956 
In 1956, Chancellor Adenauer introduced the PVMG. The reasons for its establishment were, on the one hand, the 
establishment of the BND and, on the other hand, a scandal that had shaken the government, when the president of 
the BfV had moved to East Berlin and started to publicly criticise the West German government (“John-affaire”217).  
The members of the PVMG were not elected by the MPs as a whole but chosen by the parliamentary groups.218 The 
Chancellor himself or someone appointed by him was the chair of the PVMG. According to Hansalek, this not only 
made it possible to “control the flow of information but also its evaluation and thereby the whole control process.”219 
An additional problem was the fact that the PVMG had to be reintroduced in each legislative period, enabling the 
Chancellor to stop its existence every four years. In addition, the PVMG did not have the right to claim access to 
information; rather, the government could decide whether or not to inform the PVMG on the activities of—in the 
beginning only—the BND. The government alone could therefore decide on the specific content and amount of 
information it was going to share with the PVMG.220And even if the PVMG was being informed about current activities, 
it was not allowed to “pass resolutions”.221 The PVMG was furthermore not allowed to self-initiate a meeting; instead, 
the Chancellor himself had to arrange the meetings.222 This later changed under chancellor Willy Brandt who in-
creased the powers of the PVMG by granting it the right to self-initiate a meeting.223 
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According to Hansalek, the way the PVMG was established by Adenauer shows the lack of power on the part of the 
Parliament. The MPs had not yet realised that they “not only could but had to act as a control institution”;224 instead, 
they “waived the right to build up a parliamentary committee which was explicitly legitimised by the Constitution”.225 
For Adenauer, it was therefore possible to influence and use the PVMG for his own/the government’s advantage. 
True parliamentary control of the secret services remained a desideratum. 
Pätsch-Affair/Phone-Affair, Reform 1964 
In 1964, an official of the BfV complained that his work, which included intercepting the post and telephones for the 
allies, was illegal. As a whistleblower, he informed the journal “Der Spiegel” about details of his work (“Pätsch-affair”). 
The affaire led to the creation of a parliamentary committee of inquiry since it was speculated that the BfV was trying 
to “bypass” its own limits of “intelligence work”226 by working closely together with the allies (“Telephone-affair”). 
The committee of inquiry could not find the evidence to support those speculations (not the least because the data 
it received were incomplete and a lot of the material had already been destroyed). The committee of inquiry con-
cluded, however, that the Parliament should permanently control all federal intelligence agencies.227  
Reform 1968/1969 
In 1968, a committee of inquiry was established to decide whether the current state architecture (i.e., the different 
authorities, their cooperation and coordination) that was in place for the protection of the constitutional order and 
for counterintelligence tasks was sound and sufficient.228 The committee of inquiry, whose five members had been 
taken from the parliamentary groups and were all members of the PVMG229, published its final report (the so-called 
Hirsch-Report) in 1969. It concluded that it was a matter of “urgency” to create a permanent parliamentary control 
body.230 The reform proposal included the establishment of a “Committee of the German Bundestag for Affairs of the 
Intelligence Agencies” (Ausschuss des Deutschen Bundestags für Angelegenheiten der Nachrichtendienste), which 
would replace the PVMG. The committee should be constitutionally laid down by a new article in the Constitution 
(Art. 45a of the Basic Law).231 A commissioner should furthermore be appointed who would be responsible for the 
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unobstructed cooperation of the different intelligence agencies and for the information of the new committee on 
anything of importance in the national security sector.232  
In 1969, a corresponding Bill was introduced in Parliament, trying to change the Basic Law according to Art. 79 II by 
introducing a new article that was supposed to lay down the constitutional basis for a parliamentary control commit-
tee of the intelligence agencies. The rights of the committee were supposed to match the broad ones of a committee 
of inquiry (see above). It was also laid down that the committee should be able to initiate an investigation on the 
request of two of its members or one-fourth of the members of the Bundestag.233 Despite the support of the majority 
of MPs in every parliamentary group of the Bundestag, the Bill did not receive the necessary two-thirds majority of 
votes and, thus, never entered into force. Some MPs were particularly reluctant to change the parliamentary control 
system since they, firstly, saw the reform as a restriction of the rights of the government and, secondly, were worried 
that the neo-Nazi party NPD234 would one day become a parliamentary group and thus take part in the control body.235 
Enquête Commission, Reform 1973-1976 
A few changes to the PVMG were introduced in the seventh legislature period. It was established that the chair of the 
PVMG should switch every three months among the MPs. The PVMG was furthermore now allowed to independently 
initiate a meeting.  
In 1973, an Enquête Commission236 was established to assess whether changes to the Basic Law were necessary, 
thereby also analysing the status quo of the parliamentary control of the intelligence agencies in Germany. In contrast 
to the committee of inquiry of 1968/1969, the Enquête Commission did not consider it necessary to abolish the PVMG 
and to introduce another kind of commission.237 In the meantime, the PVMG had already become slightly more in-
dependent since the rotating position of the chairman had already been introduced. This might have influenced the 
Commission’s assessment.   
Evaluating the possibility of a new commission—to be laid down in a new article in the Basic Law—as proposed in 
1968/1969, the Enquête Commission concluded that such a constitutional commission was not necessary.238 At first, 
the Commission mentioned the benefits that the introduction of such a commission and thus the change of the Basic 
Law might have: the commission could have its own proceedings and in its own right; it could initiate meetings at all 
times; the members could concentrate on their role in the commission, whereas the members of the current PVMG 
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had many different obligations; the government might be more willing to share information with a commission that 
was based on and laid down in the Constitution. Despite those benefits, the Enquête Commission concluded that it 
preferred to keep the PVMG for the following reasons: members of a commission might use their control powers for 
partisan reasons; the commission might duplicate work that the Committee on Internal Affairs and the Defence 
Committee were already undertaking; the members would not have sufficient backing by their parliamentary groups 
since they would have to remain silent on the information they would gain access to. Additionally, they were appre-
hensive that information might get leaked—either by the large number of members of the commission or by the 
necessary staff of such a commission. Furthermore, radical parties might be elected into parliament and would then 
have a seat on a commission whose duty it was to control the intelligence services—this could mean that the govern-
ment would no longer be willing or, indeed, it might no longer even be possible to share any information with the 
commission.239 
Despite the positive evaluation of the PVMG by the Enquête Commission and some structural changes, the PVMG 
was still under the influence of the government and did not have enough rights to effectively control it. As a conse-
quence and therefore not surprisingly, from 1976 onwards, the chairmen of the parliamentary groups did consider 
the meetings of the PVMG as “no longer achieving their objectives.”240 For that reason the PVMG did not hold any 
more meetings and was “de facto dissolved.”241 
Parliamentary Debate and Bill, 1977-1978 
The Bill to establish a control commission in parliament in 1977 differed from the proposal of the Commission in 
1968. The parliamentary groups wanted to obviate the necessity to change the Basic Law and thus decided to estab-
lish the commission as a “parliamentary auxiliary body (Hilfsorgan)”.242 The Parliamentary Control Commission (Par-
lamentarische Kontrollkommission, “PKK”) was to review all three federal intelligence agencies directly (not ‘indi-
rectly’ by controlling the government).243 However, the political responsibility for the agencies would stay with the 
Chancellor and the respective ministers.244 The rights of the Bundestag and the parliamentarian committees were not 
to be changed by that law.245 A particularly far-reaching feature of the Bill was that it obliged the government to give 
full information about the activities of the intelligence agencies to the commission whenever requested.246 The Bill 
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was, however, revised, and the final version was less eager to extend the rights of the parliament. When debating the 
legislation, many parliamentarians themselves were particularly worried that MPs would not keep all information 
secret and that the disclosure of information would prevent allied intelligence agencies from cooperating with their 
German counterparts.247  
The Parliamentary Control Commission (Die Parlamentarische Kontrollkommission, “PKK”), 1978 
In 1978, the PKK was established (“PKK Act”248). It was the first “institutionalised control body that was equipped with 
sufficiently legitimised powers and whose area of responsibility covered […] all three intelligence agencies.”249 The 
PKK was considered as a parliamentary panel (Gremium) and therefore not independent of the Bundestag. Differing 
from the original draft, the first paragraph of the new Act defined the organ to be controlled by the PKK as the 
government, thus not the intelligence agencies in particular.250 This was partly necessary due to the principle of the 
separation of powers and partly because the responsibility of the government would have otherwise—at least in some 
form—shifted to the parliament. Art 65 of the Basic Law states that the minister may “conduct the affairs of his 
department independently and on his own responsibility”251 (so-called Ressortprinzip). A direct parliamentary control 
of the intelligence services would thus have been a violation of that principle and therefore a breach of the Basic 
Law.  
Particularly important was the fact that the PKK was not competing with the rights of the parliament and its commit-
tees, because according to § 1 II PKK Act, “the rights of the Bundestag and its committees shall remain unaffected.”252 
Furthermore, the G10 Commission stayed the sole organ responsible for the agencies’ activities in terms of Art. 10 
of the Basic Law.253 The political responsibility of the government remained unaffected by the control,254 meaning 
that, at this stage, the parliament had rejected an oversight function for the commission, thus only allowing it to 
review the activities ex post.255 MP Liedtke said during the legislation process that an oversight or accompanying 
control should not be possible because “[t]he Control Commission has to protect the fundamental rights of the 
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citizens from attacks by the intelligence services. This means that this Commission cannot and must not be subject 
to co-decision.”256  
According to § 4 of the PKK Act, the Bundestag had to elect the members of the commission among its members. In 
general, the members of committees are selected by the respective parliamentary group.257 By ensuring that the 
members of the PKK are elected by the Bundestag, the members of the PKK/PKGr258 are supposed to be more trust-
worthy because MPs of other parliamentary groups might also have voted for them.259 The Bundestag furthermore 
got the right to decide upon the number of members as well as the composition and procedures of the commission. 
Making use of this right, the first instalment of the commission consisted of eight members including all chairmen of 
the parliamentary groups (Fraktionsvorsitzende).260 The members were to be elected with a relative majority. In the 
Bill261, a qualified majority had been intended. However, the Constitutional Court had ruled with respect to the G10 
Commission that a qualified majority did not provide sufficient protection against an improper and ‘one-sided’ filling 
of the commission.262 
For the German Bundestag as well as its committees and different organs, one major principle is that of discontinuity. 
In each legislative period, the parliament needs to be completely renewed. Committees are dissolved and can only 
resume work after a complete reconstitution. The Parliamentary Control Body is an exception to the rule: it continues 
its work until the new Bundestag will have elected the new members of the PKK/PKGr.263 This exception emphasises 
the great importance of the control body: the control duties of its members must be guaranteed at all times. Accord-
ing to § 2 (1) 2 PKK-Act of 1978, the PKK has the unlimited right to request the disclosure of information on the 
intelligence services’ activities from the government, both for general and for particular occurrences. General occur-
rences were and still are considered to be routine procedures, “the regular, typical processes and working results”, 
which have to be known for an effective control.264 Further factors that fall into the scope of “general occurrences” 
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are, for example, the following: “the general briefing on […] foreseeable changes, the creation of personal data files, 
the issuing of general administrative provisions” as well as, for example, the co-operation of the BfV with the Offices 
for the Protection of the Constitution of the Federal States.265 It is still being debated up to this point what exactly 
“occurrences of particular importance” means and how one should define this term. The discussion will be picked 
up below.  
Furthermore, there were two legislative shortcomings regarding the information requirements laid down in 1978.266 
Firstly, the commission was not a legitimate applicant in the court proceedings between governmental bodies (Or-
ganstreitverfahren) before the Constitutional Court if the government did not disclose certain information. It could 
therefore not judicially claim that information.267 Secondly, the government had the right to decide on the “date, 
nature and extent” of the disclosure.268 Therefore, the paragraph de facto made the commission dependent upon the 
government. Often, the commissioners only heard about certain scandals through the media.269 The work of the 
commission therefore lacked both efficiency and effectiveness. The provision was later abolished when it came to be 
seen that it limited the right of the PKK to request information too much (see below). It is a good example, however, 
to point out that the legislators at that time were thinking of control mechanisms that would review, not oversee, the 
agencies’ activities.270 Furthermore, the fact that the paragraph spoke of general and particular occurrences meant 
that general occurrences did not implicate all occurrences and activities, since general occurrences would otherwise 
not have been listed separately.271 
However, when the parliamentary groups introduced the Bill, one MP particularly mentioned that parliament should 
not put limits on its right to request information and thus its right to control the executive in the legislation. He 
considered it indispensable to be given all information; it should be for the executive to explain why certain infor-
mation had to be kept secret and could not be disclosed to the commission. It was considered important particularly 
in order to gain public trust that the parliament was aiming at protecting citizens’ rights to the maximum extent 
possible.272 There were also differing opinions: one MP stated that, due to the unlimited right to information, other 
intelligence services from other countries would no longer want to collaborate with the German services, and that, 
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furthermore, many people would no longer give information in fear of their lives.273 Therefore, in the final law, the 
right to information was more limited.  
The commission had to meet at least each quarter of the year. Each member was allowed at any time to request a 
meeting and a briefing (“minority right”274).275 This statutory provision is still part of today’s Act. However, notwith-
standing this power in the hands of individual members, “the cycle of meetings that is being prescribed by the statute 
is now being considered as falling far too short because of the constitutional significance of the parliamentary control 
of the intelligence services”276 These days, the Parliamentary Control Panel is only holding a meeting every 
month.277According to § 5 of the PKK Act, the proceedings of the commission are kept confidential. They remain 
confidential even if a member has left the commission. The Act did not include any rights of the commission to 
disclose information to the public or the rest of the Bundestag, for example when the government did not act ac-
cording to the law. The first act on the establishment of a parliamentary control commission was—surprisingly—
rather short (consisting of six sections in total only). Considering how big a step it was to disclose certain information 
to the parliament for the first time, this brevity comes as a surprise.  
A reform of the Act was intended at a later date, i.e. after one would have had some experience with the commis-
sion.278 The PKK, therefore, had many more rights than its predecessor, the PVMG. The fact that it was not to be 
dissolved after one legislative period clearly shows its special status compared to other legislative committees. Nev-
ertheless, the PKK was still strongly dependent on the government and the information it would disclose – at the 
government’s own discretion. 
The Reform of the PKK Act in 1992 
Since the establishment of the Commission, the necessity of the Commission in general was no longer a matter of 
debate. However, the parliamentary groups debated possible legal improvements and changes, particularly since 
many parliamentarians considered the Commission to be rather ‘inadequate’.279 Furthermore, the old raison d’être 
of the intelligence services, the East-West-conflict, had ended, making it necessary to discuss future changes of the 
mandate, possible future challenges to the services and thereby also an effective control mechanism.  
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The Bill that was introduced included the obligation of the government to inform the commission about ‘all’ “occur-
rences of particular importance”.280 This wording was changed in the legislative process to ‘the’ occurrences. Another 
change in the new law that empowered the Commission was the obligation of the government to hand over drafts 
of the annual budget plans of the intelligence services to the Commission for consultation. The government would 
then inform the PKK about the implementation of the plans in the following year if the PKK asked for that kind of 
information.281 The PKK “can examine these plans to ensure that they are politically appropriate, a right which is 
denied to the Panel according to § 10 BHO [Bundeshaushaltsordnung; “Federal Budget Code”]. A gap is closed 
here.”282 “The government should now only be able to reject the disclosure of information [on the budget plans] 
because of compelling reasons of intelligence access.”283 In the case of a rejection of the disclosure, the PKK could 
request a rationale from either the responsible minister or the head of the Federal Chancellery (for the BND). A 
general obligation to give reasons for a refusal to give information was not codified; it would have led to the possibility 
that the refusal itself would have allowed the PKK members to draw a conclusion about the nature of the occur-
rence.284 Furthermore, for the first time, the draft allowed for the “evaluation of current occurrences by members of 
the committee where prior agreement from a two-third majority of the present members had been obtained”. In-
deed, these evaluations may even be undertaken in public. It was clarified later that this only meant “an evaluation 
of occurrences, not a factual description.”285 
Further rights were codified in the respective governing acts or statutes for the different intelligence agencies. Sur-
prisingly, no additional restrictions to the rights of the PKK were added to the law. Instead, the law was combined 
with a binding agreement that the government would allow for the inspection of files and the interrogation of em-
ployees of the intelligence services in front of the Commission under certain circumstances.286 However, this agree-
ment was not made part of the statutory law: “the Federal Government uttered constitutional reservations referring 
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to the principle of the separation of powers. To avoid jeopardizing the 1992 legislation, this middle course was cho-
sen.”287 
In the debate during the legislative procedure, the duties and responsibilities of the PKK were described as “twofold”. 
On the one hand, the duty of the PKK was defined as providing protection for the citizens against intrusions of the 
intelligence services; on the other hand, the PKK was considered a body that had to make sure that the intelligence 
services could work ‘efficiently’ and ‘under protection’.288 Although the MPs did also talk about the efficiency of the 
PKK, the parliamentarians were still convinced that the Commission should not be able to ‘oversee’ the activities of 
the agencies.289 The debate in parliament was one of the first debates on the role of the PKK since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. Therefore, particularly the MPs of the PDS, a political party that had been founded in 1989 as a new left-wing 
party (today: Die Linke), emphasised the inefficiency of the PKK, mentioning that although several scandals had 
shattered public trust in the intelligence services, none of these scandals had been uncovered by the PKK since its 
establishment.290 It was further criticised that the parties who were critical of the intelligence services, the PDS and 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, had no members among the commissioners. Furthermore, it was noted that there was still 
no obligation to inform the public about the services’ activities and also that the government still had the right to 
reject the disclosure of files and information under certain circumstances.291 Besides, a former member of the PKK 
described how difficult it was to control the agencies in light of the small size of the PKK, the small number of meet-
ings and the pressure of time of the busy MPs who had several other obligations.292 Nonetheless, during the legislative 
process, the members of the PKK stressed the importance of the agencies’ work. The chair of the PKK at that time 
(who was a member of the ruling party) even thanked the agencies for their work, without mentioning any scandals 
that had occurred.293  
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
287 “[…] die Bundesregierung machte verfassungsrechtliche Bedenken aus dem Gewaltenteilungsprinzp geltend. Um aber die 
Gesetzesnovellierung 1992 nicht zu gefährden, wurde dieser Mittelweg gewählt.” (Translation mine). Hirsch, supra note 102 at 155. 
288 Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Debates, 12th Parl, Plenarprotokoll 12/62 (29 November 1991) at 5315 (MP Paul Laufs) 
[Plenarprotokoll 12/62]. 
289 Ibid.  
290 Ibid at 5318 (MP Andrea Lederer).  
291 Ibid.  
292 Ibid (MP Ralf Olderog).  
293 Plenarprotokoll 12/82, supra note 286 at 6802 (MP Rudolf Kraus). 
 
 48
The fundamental reform of the PKK Act in 1999 – The PKK becomes the Parliamentary Control Panel 
(Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremium, “PKGr”294) 
In 1999, the first major reform of the PKK took place. It had its roots in a reform proposal by the SPD295 parliamentary 
group in 1998, which wanted to increase the efficiency of the parliamentary commission by merging the G10 Panel296 
and the Commission and thus concentrating their powers.297 The new legislation was drafted and introduced to Par-
liament by all major parliamentary groups (except for the PDS).298 The PDS had tried to include provisions that their 
MPs would become members of the PKGr and that the Panel would be increased in terms of member size. The 
Committee on Internal Affairs of the German Bundestag rejected this proposal.299 The other parliamentary groups 
saw their support of the draft as a sign that no parliamentary partisan reasons were primarily responsible for the 
change of law but that all wanted to improve the control architecture.300 This was partly surprising since Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen had introduced legislation to abolish the national security agencies in general a few years before.301  
As just mentioned, the idea came up to merge the functions of the G10 Panel and that of the PKK and to thereby 
form a new parliamentary control body, the so-called PKGr. The law also included new rights for that Panel.302 How-
ever, since “the previous control bodies were now only to be combined under one single authority, this could not 
result in a new legal status for the new institution.”303 The cooperation between the new body and the parliamentary 
Trust Body (Vertrauensgremium304) was supposed to be strengthened, making the exchange of information easier 
by allowing the chairs and vice chairs of one panel to take part in the sessions of the other.305 For example, when the 
annual budget plans were discussed, the members of one panel could take part in the respective other panel’s meet-
ings.306 The number of members of the PKGr was debated in Parliament as well as in the Committee on Internal 
Affairs. The debate was particularly heated because, as just mentioned above, the PDS wanted to be represented on 
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the Panel as well (at least partly, as some members did not want to participate because of their desire to abolish the 
intelligence services on the whole).307 Other parliamentary groups were worried about including them, also because 
the PDS itself was under observation of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). 
In the Act, the Panel was assigned the right to be the recipient of the information on general and particular occur-
rences with regards to the intelligence services (without having to specifically ask for it). It was also allowed to ask 
for information concerning any other processes, if the government had the power of disposition over the infor-
mation.308 This might not be the case if the intelligence services received the information from foreign services. For 
Hansalek, although this may be seen as a restriction to the control function of the Panel, this provision made sense 
since the Panel was only supposed to control the activities that fell into the scope of the sole “responsibility of the 
government”.309 Up to this point, the definition and scope of “general occurrences” had not really changed since 1978 
(see above). But the scope of “occurrences of particular importance” remained uncertain.310 Generally accepted is 
the fact that “occurrence” refers to an “isolated incident.”311 However, it is more difficult to define “of particular 
importance”, since the assessment of “importance” is mostly of a subjective nature. In Singer’s view, it is not only up 
to the government’s assessment but to the assessment of the Panel or an individual MP. Their/his/her interest “may 
qualify an occurrence to be of particular importance, even though it has not yet been formally articulated” by the 
PKGr.312 The government published a report on its understanding of those occurrences in 2015, which has now 
become part of the PKGr Act. In the report, three different case groups that would fall into the scope of “occurrences 
of particular importance” were devised: 1) “situational developments” (Lageentwicklungen), 2) “in-house develop-
ments or incidents” (Behördeninterne Entwicklungen oder Vorfälle) and 3) “individual occurrences subject to po-
litical discussions or public reporting” (“Einzelvorkommnisse, die Gegenstand politischer Diskussionen oder öffen-
tlicher Berichterstattung sind”).313 
The right to request information on “other processes” helps to ensure that gaps of information can be filled. Some 
scholars argue that this new provision leads to a complete control of all activities of the intelligence services.314 How-
ever, as Singer puts it, “the assumption of a full control of intelligence services by around a handful of MPs is as 
devious as the imagination that the German intelligence services may keep the whole society under surveillance.”315 
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But in light of the new technologies and possibilities, it may be doubtful whether he is right with the latter. Truly 
important is the fact that the MPs must have an idea of what information they are going to request; they therefore 
need some knowledge of or trust in rumours about processes that might be going on. 
Furthermore, a new article was included in the law, codifying what so far had only been unwritten rights of the PKK. 
The PKGr received the right to ask for the inspection of files, to initiate hearings of the employees of the intelligence 
services and to make a visit at their facilities.316 The government could only refuse to disclose information if personal 
rights on the part of any third party were threatened or if the information was part of the core area of executive 
autonomy. In case of governmental refusal to disclose information, the responsible minister—as before—had to give 
reasons for his decision if the PKGr asked for them.317 With a two-third majority and after talking to the government, 
the PKGr could now authorise an expert to conduct certain investigations as part of their control power and then to 
report back to the PKGr.318 Furthermore, for the first time, a kind of “whistleblower clause” was included:  
Members of the intelligence services are permitted to approach the Parliamentary Control Panel, for official matters, but not in their 
own interest or in the interests of other members of these services, with petitions, when the authorities of the relevant services have 
not responded to those respective petitions.319 
This provision was, however, problematic insofar as it forced the members to use the official channels (the provision 
was later amended, see below).  
The PKGr could also receive petitions of citizens to the Bundestag who were affected by the intelligence services’ 
activities. However, the PKGr only received them for their own knowledge and information, not in order to take 
direct action. Additionally, the PKGr took over the rights of the G 10 Panel. The G 10 Panel consisted of five MPs who 
were elected in each legislative period and who were responsible for the election of the members of the G10 Com-
mission as well as for parliamentary and political control within the scope of Art. 10 of the Basic Law.  
In general, this reform introduced new mechanisms for the Control Panel to inform itself without being too reliant 
on the government. There was, however, a scholarly debate whether those kinds of rights were in fact legitimate 
without a corresponding constitutional basis. The prevailing view emphasised the increasingly important role of the 
Parliament in executive areas for which it needed to gain information, in particular in areas where the executive had 
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an essential “informational advantage”.320 Nonetheless, as Peitsch and Polzin pointed out in 2000, just after the reform 
of 1999, the new rights were indeed controversial issues. In particular, those authors thought that the rights to listen 
to the employees of the agencies and to visit the locations of the agencies were adjoined to the right to control the 
agencies directly (instead of the government) and therefore constitutionally illegitimate.321 The PKGr still did not 
receive any power to legally bind the government. The significance of the parliamentary control was thus still ques-
tioned.322  
Bills 2006-2009 
In the years 2006-2009, several Bills for legislative reforms of the PKGr were introduced to Parliament. In particular, 
the fact that the Panel was still heavily reliant on the government and the ways of a receiving of information were 
major points of critique. In 2008, Gusy emphasised that “the parliamentary control instances are not only blind 
guards, they are also guardians without swords.”323 One of the Bills was introduced by the SPD, CDU/CSU and FDP 
parliamentary groups. In its reasoning, it was mentioned how successful the PKGr was overall. It was, however, also 
conceded that the Panel had had its problems, which had been particularly apparent at certain instances in the Iraq 
war and during the fight against global terror. The Bill particularly mentioned that the control panel had not been 
informed regularly enough and not in depth, and furthermore, that it “is useful to further strengthen the Panel’s 
rights to independently obtain information, its possibilities to investigate the facts and its powers.”324 The legislation 
was later enacted (see below). 
A second Bill was introduced by the parliamentary group of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. This group had already submit-
ted a proposal to the Bundestag in 2006, in which the MPs demanded more transparency for the work of the PKGr, 
for example through the possibility to inform the public (under certain conditions) about aspects of matters being 
discussed in the Panel. This should happen with the help of a right to inform the chairs of the parliamentary groups, 
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through a possibility to sanction the government and by equipping the Panel with sufficient staff.325 The motion was 
rejected in 2008.326 Nonetheless, the new Bill introduced by the parliamentary group of Bündnis90/Die Grünen in 
2009 repeated several of those propositions.327 Another Bill was introduced by the FDP parliamentary group and in 
particular by MP Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, the former minister of justice. The draft aimed at improving 
the acquisition of information by making it a sanctionable “disciplinary offence” (Dienstvergehen) if the government 
did not follow its obligation to report to the PKGr.328  The very last Bill was introduced by Die Linke. This reform 
proposal, however, was different from the others since its only purpose was to regulate the observation and surveil-
lance of MPs by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Die Linke wanted to introduce a provision 
whereby the PKGr had the right to stop that surveillance with one-fifth of the votes cast. The proposal was rejected.329 
All drafts were discussed in parliament at the same time, but only the first reform proposal introduced by the SPD, 
CDU/CSU and FDP was accepted by the Bundestag (see below).  
New Art. 45d in the Basic Law  
At the same time, another Bill330 was introduced to the Bundestag by the parliamentary groups of the SPD, CDU/CSU 
and FDP, calling for a new article in the Basic Law that would formally enshrine the PKGr in the Constitution itself 
and thus give it a higher standing in law331, with the goal of increasing the Panel’s legitimacy.332 Die Linke rejected the 
legislation because it wanted the PKGr to be considered as a general committee of the Bundestag which then would 
have to comply with the rules of procedure of the Bundestag. Bündnis90/Die Grünen was particularly concerned 
since in its view a new article of the Constitution especially for the PKGr would devalue the other parliamentary 
committees, which have no special constitutional support.333  
By introducing this new article to the Basic Law, the “constitutional legislature recognised almost incidentally the 
raison d’être of the national security agencies as the new article takes them for granted”.334 This may in particular be 
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of importance as bills have been introduced to Parliament and several political debates have taken place in the last 
decades that were advocating an abolition of the national security agencies in general, not least after the disclosure 
of the NSU-scandal. The law to change the Constitution was supported by the necessary majority for changes to the 
constitution and was thus promulgated on July 22, 2009.335 
b) Status Quo: Fundamental Reform of 2009 & Reform in 2016 
The Reform of 2009 
In what follows, the promulgated law based on the draft by the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP parliamentary groups, aiming 
at a reform of the PKGr (see above), is described more closely. The PKGr was still being considered as an “auxiliary 
body (Hilfsorgan)” [sui generis] of the Bundestag.336 However, as Singer pointed out, this should not lead us to the 
assumption of any “legal consequences” being “tied” to the term “body”.337  
Since the Panel’s establishment, it has been debated whether every parliamentary group of the Parliament should be 
represented on the Panel. Before the establishment of the Panel, the fact that one day, an extreme right-wing party 
might be elected to the Parliament and thus send members to a control commission was one of the main arguments 
against the establishment of such a commission. From the 1980s until now the debates have mostly concerned MPs 
from Bündnis90/Die Grünen (not of concern anymore) and Die Linke. This has particularly been the case because 
Die Linke has been under surveillance by the BfV itself and both Die Linke as well as Bündnis90/Die Grünen (the 
latter only until the beginning of the 21st century) have called for the abolishment of the intelligence services in 
general. However, in 2014, the chair of the Panel was—for the first time—an MP of Die Linke. Nonetheless, neither 
Art. 45d of the Basic Law nor the PKGr Act mandates the consideration of minority parliamentary groups. As elabo-
rated above in the section on parliamentary control, the protection of minority rights in parliament is one of the main 
constitutional obligations. Therefore, the Constitutional Court decided that it would be improper to elect or not elect 
certain MPs just because of their party affiliation instead of electing the most capable and reliable MPs.338 
There was still no statutory provision dealing with the role of the chair and his/her ‘election’. The prevailing practice 
was to shift between a chair of the majority and a chair of the minority parliamentary groups every year. This was, 
however, not constitutionally protected as a minority right.339 The reform of 2009 introduced, for the first time, the 
right of the Panel to authorise other members of the parliamentary groups to support them in their work for the 
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Panel. Those supporters were not allowed to take part in the meetings of the Panel (if not specifically decided other-
wise by the Panel in certain instances), but they could get access to secret information (after being formally obliged 
to confidentiality).340 Furthermore, also for the first time, the legislation included the right of the Panel to have its 
own employees from the Bundestag administration.  
Since its establishment, the members of the PKGr have often been highly regarded members of the respective par-
liamentary groups, in particular because of the “significance of the Panel and the strong interest of the MPs to become 
members of the Panel”.341 The workload of the MPs, who are often also members of other committees and have 
various responsibilities and tasks, is very high, particularly when the size of the Panel and its staff is being compared 
to the size of the intelligence agencies. However, as Singer points out, it might also be beneficial to the Panel to have 
MPs who are also members of other committees, in particular the Committee for Internal Affairs or the Defence 
Committee. This may “improve the level of knowledge and thus the overall control competences of the Panel”.342 
In the first draft of the new PKGr Act, the Federal Criminal Police Office as well as the Customs Investigation Bureau 
were supposed to be amongst the services that were being controlled (via a control of the government) if they were 
active in the field of intelligence services. This new extension of the PKGr’s mandate was rejected, in particular, 
because the MPs were reluctant to soften the Trennungsgebot (separation principle regarding police and intelligence 
services) even further and because they also feared that this increased mandate might lead to a loss of power for the 
Parliament and its Committee on Internal Affairs, which were and are responsible at the moment. Singer, however, 
criticised these reasons, stating that, firstly, the Trennungsgebot did not inhibit the ambit of the PKGr, since it does 
not mandate separate control bodies, and, secondly, that in times of increasing cooperation and similar tasks for both 
intelligence agencies and the police, it might be a good idea to control them in a similar way as well.343 
Due to the findings of a committee of inquiry in the sixteenth legislative period, particularly the access to information 
for the MPs in the Panel was improved. They were now given the right to request the handing out of certain files.344 
Besides, the legislative also expressly included electronic data that had to be made available to the Panel.345 The 
intelligence services have to be thorough with their file keeping management. Not keeping files even to protect 
confidentiality would violate the rule of law principle, since it would render “a judicial review of legality of one of the 
constitutionally most sensitive public activities”346 impossible. Furthermore, beforehand, the MPs of the Panel only 
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had the right to “visit” (Besuchsrecht) the intelligence services’ localities. In the new law, they gained the right to 
access any premises of the agencies.347According to the prevailing opinion, a reason for the access is needed; the 
provision does not give the PKGr the “right to raid”348 the premises.  
Whereas before, the members had the right to listen (Anhörungsrecht) to the employees of the agencies, the Panel 
now has got the right to question all the employees of the agencies or to ask for written information of all of them. 
The same applies to all members of the government and members of other federal agencies (on the condition that 
the Panel first informs the government about it).349 The informants are obliged to answer the questions thoroughly 
and truthfully.350 Against several recommendations, the powers of the PKGr are not conditioned by reference to the 
section about the hearing of evidence in the German Code of Criminal Procedure.351 Singer also points out that the 
PKGr Act is also missing certain provisions about the hearing of evidence that the Act on Parliamentary Committees 
of Inquiry lays down. The legal and administrative cooperation with courts and all agencies was codified; this was 
necessary in order to be able to execute the questionings.  
For the first time, the right to authorise an expert to carry out an investigation for the Panel was laid down, however, 
with a very high threshold (two-thirds majority in order to prevent the governing party from choosing someone for 
their purposes) for the decision to ask a specific expert.352 The Panel can also decide (with a two-thirds majority) that 
a report about the investigation should be given to the Bundestag. The report might even include personal data if 
the respective person agreed or if the need for transparency and publicity was considered more important than the 
person’s personal rights.353 This particularity was included since the Administrative Court in Berlin had ruled that the 
PKGr should not publish personal data since there was no legal basis for this interference with someone’s fundamen-
tal rights.354 So far, there have been three major reports by experts (2004, 2005 and 2014).355 The provision aims 
mainly at reducing the workload of the Panel and making it more efficient. It can either be characterised as an “in-
vestigation instrument within the threshold of a committee of inquiry” or a “preliminary stage to a committee of 
inquiry.”356  
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The Members of the intelligence agencies are furthermore now allowed to “submit petitions to the PKGr without 
making use of official channels”357. The provision was included to help the members of the intelligence agencies who 
were “in an ethical conflict between the obligation to secrecy and an obligation to act”.358 Instead of talking to the 
press, the member could now speak to the Panel directly. However, in 2009, there were still major limitations to the 
clause. The petitions still had to be given to the head of the agency (as notice), and the member was and still is not 
permitted to submit anything “in his/her own interest or in the interest of other members of the agencies”.359 Since 
the member’s anonymity was still not being protected, it was doubtful that such a provision would increase the 
Panel’s knowledge of wrongdoings by the agencies. The current version of 2016 contains the clause that “[b]ecause 
of the fact of the petition, they must not be officially disciplined or disadvantaged.”360 It is furthermore not necessary 
anymore to give the petition to the head of the agency. However, the Panel may still forward the name of the member 
to the government, if “necessary to clarify the facts.”361 
When giving its (at least) bi-annual reports, the Panel is now also asked to give information on whether the govern-
ment has acted cooperatively, in particular whether it has complied with its obligation to disclose the information 
about special occurrences thoroughly.362 In addition, if there is a two-thirds majority approval in the Panel, a member 
of the Panel can publish a so-called dissenting opinion on certain occurrences and is therefore exempted from the 
obligation to keep the information a secret from the public.363 Whenever a presentation of the facts (Sachverhaltsdar-
stellung) is necessary for the report of the Panel or the dissenting opinion, the “matters of confidentiality have to be 
observed”.364  
For the first time, the legal jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in disputes between the government and the Panel 
(power of filing an application needs a two-third majority of votes in the Panel) is codified in the legislation.365 Fur-
thermore, from 2013 onwards, the Panel has been “making more use of the possibility of assessments according to § 
10 of the Act”, which in particular “allows for directing control” by publishing them.366 
The PKGr Act also introduced new limitations to the Panel. The restrictions to the obligation of the government to 
adhere to the requests of the Panel were extended to the new rights of the Panel. Thus, for example, the members 
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of the government do not have to answer if the government is not authorised to disclose the information.367 Further-
more, when deciding whether a process falls within the scope of the “occurrences” framework of the PKGr Act, the 
government still has the right to filter the information before disclosing it to the Panel. The “asymmetry of knowledge” 
therefore persists.368 Although the Panel does have more rights now to ask for specific data or information, it often 
does not know what it actually should be looking for. The questions might therefore be beside the point. Further-
more, the Panel’s members still do not have sufficient time to concentrate on the Panel’s work.369 Also, since the 
PKGr Act does “not know any political obligation for moderation […] the parliamentary control often becomes an 
instrument of political staging.”370 Singer also criticised the fact that the PKGr was still not responsible for the military 
intelligence of the Federal Armed Forces (Militärisches Nachrichtenwesen, “MilNWBw”). This was particularly prob-
lematic as it was uncovered in the Kunduz-Committee of Inquiry that the MilNWBw was “in practice and de facto 
partly operating as an intelligence service by using methods and instruments that are essential for determining an 
intelligence activity”.371 In general, before the enactment, the establishment of an Office for a Commissioner for the 
Intelligence Services was seen as the only alternative to an improved PKGr with more rights. Due to its limited dem-
ocratic legitimacy, the idea was rejected (until 2016, see below).  
Reform in 2016 
Due to the continuing public criticism of the PKGr’s control power372, as well as the problems of parliamentary control 
that became apparent during the NSU- as well as NSA-Committees of Inquiries, the government (CDU/CSU and SPD) 
introduced a new Bill to Parliament to reform the PKGr Act once again in July 2016, as noted briefly above. It became 
law (after several amendments) on November 30th, 2016.  
In the commentary accompanying the Bill, the parliamentary groups emphasised that the PKGr “lacks a coordinating 
body, which at the same time serves as a central point of contact for the members of the Control Panel on the part 
of the Bundestag administration which supports them, and also implements the control objectives in a strategic 
sense.”373Another problem that was determined was the low number of MPs and their lack of technical knowledge. 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
367 § 6 I of the PKGr Act 2009.  
368 Jan-Hendrik Dietrich, “Reform der parlamentarischen Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste als rechtsstaatliches Gebot und 
sicherheitspolitische Notwendigkeit” (2014) 7 ZRP 205 at 205.  
369 Ibid at 206. 
370 Ibid.  
371 “[…] die Bundeswehr in der Praxis teilweise faktisch wie ein Nachrichtendienst operiert, indem sie Methoden und Mittel einsetzt, die 
für nachrichtendienstliches Handeln wesensbestimmend sind.” (Translation mine).   
Singer, supra note 38 at 50, referring to Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuss, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht, 17th 
Parl, BT-Drucksache 17/7400 (25 October 2011) at 237 [BT-Drucksache 17/7400].   
372 Dietrich, supra note 368 at 207. 
373 “[…] fehlt eine koordinierende Stelle, die zugleich als zentraler Ansprechpartner der Mitglieder des Kontrollgremiums auf Seiten der 
sie unterstützenden Bundestagsverwaltung dient und die Kontrollziele auch in strategischer Hinsicht umsetzt.“ (Translation mine). 
Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Gesetzesentwurf CDU/CSU & SPD, 18 Parl, BT-Drucksache 18/9040 (05 July 2016) [BT-Drucksache 
18/9040]. 
 
 58
Therefore, the staff of the PKGr was to be increased. Additionally, the Panel was granted the right to annually question 
the heads of the intelligence agencies publicly. The main proposal of the draft law was the establishment of a full-
time new institution, the “Permanent Authorised Representative of the Parliamentary Control Panel” (Ständiger 
Bevollmächtigter des Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremiums) to support the PKGr in its “co-ordination with the 
other committees and, as its prolonged arm, to also exercise the rights of the Control Panel [...] in a strategic sense 
against the Federal Government and the Federal Intelligence Services” 374 (for the final regulations on the Repre-
sentative, as laid down in the Act, see below). This new authority had already been under discussion in 2009 (see 
above). However, the proposal had then been rejected, particularly because of the possibly emerging democratic 
deficit if he/she took over rights of the Panel. Those concerns (see below) are not addressed in the Bill. The Bill, 
furthermore, explicitly rejects the possibility of introducing a Commissioner for the Intelligence Services (Geheim-
dienstbeauftragten) who had to be elected by Parliament. The main reasons for the rejection were that the introduc-
tion of such a commissioner would contravene minority rights, that the collaboration of two bodies elected by Par-
liament could become difficult and that Parliament would lose some of its powers by delegating them to an “auton-
omous control institution”.375 The draft furthermore, more or less incidentally, proposed to change the rules on the 
chairman of the Panel: instead of switching annually, the chairman should now be elected for one legislative period, 
thereby making indirectly sure that he was part of the majority parliamentary group.   
The parliamentary group Die Linke introduced its own Bill and moved a motion in 2015, and the parliamentary group 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen moved a motion in 2016. All three got rejected. The Bill of Die Linke, however, only saw the 
proposed improvements as a temporary solution and still pleaded for the abolition of the security agencies in general, 
referring to the NSA/BND spy scandal as well as the “structural problems” of controlling the security agencies since 
the 80s.376 The Bill of Die Linke was, furthermore, not solely focussed on the PKGr but also wanted to increase the 
rights to information of the Committee of Defence and the Committee on Internal Affairs, irrespective of whether 
the PKGr was already informed about certain occurrences. It furthermore proposed a closer cooperation with the 
control panels of the Federal States as well as public questionings of the respective Ministers and the heads of the 
secret services by the PKGr at least twice a year.  
The motion of the parliamentary group of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen mentioned several reasons why the PKGr Act 
needed to be fundamentally reformed: the PKGr and the G10 Commission had—once again—only heard about illegal 
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activities by the services through the press, not by the government; the staff of the PKGr was too small; and there 
was a severe lack of information exchange between the different parliamentary control bodies as well as control 
bodies of the EU/the federal states. The necessary changes that Bündnis90/Die Grünen proposed were the following: 
express definitions of the occurrences and what fell into their scope (for example “co-ordinations with foreign intel-
ligence agencies”); the right to impose sanctions if the government was unwilling to share, or only partly shared the 
necessary information with the PKGr by publicly reporting on it (“including a detailed description”); the introduction 
of sound recordings as well as a keeping of minutes of the meetings of the PKGr; the possibility “for the members of 
the Panel not only to evaluate the Panel’s discussions publicly, but also to report on them, if a majority of its members 
agrees and the security and the weal of persons or the Federal Republic are not endangered by that”; the possibility—
under certain circumstances—to hold public meetings.377 
In the legislative process and the debates on the draft of the CDU/CSU and SPD, the Opposition has particularly 
expressed its concern that the introduction of the office of the Permanent Authorised Representative may actually 
decrease the democratic legitimacy of the Panel. MP Hahn (who was formerly the first chairman of Die Linke in the 
PKGr) particularly emphasised his resistance: “[T]here is a serious risk that particularly sensitive acts and files will in 
the future be submitted to the Representative alone and not to the elected MPs. This would not support parliamen-
tary control, but ultimately eradicate it.”378 Furthermore, there were worries that he or she may not “support the work 
of the parliamentarians but instead surrogate it.” S/he may instead be “another level that filters information” (MP 
Ströbele).379 MP Hahn furthermore particularly criticised the Bill for not allowing the members of the Panel “to get 
an insight into the electronic data and networks of the services—like in the Dutch model [...].”380 Additionally, Hahn 
particularly emphasised the need to not only review but also oversee the activities of the intelligence agencies.381 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
377 “Die Mitglieder des PKGr dürfen dessen Beratungen anders als bisher in der Öffentlichkeit nicht nur bewerten, sondern auch inhaltlich 
darüber berichten, sofern das PKGr dies mit Mehrheit beschließt, außer die Sicherheit oder das Wohl von Personen oder der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland würden hierdurch gefährdet.“ (Translation mine). 
Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 18th Parl, BT-Drucksache 18/8163 (18 April 2016) [BT-Drucksache 
18/8163]. 
378 “[…] [es] besteht die ernsthafte Gefahr, dass besonders sensible Vorgänge und Akten künftig allein dem Bevollmächtigten vorgelegt 
werden und nicht mehr den gewählten Abgeordneten. Damit würde die parlamentarische Kontrolle nicht unterstützt, sondern letztlich 
ausgehebelt”. (Translation mine). 
Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Debates, 18th Parl, Plenarprotokoll 18/184 (08 July 2016) at 18266 [Plenarprotokoll 
18/184]. 
379 “[…] eine weitere Ebene, die Informationen filtert.” (Translation mine). Andre Meister, “Gesetzentwurf zur Geheimdienst-Kontrolle: 
Große Koalition will Massenüberwachung legalisieren und legitimieren (2 Updates)”, netzpolitik.org (22 June 2016), online:  
<https://netzpolitik.org/2016/gesetzentwurf-zur-geheimdienst-kontrolle-grosse-koalition-will-massenueberwachung-legalisieren-und-
legitimieren/>.  
380 “[…] die Schaffung der Möglichkeit zur Einsicht in die elektronischen Daten und Netzwerke der Dienste – nach holländischem 
Vorbild.” (Translation mine). Ibid.  
381 Ibid.  
 
 60
The new PKGr Act that became effective in November 2016 amended the provision on the chairman who is now 
being elected by the PKGr (as is the vice-chairman). The presidents of the intelligence services will be heard publicly 
once a year.382 And the Panel will be given supplementary staff of the Bundestag administration.383 The Act’s most 
important new feature is the position of the Permanent Representative. He/She is bound by instructions of the 
PKGr384 and conducts “regular and specific, individual investigations”385 on behalf of the PKGr. “The Permanent Rep-
resentative shall prepare the meetings of the Parliamentary Control Panel and its reports to the plenum of the German 
Bundestag. He or she regularly attends the meetings of the Parliamentary Control Panel, that of the Commission 
under Article 10 of the Basic Law and the Trust Committee under Article 10a of the Federal Budget Regulation.”386 In 
the sessions of the PKGr, the Representative reports on his/her findings to the Panel. “The Permanent Representative 
shall be appointed by the President of the German Bundestag for a term of five years on a proposal [of the majority 
of the members present] of the Parliamentary Control Panel. A reappointment is permitted once.”387 The Representa-
tive may only work for the PKGr and is not allowed to have other commitments.388 Any person might be appointed 
as Representative “who has reached at least the age of 35, has the right to be appointed to the judicial office or to the 
higher non-technical administrative service, and who is authorised to deal with classified documents and is formally 
obliged to maintain secrecy.”389 
This part of the chapter should technically only focus on the PKGr. However, in 2016, the new reform of the PKGr 
was not the only change to the security architecture. Whereas the politicians of the government parliamentary groups 
were eager to express their support for the Parliamentary Control Panel and to stress the importance of parliamentary 
control, they—at the same time—introduced a new institution, i.e. a non-parliamentarian control body for the BND, 
to the system. The fact that the new body was established at the time when the new reform law on the PKGr was 
enacted makes it essential to discuss both the reform and the new body at the same time.  
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Along with the new regulations for the BND that were described on page 10, the new BND law introduced a new 
control body—the so-called “Independent Body” (“unabhängiges Gremium”).390 The new body will be filled with six 
members: the chairman, two committee members and three deputy members, who step in if a member is prevented 
for any reason.391 The six members are all either judges of the Federal High Court of Justice or Federal Public Prose-
cutors at the Federal High Court. Therefore, the President of the Federal High Court of Justice and the Federal Public 
Prosecutor General then nominate the members whom the Federal Cabinet may then appoint for six years. There-
fore, the members are “independent and not subject to any instructions”.392 The body is supposed to meet at least 
every three months and to report to the PKGr at least semi-annually.393 The Federal Chancellery has to inform the 
new body before the execution of any directive (or immediately after the execution in the case of imminent danger) 
that allows the BND to “collect and process information from within the country, including personal data from tele-
communications networks, through which the telecommunications of foreigners takes place (telecommunication 
networks)”.394 It may also randomly monitor the automatic transfer of data to foreign bodies.395 
The new body is an expression of the fact that the government is convinced that the BND does not act contrarily to 
Art. 10 of the Basic Law and that the G10 Commission is thus not competent. Wetzling comments on the new law: 
“In practice, it will be difficult to distinguish between bearers of German fundamental rights, EU Member States and 
authorities, EU citizens and the rest of the world. It will be difficult to control whether the BND is able to achieve a 
clean separation, in particular for an independent body, which meets less frequently than the G10 Commission, but 
has to legally control a significantly greater range of action.”396Although the law states that the rights of the PKGr 
remain unaffected by the establishment of the new body, it is doubtful that a new body will increase the willingness 
of the agencies as well as the government to seriously cooperate with the PKGr. This helps to demonstrate the gov-
ernment’s strong reluctance to seriously support parliamentary control. A former judge of the Federal High Court of 
Justice, Nešković, raised respective concerns to Netzpolitik.org: “In the Parliamentary Control Panel, the governmen-
tal groups have a reliable majority, and in the ‘Independent Body’ they control who is called. This means that control 
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390 § 16 Gesetz zur Ausland- Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes.   
391 Ibid.  
392 Ibid.  
393 Ibid, § 16 IV, VI.  
394 “[…] vom Inland aus mit technischen Mitteln Informationen einschließlich personenbezogener Daten aus Telekommunikationsnetzen, 
über die Telekommunikation von Ausländern im Ausland erfolgt (Telekommunikationsnetze), zu erheben und verarbeiten.” (Translation 
mine). Ibid, § 6 I.  
395 Ibid, § 15 I.  
396 “In der Praxis wird schwer zwischen deutschen Grundrechtsträgern, EU-Mitgliedstaaten und -behörden, EU-Bürgern und dem Rest der 
Welt unterschieden werden können. Ob dem BND die saubere Trennung gelingt, wird zudem schwer zu kontrollieren sein. Insbesondere 
nicht von einem unabhängigen Gremium, das seltener zusammenkommt als die G-10 Kommission, dafür aber ein bedeutend größeres 
Handlungsspektrum juristisch kontrollieren soll.” (Translation mine). Andre Meister, “BND-Gesetz”, supra note 60. 
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remains what it has been so far—a macabre joke.”397 Therefore, the reforms in 2016 not only led to changes to the 
Panel itself (election of the chairman, additional staff). It also and primarily introduced the Permanent Representative 
and, as a new control institution, the Independent Body. Before turning to the Canadian control system, it might be 
of interest to elaborate on the potential influence of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights 
on the German system. 
V. The Influence of the European Union (“EU”) and the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) on 
the Architecture of Parliamentary Control in Germany 
A factor of the German system, compared to Canada, is the influence of the European Union (EU), the Council of 
Europe (CoE) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on German legislation. The following section will 
give a short overview of the various influences that ‘European’ law has had on the German system. It will not give 
detailed information on oversight and review on the international level or by the EU itself or on related controversies 
on data processing and information gathering by the EU.398  
1. Influence of the Council of Europe (“CoE”) and the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) 
The next section reflects on the influence of the CoE and the ECtHR on the German national security architecture, 
i.e. on German reactions to the judgements of the ECtHR and the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) 
as well as other kinds of CoE-influences. It does not aim at giving a broad or general overview of the policy of the 
ECtHR and the CoE and the respective general legal system.  
Several articles of the European Convention on Human Rights allow for an encroachment upon these rights if neces-
sary in terms of national security.399 Additionally, as Cameron points out, “the ECtHR has held that where there is an 
exceptional situation threatening public order, such as a wave of terrorist violence, then this background can be 
taken into account in determining the legitimacy of measures that allegedly infringe ECHR rights.”400 The ECtHR has 
made several judgements concerning the assertion of powers of the security services, for example in Harman and 
Hewitt v UK.401 In this case, the ECtHR ruled that an encroachment by the secret service upon the fundamental right 
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397 “Im Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremium haben die Regierungsfraktionen eine verlässliche Mehrheit und beim ‘Unabhängigen 
Gremium‘ haben sie es in der Hand, wer berufen wird. Damit bleibt die Kontrolle das, was sie bislang war – ein makaberer Witz.” 
(Translation mine). Ibid.  
398 Artur Gruszczak, Intelligence Security in the European Union- Building a Strategic Intelligence Community (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016) at 252. 
399 Art. 6, 8, 10 and 11 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5 [ECHR]. 
400 Iain Cameron, “The European Dimension” in Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff, eds, Global Intelligence Oversight, Governing 
Security in the twenty-first century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 77, exemplary referring to Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145-B 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 48 (1988). 
401 Harman and Hewitt v UK (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 657 at17, referred to by Hans Born & Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal 
Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies. (Oslo: Publishing House of the Parliament of Norway, 2005) at 19. 
 
 63
to Article 8 of the Convention needed a basis in legislation. Therefore, the UK parliament passed the Security Service 
Act 1989, determining the MI 5 rights.402 In several judgements, the ECtHR has described what kind of law was nec-
essary in order to allow for the limitation of the fundamental rights. Born and Leigh mention several of these cases403 
and define the ECtHR qualifications of law as a “Quality of Law Test”.404 The “Quality of Law Test” thus concerns the 
second step: the requirements that the necessary law must fulfil in order to constitute a permissible limitation to the 
fundamental rights.  
In Klass and Others v the Federal Republic of Germany, the ECtHR “held that an individual might, under certain 
conditions, claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures or of legislation 
permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures had been in fact applied to him. The relevant 
conditions were to be determined in each case according to the Convention right or rights alleged to have been 
infringed, the secret character of the measures objected to, and the connection between the applicant and those 
measures”405, “since otherwise Article 8 runs the risk of being nullified”406.407 The Court has since limited the Klass 
Ruling (new threshold of “reasonable likelihood that the security services had compiled and retained information 
concerning his or her private life”) but also “in other cases […] reiterated the Klass and Others approach”.408 The 
Court now follows the so-called “Kennedy Approach” (Kennedy v the United Kingdom409).410 
The Court gave several rulings concerning the communications surveillance of citizens of CoE-member states with 
various means411 and on the right to life. In a very recent judgement of 2017, the Court had to deal with the complaints 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
402 Ibid. (Born & Leigh) at 19.  
403 Sunday Times v. UK, 26 April 1979, 2 EHRR 245 at para 47; Silver and Others v. UK, 25 Mar. 1983, 5 EHRR 347 at para 85; Silver and 
Others v. UK at paras 88-89; Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 5029/71, Report of 9 March 1977 at para 63. Kruslin v. France, 24 
April 1990. A/176-A at para 35, Huvig v. France, 24 April 1990, A/176-B at para 34, cited in Ibid at 20. 
404 Referred to by Born & Leigh, supra note 401 at 20: “In this case, the Court stated that to qualify as ‘law’ a norm must be adequately 
accessible and formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct (Sunday Times v UK, 26 April 1979, 2 
EHRR 245, para 47); [a] law which ‘allows the exercise of unrestrained discretion in individual cases will not possess the essential 
characteristics of foreseeability and thus will not be a law for present purposes. The scope of the discretion must be indicated with 
reasonable certainty.’ (Silver and Others v UK, 25 Mar. 1983, 5 EHRR 347, para 85); [c]hecks and other guarantees to prevent the misuse of 
powers by the intelligence services must be established if there is to be consistency with fundamental human rights. Safeguards must exist 
against abuse of the discretion established by law (Silver and Others v UK, para 88-89); [a]s far as these safeguards are not written in the 
law itself, the law must at least set up the conditions and procedures for interference (Klass v FRG, No. 5029/71, 
Report of 9 March 1977 para 63. Kruslin v France, 24 April 1990. A/176-A, para 35, Huvig v France, 24 April 1990, A/176-B, para. 34).” 
405 Roman Zakharov v Russia [GC], no. 47143/06, 4 December 2015 at 165 [Roman Zakharov]. 
406 Klass v Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 403 at 36. 
407 Roman Zakharov, supra note 405 at 165. 
408 Ibid at 166/167.  
409 Kennedy v the United Kingdom, [2010] ECHR 26839/05, [2010] ECHR All ER (D) 224.  
410 “Firstly, the Court will take into account the scope of the legislation permitting secret surveillance measures by examining whether the 
applicant can possibly be affected by it, either because he or she belongs to a group of persons targeted by the contested legislation or 
because the legislation directly affects all users of communication services by instituting a system where any person can have his or her 
communications intercepted. Secondly, the Court will take into account the availability of remedies at the national level and will adjust the 
degree of scrutiny depending on the effectiveness of such remedies”, ECtHR in Roman Zakharov, supra note 405 at 171. 
411 For example, Copland v the United Kingdom, no. 62617/00, ECHR 2007-I; Khmel v Russia, no. 20383/04, 12 December 2013; Uzun v 
Germany, no. 35623/05, ECHR 2010; S. and Marper v the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, ECHR 2008; Sher and 
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concerning the Beslan terror attack of 2004, where “[t]he applicants argued that the Russian authorities [the intelli-
gence services412] had had knowledge of a real and immediate threat to life but had failed to take the reasonable 
preventive measures available”413, claiming a violation of Article 2 of the Convention on Human Rights.414 The judge-
ment against Russia415 clearly shows the different kind of influences the ECtHR may have on the security structure of 
its member states. Not only may it define thresholds for domestic laws, it also forces the member states’ governments 
to make sure that their intelligence services are taking the appropriate measures and steps to protect their citizens.  
Furthermore, in judgements concerning the extraterritorial rendition of people from member states’ territories416, 
“[t]he Court has confirmed that even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and 
organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned [Article 3 of the Convention].”417 This case law may 
also be important considering the cooperation of western intelligence agencies with security agencies of countries 
that actually or allegedly torture their detainees.418 Prior to the case Al Nashiri v. Poland, concerning the secret CIA 
prisons and detentions and the collaboration of the States Parties to the Convention, the Council of Europe had 
introduced a procedure under Art. 52 of the Convention, sending the following questionnaire to the States Parties of 
the Convention: 
[t]he States were asked to explain how their internal law ensured the effective implementation of the Convention on four issues: 1) 
adequate controls over acts by foreign agents in their jurisdiction; 2) adequate safeguards to prevent, as regards any person in their 
jurisdiction, unacknowledged deprivation of liberty, including transport, with or without the involvement of foreign agents; 3) ade-
quate responses (including effective investigations) to any alleged infringements of ECHR rights, notably in the context of depriva-
tion of liberty, resulting from conduct of foreign agents; 4) whether since 1 January 2002 any public official had been involved, by 
action or omission, in such deprivation of liberty or transport of detainees; whether any official investigation was under way or had 
been completed.419 
The CoE was not only requesting a statement concerning these matters of the Polish government but of all govern-
ments of the states that had signed the Convention. The results were later published in an official report.420 As a 
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Others v the United Kingdom, no. 5201/11, 20 October 2015 (not final); Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.) (no. 54934/00, ECHR 2006-
XI, listed in European Court of Human Rights, Research and Library Division of the ECtHR. International and national courts 
confronting large-scale violations of human rights -Terrorism-; Background paper for the seminar, Opening of the Judicial Year 2016, 
online: European Court of Human Rights <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Seminar_background_paper_2016_part_2_ENG.pdf>. 
412 Ibid at 8. 
413 Tagayeva and Others v Russia, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0413JUD002656207 at 478.  
414 Ibid.  
415 The Court held inter alia that Russia had violated the positive obligation to protect the lives of the endangered people (Art. 2 ECHR) by 
avoiding or at least minimising the terrorist threat and taking the appropriate measures (in this case in particular since the terrorist threat 
was very specific).  
416 For example, El-Masri v the Former Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, ECHR 2012 [El-Masri]; Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 
28761/11, 24 July 2014 [Al Nashiri].  
417 El-Masri, ibid. at 195, referring to Chahal v the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 79, Reports 1996-V and Labita v Italy [GC], no. 
26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV. 
418 Cf. the Arar-scandal in Canada (see below, part II of the thesis). 
419 Al Nashiri, supra note 416 at 241.  
420 (SG/Inf (2006) 5) of 28 February 2006.  
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result, the Secretary General of the CoE proposed several measures to the governments of the CoE-States “to control 
the activities of foreign intelligence services in Europe, reviewing state immunity, and making better use of existing 
controls on over-flights, including requiring landing and search of civil flights engaged in state functions”. According 
to the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE webiste, none of the proposals has so far ever been put into practice.421  
Furthermore, on the topic of the secret CIA detentions and the collaboration with several member states of the CoE 
as well as renditions, “[o]n 1 November 2005 the Parliamentary Assembly of the [CoE] launched an investigation into 
allegations of secret detention facilities being run by the CIA in many member states, for which Swiss Senator Dick 
Marty was appointed rapporteur.”422 So far, there have been three so-called Marty Reports in 2006423, 2007424 and 
2011425, all of which came to the conclusion that secret detention centres had existed in CoE-member states and that 
extraordinary renditions had happened. In the 2007 report, it was also referred to a German citizen who was the 
victim of an extraordinary rendition by the CIA to Afghanistan:  
In Germany, the work of the Bundestag commission of inquiry is proceeding energetically. But the prosecutorial authorities, en-
gaged in the hunt for the kidnappers of Khaled El-Masri, still meet with lack of co-operation on the part of the American and Mace-
donian authorities. Khaled El-Masri still awaits the rehabilitation and redress of damages owed to him, in the same way as Maher 
Arar, the victim in a comparable case in Canada.426 
Unlike the Canadian case, the German commission of inquiry came to the conclusion—in contrast to statements of 
El-Masri, possible witnesses427 and NGOs—that no German authority had known about the incident and that there 
had been no intelligence collaboration either while he had been in Afghanistan.428 The Commission of Inquiry, which 
was not only concerned with the case of El-Masri, but also with the activities of the German security agencies in the 
war in Iraq (including two other cases of extraordinary renditions to Guantanamo Bay and Syria), was harshly criti-
cised for its work and work results, for example by the ECCHR, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human 
Rights.429 The ECCHR heavily supported the claim that the German authorities had known about the extraordinary 
renditions and that there had been at least information sharing between the German authorities and foreign agencies, 
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421 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, The Council of Europe's investigation into illegal transfers and 
secret detentions in Europe: a chronology, online: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
<www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/FeaturesManager-View-EN.asp?ID=362>.  
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423 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of 
detainees involving Council of Europe member states. Doc. 10957 (12 June 2006).  
424 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. Secret detentions 
and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report. Doc. 11302 rev. (11 June 2007). 
425 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Abuse of state secrecy and national security: obstacles to 
parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of human rights violations. Doc. 12714 (16 September 2011). 
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427 For example, Peter Blechschmidt, “El-Masri-Entführung – ‚Die Botschaft war früher informiert‘“, Süddeutsche Zeitung (17 Mai 2010), 
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428 BT-Drucksache 16/13400, supra note 428 at 353. 
429 European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Folter und die Verwertung von Informationen bei der 
Terrorismusbekämpfung. Die Fälle Kurnaz, Zammar und el-Masri vor dem BND-Untersuchungssausschuss, ed (Berlin: ECCHR, 2011). 
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thereby also relying on the statements of Marty in the commission of inquiry.430 It furthermore used the Canadian 
Arar Commission as an example of an inquiry that—unlike the German commission—“showed great sensitivity to 
liberal and democratic legal principles as well as a special commitment to the protection of basic human rights.”431 In 
2017, the German Federal Public Prosecutor who had “launched an examination as to whether the report raise(d) 
suspicions that crimes (had) been committed under the German Code of Crimes against International Law 
(CCAIL)”432 discontinued his investigations due to the limitation period in proceedings, according to Der Spiegel.433  
In 2011, the Marty Report furthermore proposed:  
With regard to international co-operation between oversight bodies, the Assembly calls on parliaments participating in the develop-
ment of the future ‘Network of European expertise relating to parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence services’ to con-
sider widening the terms of reference of the future network and the range of participants in order to make it an effective instrument 
of co-operation between the competent bodies of all Council of Europe member and observer states, making it possible to remedy 
the shortcomings in parliamentary oversight resulting from increased international co-operation between the services in question.434 
In 2017, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner of Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, visited Germany for one week “to 
assess [its] effective respect for human rights.”435 The report by Muižnieks particularly emphasised the role of the 
BND in the mass surveillance NSA scandal and the BND’s surveillance of European partners. The CoE-Commissioner 
of Human Rights also criticised the current oversight/review structure in Germany. “In the Commissioner’s view, 
current challenges relating to effective oversight of intelligence and security services in Germany include the lack of 
resources and expertise, the scope of the oversight of telecommunications, problems of coordination, as well as the 
absence of effective remedies for persons affected by surveillance of their telecommunications.”436 He emphasised 
the “lack of resources […][:] the ratio of the number of overseers to the number of those subject to oversight is 
especially telling: two bodies of 13 members, supported by a small secretariat, are responsible for the oversight of 
activities involving, for the largest agency (the BND), a staff of about 6,000.”437 He concluded and proposed:  
The authorities should also guarantee that all oversight bodies have access to all information, regardless of its level of classification, 
which they deem to be relevant to the fulfilment of their mandates. Access to information by oversight bodies should be enshrined 
in law and supported by recourse to investigative powers and tools which ensure such access.  
The question of surveillance operated by the German intelligence services over non- German citizens outside of Germany should 
be clarified. The Commissioner urges the authorities to ensure adherence to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
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430 Ibid at 33.  
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432 Update of 7 CoE-Member States on the CIA secret detention centres and extraordinary renditions, online: <website-
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Rights, guaranteeing the right to private life, which should apply to all activities of the states that are party to this Convention, 
including all its national security and intelligence activities.438 
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany rejected the criticism of the Human Rights Commissioner on 
the issue of oversight/review.439 
The European Convention on Human Rights has—according to Art. 59 II of the Basic Law—the character of a federal 
law. Therefore, “[t]his classification means that German courts must observe and apply the Convention within the 
limits of methodically justifiable interpretation like other statute law of the Federal Government.”440 Furthermore, 
the Constitutional Court held that “[t]he decisions of the EC[t]HR have particular importance for Convention law as 
the law of international agreements, because they reflect the current state of development of the Convention and its 
protocols. […] It follows from […] [Art. 46 of the Convention] that the judgments of the EC[t]HR are binding on 
the parties to the proceedings and thus have limited substantive res judicata.”441 Even if Germany is not a party to the 
conflict but the ECtHR judgement is directed at another member state, the Constitutional Court concludes that 
[t]he binding effect of decisions of the EC[t]HR depends on the area of competence of the state bodies and the relevant law. 
Administrative bodies and courts may not free themselves from the constitutional system of competencies and the binding effect of 
statute and law (Article 20.3 of the Basic Law) by relying on a decision of the EC[t]HR. But the binding effect of statute and law also 
includes a duty to take into account the guarantees of the Convention and the decisions of the EC[t]HR as part of a methodologically 
justifiable interpretation of the law. Both a failure to consider a decision of the EC[t]HR and the ‘enforcement’ of such a decision in 
a schematic way, in violation of prior-ranking law, may therefore violate fundamental rights in conjunction with the principle of the 
rule of law. […] If there are decisions of the EC[t]HR that are relevant to the assessment of a set of facts, then in principle the 
aspects taken into account by the EC[t]HR when it considered the case must also be taken into account when the matter is consid-
ered from the point of view of constitutional law, in particular when proportionality is examined, and there must be a consideration 
of the findings made by the EC[t]HR after weighing the rights of the parties.442 
After this judgement, the influence of the Convention as well as the judgements of the ECtHR have been even more 
emphasised by the Constitutional Court “[i]n a tone which showed an even higher affinity to the European Human 
Rights Convention.”443 Therefore, different requirements of the statute law for the security agencies that are displayed 
in the so-called “Quality of law test” have influence through the normative influence of the ECHR and ECtHR on the 
judgements of the Constitutional Court that are concerned with these laws. Caparini and Gruszczak therefore argue 
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443 “[…] deutlich EMRK-affinere Tonlage.” (Translation mine). Christoph Grabenwarter & Katharina Pabel, Europäische 
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that international bodies such as the CoE and the ECtHR constitute a new444 “dimension of accountability” by “re-
veal[ing] secret information and launch[ing] international investigations [and] even [by] set[ting] some standards 
with regard to oversight and accountability.”445 
2. Influence of the European Union (“EU”) 
The extent to which the European Union may influence the national responsibility to provide for an adequate national 
security and national review mechanism is difficult to grasp in only a few paragraphs. Therefore, this paper only gives 
a very limited overview of the EU’s possible influence and its implications. Additionally, in any case, as Gruszczak 
argues, “[i]ndeed, the principle of originator control is the critical determinant of intelligence oversight in the EU, 
hampering efforts to strengthen the independent control and supervision of information management and intelli-
gence sharing in the EU security fields.”446 Therefore, this paper only reflects on the influence of the EU on the 
national security oversight and review structure, not on any kind of EU oversight. Also, it will not elaborate on the 
issue of national parliaments overseeing EU agencies or collaborations, for example as set out in Art. 88 of the Treaty 
of the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).  
In general, as noted above, the member states of the EU kept the sole competence in the area of national security 
(see Art. 4 s 2 Treaty on European Union, “TEU”447 and Art. 72 TFEU448). One may therefore already argue that the 
EU’s influence on the German national security structure is rather limited. The EU does have the “competence to 
agree on foreign policies ‘to safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity’ (Art. 
21 TEU) […] [and the shared competence] to adopt legislation in the area of police cooperation (Art. 87 TFEU) and, 
in relation to material criminal law, as regards organized crime and terrorism (Art. 88 TFEU).”449 
There are different areas of law in which the EU had had a great impact on the German legislation and judgements 
by the courts, for example in the area of data protection. Firstly, EU provisions on data protection do exist. In April 
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2016, the new “General Data Protection Regulation”450 as well as the Directive (EU) 2016/680451 were adopted and 
entered into force in 2016. The regulation will be applied from May 2018 onwards and the directive needs to be 
implemented by the member states into national law by May 2018 as well. Both the regulation as well as the directive 
are part of the “reform of EU data protection rules” as a “robust set of rules to make sure people's right to personal 
data protection—recognised by Article 8 of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights—remains effective in the digital 
age [emphasis in the original].”452 The reform package will provide for a harmonisation of the data protection laws in 
the European member states, including the statutory provision of the new so-called “right to be forgotten”, a right 
that the European Court of Justice had developed in 2014453. The regulation also includes, for example, a chapter on 
“transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations” as well as a chapter on “independent 
supervisory authorities.”454 In Germany, a new statute law on data protection will be established.455 Here, “[i]n the 
interest of a homogenous development of the general data protection law, the new Federal Data Protection Act 
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) is to be applied, insofar as this is not regulated by that law or by sector-specific laws, also 
for the processing of personal data within the scope of activities of federal public authorities outside the scope of the 
Union law, such as data processing by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Federal Intelli-
gence Service or the Military Counterintelligence Service or in the area of the Security Verification Act.”456 Thus, the 
EU does not only have a direct influence on German legislation in terms of the provisions of the regulation and the 
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purposes of the directive, but also indirectly, by influencing the data protection laws also in areas outside their com-
petence.  
Also, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has ruled in several instances on data protection. Two instances were 
mentioned above, the “right to be forgotten”457 as well as the judgement on the German Data Commissioner.458 An-
other judgement worth mentioning is the Court’s judgement on the data retention and safe harbour provisions.459 
The ECJ held that the Data Rendition Directive460 was invalid because it violated Arts. 7 (‘Respect for private and 
family life’), 8 (‘Protection of personal data’) and 52 (‘Scope of guaranteed rights’- principle of proportionality) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.461 Germany had not yet incorporated the Directive into 
national law and was thus expecting fines by the European Commission. In 2016, the ECJ ruled again on data rendition 
on a request of the Administrative Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Sweden and the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) 
(Civil Division), United Kingdom on the interpretation of EU law.462 This time, the ECJ held: 
[g]iven the seriousness of the interference in the fundamental rights concerned represented by national legislation which, for the 
purpose of fighting crime, provides for the retention of traffic and location data, only the objective of fighting serious crime is 
capable of justifying such a measure […] Further, while the effectiveness of the fight against serious crime, in particular organised 
crime and terrorism, may depend to a great extent on the use of modern investigation techniques, such an objective of general 
interest, however fundamental it may be, cannot in itself justify that national legislation providing for the general and indiscriminate 
retention of all traffic and location data should be considered to be necessary for the purposes of that fight.463 
The ECJ therefore prohibits the “general and indiscriminate retention”464 of traffic data and location data. The current 
German statute law on data rendition is currently being challenged before the Constitutional Court. Heavily criticised 
by NGOs as well as opposition parties and the Data Commissioner465, the research services division of the Bundestag 
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has now come to the conclusion that the German law is incompatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU as well as with the new standards established by the ECJ.466 
Interesting and worthwhile noting in this small chapter on the European Union’s influence is the European Parlia-
ment’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (“LIBE”). Of particular interest are the studies that 
have been done in the framework of national security law in the last couple of years, for example: “Parliamentary 
Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies in the European Union” (2011)467, “Developing an EU Internal Secu-
rity Strategy, Fighting Terrorism and Organised Crime” (2011)468, “The US Surveillance Programmes and Their Impact 
on EU Citizen’s Fundamental Rights” (2013)469, “Evaluation of EU Measures to Combat Terrorism Financing” (2014)470, 
“National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges” (2014)471, “A 
Quest for Accountability? EU and Member State Inquiries into the CIA Rendition and Secret Detention Programme” 
(2015)472 and “The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism” (2017)473. The studies may indeed influence the 
EU policies by influencing the decisions of the EU parliament; they do, however, have no direct influence on the 
legislation and security architectures in the member states. 
Furthermore, the studies clearly aim at the EU politicians. For example, the study on parliamentary oversight was 
conducted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the European Union 
Institute (EUI). Its aim was to “identify democratic standards and best practice as well as a proper balance between 
the demands of secrecy and the need for scrutiny which can be used by the European Parliament (EP) when it sets 
up its own oversight body.”474 Thus, the authors did not seek to exert an influence on the Member States’ policies. 
The study does, however, also refer to the oversight of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(“Europol”) as well as of Eurojust475 and Frontex476, not only by the EU parliament but also by the national parliaments.  
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Due to the limited space, the following evaluation will only focus on the just recently updated control mechanisms 
for Europol. Art. 88 TFEU explicitly states that “[t]hese regulations [on Europol] shall also lay down the procedures 
for scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, together with national parliaments.” On May 11, 2016, 
the European Council and European Parliament adopted a new regulation on Europol.477 With regards to the over-
sight/review of Europol’s power, the regulation states: “While respecting the role of the European Parliament to-
gether with national parliaments in the scrutiny of Europol's activities, it is necessary that Europol be a fully account-
able and transparent internal organisation. To that end, in light of Article 88 TFEU, procedures should be established 
for the scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament together with national parliaments. […] However, 
the way in which national parliaments scrutinise their governments in relation to the activities of the Union is a matter 
for the particular constitutional organisation and practice of each Member State.”478 Chapter VIII then sets up a “Joint 
Parliamentary Scrutiny Group” (“JPSG”), “established together by the national parliaments and the competent com-
mittee of the European Union.”479 Art 51 of the Regulation also refers to Article 9 of Protocol No 1 of the Lisbon Treaty 
on the role of national parliaments in the EU which states that “[t]he European Parliament and national Parliaments 
shall together determine the organisation and promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation 
within the Union.” The new regulation also sets up a new right of the national parliaments as they shall also receive 
annual reports.480 In April 2017, the speakers of the member states’ parliaments came together to inter alia establish 
the new control body. Amongst other details, they decided that “each Parliament shall have the right to nominate up 
to four members of the JPSG; in the case of bicameral parliaments each Chamber shall have the right to nominate up 
to two members of the JPSG. The European Parliament shall have the right to nominate up to 16 members of the 
JPSG. […] The JPSG shall meet twice a year.”481 Even though they also decided that there might be additional meet-
ings, for example for “matters of urgency”482, it is doubtful that the committee can deal with the amount of infor-
mation, coming from all member states, that is processed by Europol.  
In Germany, after the Lisbon Treaty, the Constitution furthermore set up a few rules on the involvement of the 
national parliament in EU politics. Art. 23 of the Basic Law for example states that “[t]he Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
shall have the right to bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union to challenge a legislative act 
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of the European Union for infringing the principle of subsidiarity” and that “[t]he Bundestag and, through the Bun-
desrat, the Länder shall participate in matters concerning the European Union. The Federal Government shall keep 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat informed, comprehensively and at the earliest possible time.”483 
As for the lack of kompetenz-kompetenz on the EU’s side, one may quote Ian Cameron: “the EU will legislate, and 
adopt treaties on, areas indirectly touching intelligence accountability. However, the lack of formal EU competence 
in national security matters means that to a large extent it is forced to build upon the case law of the ECtHR. […] If 
there is no real interest at the national level in improved oversight, which is where such oversight must be imple-
mented in any event, then it is asking a lot of the ECtHR to disprove of the oversight solution adopted by the state, 
even if most impartial observers would regard the system as gravely deficient.”484  
In conclusion, this chapter has described the German system of parliamentary control, its genesis and the European 
influence on the German model. Before turning to any kind of assessment of the German model in order to work 
out potential lessons for the Canadian system, the Canadian approach to parliamentary control needs to be and will 
be described closely in the following chapter. 
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Chapter II: Canada: The Long Path to Bill C-22. Parliamentary Control and National 
Security Matters between 1969 and 2017 
 “Before us are issues that question the very foundations upon which our parliamentary sys-
tem is built. In a system of responsible government, the fundamental right of the House of 
Commons to hold the government to account for its actions is an indisputable privilege and 
in fact an obligation.”485 – Speaker Peter Milliken 
In June 2016, the Canadian government proposed a new Bill to Parliament—Bill C-22.486 Bill C-22 will establish the 
first Canadian National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliament (“NSICOP”), thus, the first review commit-
tee of parliamentarians in Canada. The idea of establishing a committee is not new. Indeed, the idea has been debated 
publicly for roughly the last forty years—not only by academics but also in newspapers, by various public inquiries 
and, not least, by parliamentarians in debates over bills and in parliamentary committees. Despite the change in the 
political sphere, from being focussed on Soviet espionage and subversion to global terrorism and the lone wolf prob-
lem, and notwithstanding the technological developments in the last forty years and their influence on national se-
curity, the idea of establishing a committee has stood the test of time.  This chapter aims at reflecting on the last four 
decades of discussions and the idea of legislative control of security agencies: has the idea made progress in the last 
forty years? What exactly were the ideas debated in the different inquiries and put into words in the different bills 
that did not become law? Have former ideas and recommendations been taken over or been neglected by the new 
Bill C-22?  
I.  Legal Concepts  
In 1998, in Reference Re Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada defined democracy broadly speaking as 
“a political system of majority rule.”487 However, there is a lot more to the concept, particularly when elaborating on 
the tension between democracy and transparency on the one side and secrecy needed for diplomacy, military oper-
ations and intelligence activities on the other side. As for the concept of democracy in a Westminster state, one might 
consider going as far back in time as the Magna Carta of 1215, or the Bill of Rights in England of 1688. For the 
purpose of this short overview, it is sufficient to start with the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867.488 Despite the 
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perception of Canada as a democratic state in a Westminster tradition, the notion of democracy is neither explicitly 
mentioned (only indirectly by referring to the UK Constitution in the preamble) nor explained in this document. Not 
surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the explicit textual mentioning of the democratic principle as 
part of the constitutional framework of Canada to be “redundant, even silly” since it was so obvious.489 However, in 
1982, when enacting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”), the democratic rights of the 
citizens, notably, the right of democratic participation in elections, were codified490as a right in section 3 and as an 
overarching normative source in section 1. In 1986, the Supreme Court further elaborated on the concept of democ-
racy in R. v Oakes: “democratic society which I [Chief Justice Dickson] believe to embody, to name a few, respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide 
variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance 
the participation of individuals and groups in society.”491 The Supreme Court further broadened this definition of 
democracy in 1998, when it ruled that the notion of democracy could only stand together with both constitutionalism 
and the principles of the rule of law as the existence of a legal framework was necessary for any kind of legitimacy: 
“[The democratic institutions] must allow for the participation of, and accountability to, the people, through public 
institutions created under the Constitution” and must also respect the “moral values, many of which are embedded 
in our constitutional structure.”492 
The primary public institution that represents the will of the people in a representative parliamentary system is the 
legislature. Through fair elections and equal suffrage, parliamentarians are considered as the people’s representa-
tives. The division of responsibilities within a state between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary is often 
expressed through the application of the notion of the separation of powers. Montesquieu argued in his famous work 
“De l'Esprit des Lois” in 1748 that the separation of power between the legislative and executive was necessary in 
order not to restrict liberty, otherwise, despotic executive officers could legislate and enforce undemocratic legisla-
tion.493 Notwithstanding such long-standing republican conceptions, “under parliamentarism, the ministers, who 
form the government, are themselves able to exercise executive powers (…) and are accountable to Parliament for 
use of these powers. Thus, there is no formal separation between legislative and executive powers (…).”494 It has 
even been argued that the notion of the separation of powers was not applicable at all to the Canadian system,495 
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given the lack of a strict distinction between legislative and executive powers in Canada (particularly considering that 
the legislature can delegate its legislative rights to the executive).496 Beyond the separation of power question, it can 
further be noted that the foundation of the Canadian constitution is one of “parliamentary sovereignty” instead of 
“popular sovereignty.”497 In light of the embeddedness of Cabinet in Parliament and Cabinet’s accountability to Par-
liament, the Supreme Court confirmed the existence of a notion of the separation of power in Canadian constitutional 
law in 1985.498 It highlighted that the “actions undertaken by the executive branch usually must flow from statutory 
authority clearly granted and properly exercised.”499  
Well as that may be, the combined legal and political reality is that the executive in Canada enjoys vast rights and 
powers. In majority governments, the executive can control the House of Commons, appoint Senators to the second 
chamber500 and appoint Judges501 to the Courts.502 For that reason, instead of the notion of the formal separation of 
powers and consistent with the key (indeed dominant) role of the executive despite overarching parliamentary sov-
ereignty, “in Canada, it is more common to view responsible government as a self-standing unwritten principle of the 
Constitution.”503 It is a principle which—in Canada—dates back to the Durham Report504, which inter alia recom-
mended that the executive should be dependent upon the “confidence of the Legislative Assembly”.505 Responsible 
Government therefore “require[s] that the Prime Minister and Cabinet may hold office only for so long as they can 
control a majority of the House of Commons”506, within which system accountability means “the obligation to render 
an account of, and accept responsibility for, one’s actions, both the results obtained and the means used”507, also by 
publicly providing the necessary access to all information that needs to be given in order to ensure for effective 
parliamentary scrutiny. “Thus, democratic government is limited, equal and open government,”508 by virtue of those 
features of Westminster democracy that makes government accountable to Parliament and, despite extensive dele-
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gated and de facto executive powers, that emphasises ultimate parliamentary supremacy over the executive. Further-
more, the principle of parliamentary privilege in Canada is another concept supporting parliamentary sovereignty 
with an attenuated separation of powers. “The purpose of privilege is to recognize Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction 
to deal with complaints within its privileged sphere of activity.”509 
II. National Security  
“National security” is a term that is difficult to delineate. In 2004, the Privy Council Office defined it as “deal[ing] with 
threats that have the potential to undermine the security of the state or society.”510 However, a definition that simply 
repeats the word ‘security’ in an attempt to define “national security” is hardly helpful. Furthermore, Canadian legis-
lation tends to rather focus on the activities that may pose a threat to national security than on the term national 
security itself. The Security of Canada Information Sharing Act for example defines “activities that undermine the 
security of Canada” as “activities that undermine […] the sovereignty, security or territorial integrity of Canada or 
the lives or the security of the people of Canada.”511 Therefore, one may want to go back to 1979 for some sort of 
starting point that would seem to be as valid now as then, when the ‘Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain 
Activities of the Royal Mounted Police’ defined national security in its first report as “the need to preserve the territory 
of our country from attack [and] the need to preserve and maintain the democratic processes of government.”512  
1. Tensions 
In the previous paragraph on democracy, I quoted Green who defined democratic government as being “open” and 
“limited”. The activities of the executive in the field of national security are, however, mostly conducted in secret, 
often, but not always, with good reasons: to protect its sources, gain access to subversive plans and plots, prevent 
terrorism and so on. The government might therefore not always be able to disclose certain information, either to 
the public or even within the executive itself. Effective accountability both within the executive and to the public is 
therefore difficult to achieve.513 Moreover, a conflict exists not only between accountability and secrecy but also be-
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tween security on the one hand and civil rights on the other. In the words of the Supreme Court, “these two propo-
sitions describe a tension that lies at the heart of modern democratic governance. It is a tension that must be resolved 
in a way that respects the imperatives both of security and of accountable constitutional governance.”514 
2. Leading Canadian National Security Agencies  
In Canada, several national security agencies exist, conducting different activities, Bill C-51 mentioning 17 agencies 
and departments that are operating in the field of national security.515 For many of these, for example the Canadian 
Border Services Agency or the Canadian Revenue Agency, no independent review body exists. In this chapter, due to 
lack of space, only three agencies, probably the best known and the ones that are currently subject to review by an 
independent body and therefore play a role in the general oversight and review structure of Canada, will be described 
in more detail. 
a) Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is responsible for law enforcement in the field of national security. The police 
force describes its tasks on its website as “national security criminal investigations, protective policing, border integ-
rity, critical infrastructure protection, marine security, air carrier protection, critical incident management and a host 
of related support services.”516 Since the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2001 as well as the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 (Bill C-
51), the RCMP has received even wider powers in the field of national security.517 Up until 1984, the RCMP was the 
only national security agency conducting investigations. After the RCMP had engaged in illegal activities and rights-
infringing conduct518, a civilian national security agency was established in 1984.519  
b) Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”) 
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (“CSIS Act”)520 established a civilian national security agency, leaving 
the RCMP with law enforcement and investigation powers codified in the Security Offences Act.521The mandate of 
CSIS was originally the collection of intelligence. Since 1984, CSIS’ powers have drastically increased. Critics are now 
calling it—particularly since the enactment of Bill C-51—a “‘kinetic’ service, able to do things to people to ‘reduce’, 
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‘disrupt’ or what used to be called ‘counter’ broadly defined security threats”.522 Thus, s. 12.1 (1) of the CSIS Act 
empowers the Service to take (necessary and proportionate) measures to reduce security threats. These measures 
may even “contravene” rights of the Charter if CSIS gets a warrant granted by a judge.523  
c) Communications Security Establishment of Canada (“CSEC” or “CSE”) 
Created in 1946 for Cold War purposes, the focus of CSEC, the Canadian foreign signals intelligence agency, has 
shifted to anti-terrorism since 9/11. It indeed only received its first express statutory mandate through the Anti-Ter-
rorism Act in 2001.524 In terms of ministerial responsibility, “[t]he Communications Security Establishment was trans-
ferred to the Department of National Defence for administrative purposes in 1975 through an Order-in-Council under 
the Public Service Rearrangement and Transfer of Duties Act.”525 CSEC has particularly been in the focus of the 
media and in the public eye due to the Snowden revelations in 2013 and has since then been under criticism for 
broad collection and analyses of meta-data, for example, data acquired from WiFi-users at Canadian airports526 and 
through mass-surveillance programs.527 Snowden also disclosed that CSEC had spied on Brazil’s mining and energy 
ministry.528 
3. Control Mechanisms 
a) Special Bodies for the Intelligence Agencies 
RCMP Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (“CRCC”) 
The RCMP was subject to review by the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP from 1984 to 2014, 
when the Commission was replaced by the RCMP Civilian Review and Complaints Commission.529 The Commission 
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is an independent body that reviews the “on-duty conduct of RCMP members.”530 Roach and Forcese criticised the 
CRCC for its small budget (especially compared to the powers of the RCMP since 2015), its inability to self-initiate a 
review since it is bound to complaints made by the public (on all matters), its inability to closely cooperate with other 
review bodies, and the fact that the RCMP can refuse its request to access secret information.531 Therefore, they 
concluded that they “wonder whether a body with a dominant complaints mandate and a broad subject-matter remit 
will ever have the resources to exercise an important but highly complicated and potentially resource intensive se-
curity review mandate.”532 Furthermore, the Commission does not have the necessary access to the information 
needed to fulfil its review mandate533 because the RCMP “can refuse to provide [the information requested], citing 
the need to protect operational information and intelligence from foreign sources.”534  
Security Intelligence Review Committee (“SIRC”) 
The independent review body for CSIS’ activities is the Security Intelligence Review Committee. SIRC is firstly re-
sponsible for reviewing the activities of CSIS and is secondly also contact for complaints about CSIS. The committee 
consists of three to five members (one of whom is the Chair), serving for a maximum period of five years. The com-
mittee members are appointed by the Governor in Council after a consultation with the leaders of all official parties 
of the House of Commons (those with more than 12 parliamentarians).535 SIRC annually reports its findings to Parlia-
ment. 
In the debate on a committee of parliamentarians, many Conservative Party MPs (for example, former Public Safety 
Minister Steven Blanley536) argued that a review committee of parliamentarians would only duplicate the work done 
by SIRC and complimented SIRC on the work it had done so far. However, SIRC has also been criticized due to its 
limited scope of review. Notably, since it is only the so-called watchdog of CSIS, it has often had difficulties reviewing 
national security incidents that included activities of other agencies, for example, in the handling of the Omar Khadr 
case537 or the Afghan detainee situation (to be discussed below). 
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Despite SIRC’s limited scope for review, it nevertheless does help to hold CSIS to account. Its 2014/5 concerns about 
CSIS’ data collection prompted the Federal Court rule that the existence of the data collection since 2006 (as part of 
an Operational Data Analysis Center program) was unlawful as the collection was not necessary and proportionate in 
accordance with s. 12 of the CSIS Act, and particularly because the court did not know about the data collection. The 
court therefore concluded that the conduct constituted a breach of CSIS’ “duty of candour.”538 
CSIS Office of the Inspector General (Abolished) 
A second internal review body of CSIS that was put in place in 1984 was the Office of the Inspector General. The 
Inspector General was a kind of oversight mechanism—the Minister’s eyes and ears inside CSIS—and thus enhanced 
ministerial responsibility. However, the position was abolished in 2012 purportedly for financial reasons and on the 
claim that SIRC would supposedly take over the Inspector General’s responsibilities—although with an inadequate 
staffing level.539 
Communications Security Establishment Commissioner 
The only real review body of the CSE(C) is the Office of the CSE(C) Commissioner, who in 2007 became part of the 
Department of National Defence (but kept its own budget).540 The Commissioner, who is a “supernumerary judge or 
a retired judge of a superior court”, works part-time and has quite wide powers to access information.541 He is not 
allowed to cooperate with other review bodies such as SIRC and must not share any secret information with them 
(let alone with the public). The office of the Commissioner has been criticised after it commented on the Snowden 
revelations by stating that CSEC had not unlawfully collected metadata from Canadians.542 It therefore argued in line 
with the then Prime Minister Stephen Harper who had argued that he was not “‘a big believer’ in wide-net electronic 
surveillance.”543 Beyond debates over what CSEC has or has not done, “CSEC is not subject to judicial review and 
(…) their practices are not based on evidentiary standards.”544 Furthermore, many of the objects of investigation of 
the CSEC Commissioner are governed by international agreements and thus cannot be reviewed domestically for 
reasons of secrecy of information.  
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b) Other (Executive) Control Mechanisms 
Ministerial Supervision  
In theory, the respective ministers oversee the activities of the national security agencies and their departments 
(ministerial responsibility). However, weak points of ministerial responsibility have become known, for example in 
2016, when CSIS claimed to have informed the Minister of Public Safety in 2006 and 2010 about its unlawful collection 
of meta-data.545 Furthermore, it seems almost impossible for any minister in current times to stay informed about all 
activities of his/her department and the respective agencies while at the same time having the necessary knowledge 
and expertise to act upon given information. In addition, certain agencies are part of the department of the Minister 
of Public Safety (e.g. the RCMP and CSIS) while others are part of other departments (e.g. CSEC as part of the de-
partment of the Minister of National Defence). The different ministers therefore constantly have to coordinate their 
actions and to collaborate in order to understand the big picture. It might also be considered as problematic that 
ministers, theoretically accountable to parliament, are in practice mostly dependent on the favour of the Prime Min-
ister. Of course, the abolition of the Inspector General only exacerbates the problem with regard to CSIS. As for the 
RCMP, any kind of ministerial responsibility is seen as problematic due to the need for independence of the police 
from politics, leaving the RCMP “untouched by any reform to their almost non-existent accountability”.546 While CSEC 
is indeed dependent upon ministerial authorisations from the Minister of National Defence547, “ministerial authoriza-
tions are general, relating to a class of activities rather than to specific individuals or targets”.548 Furthermore, “[u]nder 
Ministerial Authorization, reviews of CSEC work do not happen until after the authorization has ended.”549  
The Prime Minister’s National Security Advisor (Privy Council Office)  
The Prime Minister’s National Security Advisor is responsible for advising the Prime Minister in the field of national 
security. His mandate has often been part of the debates in inquiries, particularly calling for its expansion to oversee 
the cooperation between and the co-ordination of the work of the different national security agencies and different 
departments of government.550  
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Privacy Commissioner (Officer of Parliament)  
The Privacy Commissioner’s responsibility is limited to “personal information handling and issues related to pri-
vacy.”551 Additionally, particularly since the increase of powers of the agencies in Bill C-51, the workload of the Privacy 
Commissioner has expanded immensely. The new information-sharing powers of “more than 100 federal agencies” 
allow the “information sharing for every imaginable security threat, whenever an agency deems it relevant.”552 There-
fore, an effective review of the privacy impacts of the information-sharing activities of the agencies and departments 
will probably prove unworkable in practice.  
Office of the Auditor General  
The Office of the Auditor General audits all government departments and agencies553 and is like the Privacy Commis-
sioner an “Officer of Parliament”. Since the “Office of the Auditor General of Canada serves Parliament by providing 
it with objective, fact-based information and expert advice on government programs and activities, gathered through 
audits”554, the Office may—similarly to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner—also be considered as part of the 
parliamentary control structure of Canada. Irrespective of this classification, the office does not have the staff nor the 
budget to oversee all national security activities in detail. The Auditor General has, however, issued several reports 
in the realm of national security, for example, a report on “Intelligence and Information Sharing” in March 2009.  
Ad hoc Commissions of Inquiry 
A commission of inquiry may be “established by the Governor in Council [Cabinet] to fully and impartially investigate 
issues of national importance”555under the Inquiries Act. Several different public inquiries investigating issues of na-
tional security have discussed the idea of creating a national security committee of parliamentarians/parliamentary 
committee over the years; they will be listed and discussed below. Former Supreme Court Justice Frank Iacobucci 
(who headed up one such inquiry) assessed inquiries themselves as yet another effective democratic accountability 
mechanism556. As a counterpoint, one might also interpret some inquiries as a last governmental stopgap measure to 
gain back some control over its “own” national security agencies.557  
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c) Parliamentary Control Mechanisms 
Question Period558 in parliament also provides for some kind of accountability—theoretically. In practice, it is difficult 
to ensure additional accountability if the ministers are not well-informed or are schooled in giving ‘non-answers’. 
Furthermore, the questions asked often refer to the current foci of the media559, leading Rempel to conclude that “as 
an oversight tool with respect to any issue that might be considered ‘routine’ or ‘mundane’, including most budgetary 
issues, it is largely ineffective.”560There is also the possibility to ask the minister written questions (known formally as 
Order Paper Questions), which must be answered within 45 days.561 The House of Commons Standing Committee 
on Public Safety and the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence also deal with issues of national security. 
However, they may not be seen as adequate review bodies due to their broad mandate, heavy workload and strict 
party discipline. As well, although committees of Parliament have the right to question witnesses, their members 
have partially “been denied the […] access of information that is needed to ask the right questions of security offi-
cials.”562 The same problem may occur in special committees of the House of Commons, the Senate or both Houses 
that may be established to explicitly deal with issues of national security. Another way to hold government to account 
is the possibility of the legislative to hold a so-called “vote of confidence”, an instrument that is, however, an excep-
tion as it comes with it either the triggering of an election or a change of government within the current Parliament. 
A final way is to hold the government or the head of government (the Prime Minister) in contempt of parliament for 
refusing to produce uncensored information to a parliamentary committee inquiring into a national security matter. 
This is what happened in 2010 in the Afghan detainee situation that I will describe more closely in the following part 
on the views of parliamentary control in Canada and the correlating debates on the establishment of a parliamentary 
control body in roughly the last four decades.  
III. Parliamentary Control and National Security  
1. (Parliamentary) Control in Theory  
Before turning to the history of the idea of legislative control of security agencies it is important to mention the two 
modes by which accountability mechanisms operate in Canada, whether we are talking about parliamentary control 
or also the various extra-parliamentary control bodies and mechanisms mentioned above. Whereas in Canadian na-
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tional security terminology, “review” refers to an ex-post examination of the activities of an executive body, “over-
sight” on the other hand means the examination of ongoing activities—therefore also “the power to issue directions, 
influencing conduct before it occurs.”563 With respect to parliamentary control (whether in an oversight or review 
mode), Franks mentions the following principles: “[…] that administrative activities are conducted under the au-
thority of, and within the limits of the law; […] [and] […] that parliamentary scrutiny is conducted in public, and 
publicity is the effective sanction over the executive.”564 
2. The new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (“NSICOP” or “the Committee”) 
As mentioned above, in June 2016, the Liberal government proposed Bill C-22, a law that establishes Canada’s first 
National Security Committee of Parliamentarians, which became law in June 2017. Before turning to Bill C-22 in its 
final form, this chapter will provide a short overview of the last 40 years in which the establishment of some sort of a 
committee of parliamentarians or parliamentary committee to conduct review (and/or oversight) of the Canadian 
security agencies has been debated. Thereby, the ideas behind Bill C-22 are not only integrated into the history of 
the idea of parliamentary control of the security agencies but the reader may also evaluate its provisions by comparing 
them to different ideas discussed in different situations and instances in the past. Another way of thinking about the 
relevance of historical discussions is in terms of the following question: could the NSICOP have dealt with the scan-
dals and events that prompted debates in the past?   
a) Historical Overview 
MacKenzie Commission, 1969  
The first inquiry to discuss the establishment of a committee of parliamentarians was the Royal Commission on 
Security (“MacKenzie Commission”), which published its report in 1969.565 The inquiry was conducted without “pub-
lic hearings but relied almost entirely upon the RCMP for its information and its interpretation of security issues”.566 
Nonetheless, besides recommending the establishment of a civilian security agency567, the Commission did discuss 
the option of creating a Committee of Parliamentarians because of the “concern of Parliament and the public in the 
general area of security […] [and] to provide some public reassurance that the activities and operations of the Se-
curity Service [then RCMP] are not immune from responsible scrutiny apart from that exercised by the government 
of the day.”568 The commissioners, however, concluded that parliament should not “be directly involved in these 
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executive matters” including because it would be problematic to subject parliamentarians to security clearances.569 
Interestingly enough, the Commission therefore was a strong proponent of the notion of the separation of powers 
in the realm of security (at a time when the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the existence or scope of this 
concept in Canada570).571 
MacDonald Commission, 1979 
The Commission of Inquiry concerning certain activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“MacDonald 
Commission”) focussed on illegalities of the RCMP. In its second report, the Commission recommended the estab-
lishment of a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Security and Intelligence.572 Furthermore, it emphasised that a 
smaller committee than the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs of the House of Commons would pro-
vide for a better and more time-effective possibility to review the activities of the relevant ‘agencies’. The Commis-
sioners also discussed the fear of partisan parliamentarians. They agreed with the findings of the MacKenzie Com-
mission that one should not oblige the parliamentarians to undergo security clearances; instead, they argued that it 
was sufficient to consult the security agency before the appointment of parliamentarians to the committee which 
should then report its concerns to the respective party leader, who would then, one assumes, be expected not to 
appoint parliamentarians about whom the security agency had concerns. Additionally, briefings and the necessity to 
take an oath could be considered. 
The members of the committee would be selected by their respective party leaders who themselves would possibly 
become members of the committee. All parties that were in the House of Commons (and were not planning to 
overthrow the political system) would be proportionately represented in the committee. Additionally, a member of 
the opposition would be the chair of the committee. All in all, not more than ten members would be on the commit-
tee, in order to ensure an effective in-depth review process. The committee itself would be renewed after each legis-
lative period of Parliament to prevent too close links between the parliamentarians and the agencies.  
 The committee would receive annual reports by the Solicitor General and be allowed to question him once a year, 
particularly about the spending of funds (in camera).573 The committee would also be responsible for reviewing 
whether the agencies had “fulfill[ed] the intentions of Parliament as set out in the organization’s legislative charter”.574 
Also, the exercise of extraordinary powers and the possibility of illegal activities of the (recommended new civilian) 
agency should be reviewed by the committee. Therefore, the committee should receive at least one annual report by 
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the Auditor General, particularly also including possible problems of the agency with its legislative mandate. Further-
more, the committee should not only review the activities of one civilian agency but of all federal agencies involved 
in security since otherwise a circumvention of the review might be possible. The MacDonald Commission hoped 
that further commissions of inquiry would not be necessary due to these powers of the new proposed committee.  
Some further recommended features merit mention. If secret information had to be revealed, the committee would 
meet in camera. One of the remedies of the committee would be the possibility to speak out publicly (without 
disclosing secret information) if it had pointed to problems and the government had nonetheless not taken the 
necessary actions. Also, it would report annually about the in camera sessions by publishing an edited version of the 
logs of the meetings. In short, the committee would “be concerned with both the effectiveness and the propriety of 
Canada’s security and intelligence arrangements”.575 However, the mandate did not include the power to address 
issues on the committee’s own initiative. “Matter[s] relating to security and intelligence” could also be “referred to it 
by [either] the Senate or the House of Commons.”576 As with the MacKenzie Commission, the report was not dis-
cussed in parliament.577 
Five years later, a civilian agency was established in 1984 by Bill C-157—CSIS governed by the CSIS Act.578 However, 
no committee was created. The enactment was preceded by a special Senate committee’s debate on the proposed 
Bill C-157.579 Despite some desires of the special Committee to strengthen accountability, for example, ministerial 
responsibility, it nevertheless rejected the establishment of a parliamentary committee, arguing that the work of SIRC 
would be duplicated and that a committee would “be subject to the vagaries of time, changes in membership and 
overwork [as well as] […] problems in maintaining the security of information both because of partisan motivations 
of its members, and because there was a ‘general question of whether that type of committee can maintain the 
requisite confidentiality by reason of the nature of its proceedings’.”580  
Special Senate Committees, 1999 & 2011 
Apart from the Air India bomb explosions, which will be discussed below, the time at the end of the Cold War and 
during the 1990s was “[a] formless era without a clearly defined adversary did not imply an era of security”.581 
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In 1999, a Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence discussed threats to Canadian security and the 
government’s responses to Senate committee reports of 1987 and 1989.582 It also again discussed the potential of a 
parliamentary control committee. The senators, however, did not recommend the creation of a permanent parlia-
mentary committee as a special purpose body to review or oversee the Canadian Security Intelligence Service [or 
CSEC]” because of once again the probable duplication of the work of SIRC, this time also mentioning that it might 
be “counter-productive […] to subject the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security 
Establishment to another layer of review or a process of continuous review.”583 Instead, they recommended a parlia-
mentary committee to conduct reviews of all actors in the national security field584, including the other review bodies. 
That committee would not review specific agencies but practise a general and broad review and take the form of a 
standing Senate Committee.585 This committee was therefore not intended to be similar to the one the MacDonald 
Commission had proposed or the one Bill C-22 establishes but was intended to be a standard Senate committee 
conducting an encompassing review mandate. A standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence was 
indeed established in 2002586 but it has no extra legislative underpinnings beyond the governing law and rules for all 
Senate committees. 
In 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Act587 (“ATA”) was passed due to the terrorist attacks in New York City on 9/11, “creat[ing] 
measures to deter, disable, identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorist groups and to prevent and punish the 
financing, preparation, facilitation and commission of acts of terrorism. It also provided law enforcement agencies 
with new preventive and investigative tools and established stronger laws against hate crimes and propaganda.”588 
Before its enactment, a special Senate Committee conducted a report on the legislation.589 While again, not proposing 
a review committee, it called, inter alia, for the appointment of an Officer of Parliament who should “monitor, as 
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appropriate, the exercise of powers provided in the bill. This officer should table a report annually, or more fre-
quently, as appropriate, in both Houses.”590 No such Officer of Parliament—nor any other new control mechanism—
was established by the subsequent ATA 2001.  
Paul Martin Government Plan and Interim Committee of Parliamentarians  
In February 2004, the Liberal government of Paul Martin published the “Action Plan for Democratic Reform”, includ-
ing the idea to create a National Security Committee of Parliamentarians.591 From May 2004 to October 2004, a joint 
Interim Committee of Parliamentarians on National Security discussed how an effective National Security Committee 
might look. After having familiarised themselves with British, American and Australian models of parliamentary con-
trol, the committee identified three alternative “structures” as to how the Canadian approach to parliamentary scru-
tiny might look.592 The one chosen in a ballot by the members of the Interim Committee as the preferable option 
included the creation of a so-called “innovative joint committee of Parliament593—one with co-Chairs and co-Vice 
Chairs like a traditional joint committee but with equal representation of members from the House of Commons and 
the Senate”594, thereby avoiding partisan efforts and guaranteeing more consistency and commitment.595 The mem-
bers of the committee would have the same privileges as in the regular plenary meetings of Parliament. The Prime 
Minister would appoint the members for one legislative period, but talk to the leader of the opposition before ap-
pointing members of the opposition. The members would fill the “leadership positions” of the committee by secret 
ballot.596 In addition, the committee would have the right to initiate an “inquiry into any particular activity or incident 
within its purview”.597 The already existing review bodies would continue their work but report to the committee. 
Furthermore, the committee should have the same right to get access to information as SIRC and the (now abolished) 
Inspector General of CSIS. The members would “swear an oath of secrecy”, whereas the staff would need to get 
security clearance. The reports of the committee to Parliament would have to be presented to the government be-
forehand and the government would have the right to “black out” sensitive information due to secrecy necessities.598 
Nonetheless, the proposals “made little headway due to a series of elections and changes in government since 
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2004”.599 Bill C-81 proposing a national security committee was tabled by the Martin government but did not become 
law, and will be discussed below.600 
Arar Commission 
The Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (“Arar Commission”) 
was the next inquiry set up by the government (Martin) to investigate the activities and possible wrongdoings of 
officials of national security agencies. Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen, had been kidnapped by the American authori-
ties, rendered to Jordan and then on to Syria, and imprisoned and tortured in Syria with RCMP and CSIS collaborating 
or at least not interfering. A commission of inquiry was established by the government. As Whitaker pointed out, 
“[t]he need for a special inquiry in the first place was necessitated by the manifest incapacity of the existing account-
ability architecture to cope with the issues raised by the Arar affair.”601 Therefore, the head of the commission, Dennis 
O’Connor, not only investigated the incident in itself but also reviewed the structure of the accountability mecha-
nisms in a second report in 2006, including the draft of several recommendations for the national security architec-
ture. “[U]nfortunately, almost none of his recommendations have been acted upon.”602 
Nonetheless, O’Connor did not escape criticism. Whitaker, firstly, criticised O’Connor for not elaborating on the 
“potential role of Parliament, claiming that this fell outside his terms of reference. [Secondly,] his reform proposals 
focussed exclusively on the traditional emphasis of national security review in Canada, issues of propriety, while 
ignoring issues of efficacy. […] Efficacy issues can benefit as much from external scrutiny as propriety issues can.”603 
Roy stated in 2016: “O’Connor’s decision to not address the issue of more direct forms of political oversight via a 
Parliamentary Committee further entrenches the secrecy that pervades the workings of critically important portions 
of our public sector.”604 O’Connor himself believed, however, that a parliamentary committee might be established 
in the near future: “In five years’ time, […] a national security committee of parliamentarians may have been estab-
lished.”605 Furthermore, he thought that Parliament would then be focussed on efficacy review: “I recognize that a 
committee of parliamentarians […] might be concerned more with the efficacy of these activities than their propri-
ety.”606  
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Air India Commission  
In 2010, the work of another inquiry was completed, this time focussing on the efficacy of the agencies607: the Com-
mission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 (“Air India Commission”).608 The 
incident that was examined had happened back in 1985, when two bombs had been placed on two flights of Air India, 
departing in Canada and killing 329 people. The incident was considered as an example of “intelligence failure”.609 
SIRC had already started to investigate the incident in the 1980s, but had to fight against resistance from the agencies 
and the government.610 Furthermore, SIRC was once again limited to only reviewing CSIS conduct even though the 
RCMP was also involved.611 Notwithstanding its large amount of recommendations, the Air India Commission did not 
pick up the idea of establishing a committee of parliamentarians. 
Afghan Detainees  
The “Afghan Detainee” situation was the next Canadian scandal in the field of national security. In the years 2006 and 
2007, Taliban fighters who were caught by Canadian forces in Afghanistan were handed over to the Afghan authori-
ties, either without assessing whether they might be exposed to torture and mistreatment there or without caring 
sufficiently. A House of Commons Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan in Parliament was 
established to investigate the treatment. Since documents with secret information were not given to the Committee 
and the witnesses were, except for Richard Colvin, not speaking out612, the parliamentarians of the opposition felt 
that their common parliamentary privilege was violated.613 The Committee, and then the House as a whole, adopted 
a motion for the government to produce all relevant documents in unredacted form to the Committee, but the 
government refused.  
On April 27th, 2010, the Speaker of the House of Commons, Milliken, gave a ruling that held the government in 
contempt of Parliament, stating that it was “‘the fundamental role of Parliament to hold the Government to account’ 
for the actions of its officials.”614 Although Parliament often agrees to the refusal of government to disclose certain 
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documents containing national security information, this “was a description of practice and not a binding prece-
dent”.615 “The right of Parliament to obtain all possible information on public questions is undoubted and the circum-
stances must be exceptional, and the reasons very cogent, when it cannot be at once laid before the House.”616 Un-
fortunately, the ruling only “produced an ad hoc compromise with government that allowed a few members of Par-
liament, assisted by retired judges, to have limited access to at least some secret documents.”617 After the 2011 elec-
tion, when the Conservatives won a majority and shut down the ad-hoc parliamentary process when it was only 
partway through its work, ground-breaking and innovative discussions on the role of Parliament in holding the gov-
ernment into account came to an end. 
Senate Committee, 2011  
In 2011, another Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism published an interim report, recommending the es-
tablishment of a parliamentary committee, and emphasising that the Senate Committee “strongly believes that par-
liamentarians must be fully informed about national security activities so that they can more effectively defend the 
interests of Canadians.”618 The Committee recommended a committee consisting of members of both Houses of 
Parliament, reviewing the “expenditures, administration and policy of federal departments and agencies”.619 When 
necessary, the sessions should be held in camera. The members would be appointed by the Governor in Council, 
and they would have to swear an oath of secrecy. They would report to the Prime Minister who would have to make 
the report public (if censored, then including information on the fact of a section being censored). However, reports 
and findings from Senate committees are rarely paid attention to620 and this was no exception in the 2011 – 2015 
period of majority government.   
In conclusion, although there have been recommendations to create a committee of parliamentarians in the last 30 
years by various inquiries and by different committees, none of the recommendations have been acted upon. There 
were, furthermore, several unsuccessful legislative attempts in the last ten years. These will be discussed in the next 
paragraph.  
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Bills 2005-2016 
In November 2005, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness tabled an Act to establish the National 
Security Committee of Parliamentarians—Bill C-81.621 It did not become law, “in large part due to the intensifying 
partisan environment of a minority and scandal-plagued Liberal Government struggling to survive.” 622 An election 
was called within a month of Bill C-81 being introduced, the result of what was the first minority government of 
Stephen Harper.  
Bill C-81 set out a joint committee that would have included not more than three Senators and not more than six 
members from the House of Commons. The members would have been appointed by the Governor in Council, who 
would then have appointed the Chair among the members of the committee. The members would have had to swear 
an oath of secrecy and would furthermore have not been able to claim immunity on grounds of parliamentary privi-
lege regarding their knowledge obtained in the committee. The mandate would have included “the legislative, regu-
latory, policy and administrative framework for national security in Canada, and activities of federal departments and 
agencies in relation to national security; and any matter relating to national security that the Minister refers to the 
Committee.”623 Regarding access to information, the committee would have had to ask the Minister to provide the 
information, who would also have had the right to deny access to it completely or in part. The only safeguard would 
have been a consultation of the minister with the Chair and, on request, the issuing of a written statement. The 
committee would have had to report annually about its work. Before transferring it to Parliament, the Prime Minister 
would have had the right—after consultation with the Chair—to exclude certain parts that could not be disclosed for 
reasons of national security, defence or international relations. 
The fact that the committee would have had to review only specific matters relating to national security which a 
Minister referred to the body might be considered as a back-door entrance for governmental misuse. It might have 
been possible to overload the committee with rather small issues, thereby limiting its capacity to focus on other 
issues. Since the Chair was going to be appointed and not elected, the Bill’s respective safeguards (consultation with 
the Chair over the information provided and the non-disclosure of parts of the report) can hardly be seen as effective, 
since a Chair of the governing party might possibly not exercise effective control over the powers of the Ministers 
and the Prime Minister. 
Despite the weaknesses of the Bill, its wording and provisions were reintroduced to Parliament several times in vari-
ous private members’ business bills (PMB’s) by Liberal MPs, in 2007 and 2009 by MP Derek Lee (Bill C-447624, Bill C-
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352625), and in 2013 by MP Wayne Easter (Bill C-551626). In May 2014, Senator Hugh Segal introduced Bill S-220627 to 
the Senate. The Act would have created an Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. Senator Segal, who 
had been Chair of the Special Senate Committee of 2011, used the UK version (the Intelligence and Security Com-
mittee) as a role model for his proposal. S-220 would have created a committee with nine members of both houses, 
three members from the Senate and six from the House of Commons. The Senators would have only been appointed 
after a consultation of the Prime Minister with at least one other Senator. Furthermore, “[a] member of either House 
may only be appointed as a member of the Committee after approval of the appointment by resolution of that 
House.”628 Differing from Bill C-81 in 2005, the Chair would have been elected by the members of the committee. S-
220 would not have needed to request access to information from the respective minister but the committee would 
have had the powers to “summon before it any witness”629 and to get access to all information apart from information 
falling under s 39 (1) of the Canadian Evidence Act (Cabinet confidences). As an additional safeguard, the Prime 
Minister would have had to release a statement if he/she excluded parts of the report before referring it to Parlia-
ment.Also in 2014, MP Joyce Murray introduced a Bill to the House of Commons, proposing a Committee of Parlia-
ment—Bill C-622.630 Her model consisted of three Senators and six Members of the House of Commons, including a 
safeguard clause that only four members of the House of Commons might be from the same political party. Like 
Senator Segal, she also proposed an elected Chair and an approval clause for members from either house. The bill 
included clauses dealing with the staff for the committee and its estimates. The mandate, for the first time, also 
mentioned the committee’s obligation to “report publicly on its activities, findings and recommendations”631, thereby 
emphasising the connection between transparent democracy and the committee. The Committee would also have 
had the right to summon any witnesses and to access any information (except again for s 39(1) of the Canada Evi-
dence Act632). Particularly interesting is the section on the report to Parliament, since it included a clause that the 
report had to contain detailed information to “meaningfully inform Parliament and the public”.633 Although the Prime 
Minister would have had the power to ‘censor’ parts of the annual report of the committee, the Chair could have 
“disclose[d] to the public the general nature of any information that has been excluded from the report by the Prime 
Minister […] as long as the disclosure does not reveal the substance of the excluded information”.634 Bill C-622 
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therefore particularly emphasised the importance of informing parliament and the public in a detailed manner. How-
ever, none of the bills entered into force.  
b) Status Quo: Bill C-22, An Act to Establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians 
Since the debate about the creation of a Committee of Parliament started anew in the discussions on Bill C-51, in 
June 2016, the new Liberal Government introduced yet another Bill to establish a National Security and Intelligence 
Committee of Parliamentarians.  
The mandate of the Committee in Bill C-22 was to 
 review the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative and financial framework for national security and intelligence; any activity 
carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence, unless the activity is an ongoing operation and the 
appropriate Minister determines that the review would be injurious to national security; and any matter relating to national security 
or intelligence that a minister of the Crown refers to the Committee.635 
 
The Committee may therefore not only review activities but also has the right to oversee the activities (with the 
exception mentioned in the provision).  
In the original draft version of June 2016, the Committee consisted of up to eight members from both Houses of 
Parliament and a chair. In the final version of the Bill636, the number of MPs has increased to 11 members (including 
the chair).637 The idea of Bill C-622 to allow only a certain number of MPs of the House of Commons (5/8) in the 
Committee to stem from the government parties to “counter majority party domination”638 is adopted. With five out 
of eight members of the House of Commons who may be members of the governing parties as well as, in addition, 
up to three Senators (without specifications), it is more than doubtful that the clause will protect from party domi-
nation. The fact that the Prime Minister has to consult inter alia the “leader of every caucus and every recognized 
group in the Senate” before a Senator may be appointed to the Committee is only a small safeguard if the consulted 
people don’t actually have a veto or a similar right. The Governor in Council will then appoint the members of the 
Committee, “on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.”639 However, in contrast to both S-220 and C-662, the 
chair in C-22 will not be elected by the members of the committee but appointed by the Governor in Council upon 
the recommendation of the Prime Minister, a fact which may show some mistrust in the Parliamentarians.640 A clause 
that would grant the Chair a double vote was abolished at the Committee stage though; now the Chair “may vote at 
meetings of the Committee only in the case of a tie.”641 For the first time, a security clearance for the members of the 
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committee was made obligatory, whereas in the previous proposed bills, the swearing of an oath had been considered 
sufficient. Even in the MacKenzie Commission, it had been seen as highly problematic to have parliamentarians 
subject to security clearances. The MacDonald Commission had also dealt with the problem of security clearance and 
concluded that it should be sufficient to consult the security agencies before an appointment (see above).  
As MP Chagger pointed out, a “key element of [C-22] […] is the ability of the committee to initiate reviews of any 
national security operations, including ongoing operations.”642 Because of that scope, she justified the different limi-
tations to the Committee’s powers (see below). According to s 13 of Bill C- 22, the Committee “is entitled to have 
access to any information that is under the control of a department and that is related to the fulfilment of the Com-
mittee’s mandate.”643 The clause is similar to the clause of the original draft of June 2016. There had been major 
amendments done at the Committee stage but they were deleted at the report stage, drastically limiting the rights of 
the Committee again. The draft that was agreed upon at the Committee stage additionally entitled the Committee 
“to send for persons, papers and records”, therefore also to subpoena witnesses.644 The government, however, re-
jected this change of Bill C-22 and had it voted down at report stage, stating that “[e]ssentially, under section 13 and 
15, both the government and the committee would have the power to determine who should appear to provide 
testimony, and yet there is no recourse mechanism to solve the deadlock.”645 It was not mentioned, however, that 
such a “deadlock” could easily be bypassed: other possibilities could be that all witnesses chosen by either govern-
ment or Committee would be called or to always let the Committee, not the government, decide on whom to ask 
oral questions. 
For the first time, a clause that calls for cooperation with the other review bodies is included to prevent a duplication 
of work. Furthermore, a kind of whistle-blower clause for the Committee has been incorporated into the bill. The 
Committee not only has the right to but “must inform the appropriate Minister and the Attorney General of Canada 
of any activity that is carried out by a department and is related to national security or intelligence and that, in the 
Committee’s opinion, may not follow the law.”646 The exertion of this power, however, would need the Committee 
to have access to sufficient and thus also possibly sensitive information, which might not easily be the case under the 
current Bill C-22 structure (see below).  
The mandate set out in C-22 is limited again compared to older Bill proposals. A minister can stop the review process 
if he “determines” it would be “injurious to national security”647, thereby having the power to veto the review (or 
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oversight of an ongoing operation) of the committee. There is also no definition of “injurious to national security” 
provided in the legislation, which might give way to different interpretations of the clause. There is no comparable 
clause in the mandate of SIRC, which—again—likely shows some mistrust in the committee by the government. At 
the Committee stage of the Bill, a safeguard was added, however, stating that the Minister must firstly give reasons 
to the Committee if he relies on the clause “injurious to national security”, and secondly, that he/she must tell the 
Committee once the oversight would cease to be injurious to national security or once the activity came to an end 
so that the Committee might review the activity then.648 
Section 14 of Bill C-22, in the first draft, mentioned several (seven) restrictions for the Committee to gain access to 
secret information. Thereby, the clause was much more restrictive than the preceding bills and recommendations by 
the inquiries. The Committee would not have access to the Cabinet confidence649, a provision which thus corre-
sponded to the limit on access to information for SIRC. Whereas this had been the only limitation in the previous 
proposed bills, this time, the committee would also not be able to access information “respecting ongoing defence 
military operations”.650 Thus, it would have not been possible, for example, to review the Afghan detainee case while 
it was ongoing. The provision would thereby very much be in contradiction to the Speaker’s ruling of 2010. Further-
more, the Committee should not get access to information “relating to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law 
enforcement agency”651, which would have ruled out the possibility to, for example, review Toronto 18 case652 or the 
Air India Bombings. As MP Clement stated in the parliamentary debate, “removing information directly relating to 
law enforcement investigations that may lead to a prosecution essentially removes all RCMP participation in this 
committee. Quite literally, any action taken by RCMP National division may lead to a prosecution.”653 It again seems 
as if the distrust of or suspiciousness against parliamentarians, which was already discussed in the MacDonald report, 
has not decreased in the last thirty years. Because of its implications, the clause was very much debated in Parliament 
at the Committee stage and was then completely abolished apart from the cabinet confidence provision. The newest 
version that was restored at Report Stage, however, takes up several of the provisions of the first draft. Besides the 
Cabinet confidence, the Committee 
is not entitled to have access to […] information of which is described in subsection 11 (1) of the Witness Protection Program Act; 
the identity of a person who was, is or is intended to be, has been approached to be, or has offered or agreed to be, a confidential 
source of information, intelligence or assistance to the Government of Canada, or the government of a province or of any state allied 
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with Canada, or information from which the person’s identity could be inferred; information relating directly to an ongoing investi-
gation carried out by a law enforcement agency that may lead to a prosecution.654  
Whereas s 15 of Bill C-22 permits information to be requested by the Committee from the responsible Minister (with 
exceptions in subsection 2), according to s 15 (3) the Minister must then “provide or cause to be provided to the 
Committee, in a timely manner, the requested information to which it is entitled to have access.”655 There is no exact 
definition or defined understanding of the phrase “in a timely manner”, thus possibly granting a Minister the right to 
withhold information for a rather long and decisive period of time. Whereas the Committee stage had rejected the 
provision in s 16 (“Refusal of information”), the provision was restored at Report Stage. This means that the Commit-
tee must make a request for information to the respective minister, who then has the chance to deny access because 
of security reasons (applying again the phrase “injurious to national security”656). 
The ministerial vetoes in the mandate and access-to-information clause are set out as final decisions in s 31, thereby 
also preventing the committee from going to court. As well, the access of the members to parliamentary privilege is 
limited by s 12. Furthermore, compared to the bills prior to C-22, the power of the Prime Minister to have the annual 
report revised has grown. Now, not only national security but also international relations and national defence are 
reasons for demanding a “censored” parliamentary and/or public version of the report.657 The powerful position of 
the Prime Minister that was already set up in the proposed Bill C-81 has thus been taken further. Ms. Murray’s very 
progressive approach in 2014, suggesting for example to have a Chair who would be allowed to talk publicly about 
the “general nature of the excluded information”, has not been followed. Again, the very limited approach of Bill C-
81 was adopted by Bill C-22 and thus no written statement of the Prime Minister mentioning the reasons for his 
assessment is required. New provisions do, however, make it necessary to clearly state if a report has been revised, 
including the reasons thereof.658 The report will furthermore also be forwarded to the national security committees 
of Senate and House of Commons.659 Bill C-22 also establishes a Secretariat “to assist the Committee in fulfilling its 
mandate”. Due to the limited length of the thesis, the thesis won’t address the problems of providing for an ade-
quately funded staff with sufficient expertise. The issues will be mentioned in more detail in the conclusion to give a 
hint for further research. 
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IV. Influence of the Five-Eyes Membership 
Canada is a member state of the “United Kingdom United States of America Agreement”, thus a full member (and not 
a third party) of the so-called “Five Eyes information sharing alliance”. This agreement dates back to a collaboration 
of the United States with the United Kingdom as well as Canada, Australia and New Zealand660 and stands for a close 
cooperation in the field of intelligence gathering, particularly signal intelligence. The agreement has particularly been 
in focus after the Snowden revelations that the member states had spied not only on third parties, but on close allies 
of the five member states, such as Germany.661 In the words of the LIBE inquiry of the European Parliament: “[r]aw 
personal data collected through [different, for example PRISM,] programmes is shared in bulk between the intelli-
gence communities of the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the ‘Five Eyes’ agreement.”662 The 
activities of the five Eyes had already been the focus of attention in the European Union because of the so-called 
ECHELON-affair, when it became known that the Five Eyes states recorded “international telecommunications with 
the help of a monitoring program called ECHELON […]. ECHELON is used to monitor satellite-based telephone 
calls, fax and Internet communications”.663 
There is no formal oversight body that is responsible for the Five Eyes. Morgan argues that there is instead “institu-
tional convergence” in terms of oversight of the Member States to the Five Eyes Agreement.664 This convergence may 
now also be more obvious since the Bill C-22 is largely based upon the model of the parliamentary committee of the 
UK.665 However, there is no body that is transnationally responsible for all States to the Agreement. Whereas the deep 
impact of the Five Eyes on the collection of intelligence and the modern mass surveillance tactics is commonly 
acknowledged, their role in the field of parliamentary control may still be considered as rather limited. However, the 
agreement might indeed limit the powers of any parliamentary control body: either might shared intelligence not fall 
within their mandates or its disclosure might be seen as threatening any relationship with the Five-Eyes members. I 
will therefore not elaborate further on the Five Eyes but turn to the assessment and comparison of the German and 
Canadian models, especially with regard to possible leasons that Canada might learn from the German experience. 
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660 United States, National Security Agency, online: National Security Agency <https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-
documents/ukusa/>.  
661 Patrick F. Walsh & Seumas Miller, “Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post Snowden” (2016) 
Intelligence & National Security 31:3 at 345-368. 
662 European Union, European Parliament, LIBE, Inquiry on Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens, “Protecting Fundamental Rights in 
a Digital Age” (2013-2014) at 80,81. 
663 “[I]nternationale Telekommunikation mit Hilfe eines Überwachungsprogramms namens ECHELON […]. ECHELON dient zur 
Überwachung der über Satellit geleiteten Telefongespräche, Telefaxverbindungen und Internetkommunikation”. (Translation mine). 
Thomas Petri, “Déjà vu – datenschutzpolitische Aufarbeitung der PRISM-Affäre. Appell nach mehr Transparenz der 
nachrichtendienstlichen Tätigkeit” (2013) ZD 557 at 557. 
664 Richard Morgan, “Institutional Convergence and the structure and oversight of intelligence activities” in Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel 
J. Rascoff, eds, Global Intelligence Oversight, Governing Security in the twenty-first century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
665 Canada, Library of Parliament, Legislative Summary Bill C-22, Publication No. 42-1-C22-E, 22 August 2016 at 1, online: 
<https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/LegislativeSummaries/42/1/c22-e.pdf>.  
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Chapter III: Parliamentary Control of the Agencies in Canada and Germany: A 
Comparative Approach 
The previous two chapters of this thesis helped to draw some provisional conclusions. Firstly, they showed that there 
is a common debate, in two countries with a distinct legal history, on how to balance security with the citizens’ 
liberties as well as human rights in general. Secondly, this debate often led the people involved, in discussions as well 
as in practice, to the conclusion that intelligence services and their work was necessary but had to be accompanied 
by an effective review mechanism—if possible in parliament itself in order to increase its (democratic) legitimacy. 
Thirdly, the exact approach to and character of such a parliamentary review/oversight body is still unclear and has 
been a constant point of discussion: questions as to which powers are necessary for which actors and how to protect 
secret information are two examples in a debate that has taken place in both countries over—at least—the last forty 
years. Fourthly, Germany has, despite its long history with an existing parliamentary control panel (or commission), 
neither found nor claimed to have found the perfect solution, the right model or the most effective answer to the 
different problems that emerge when trying to limit as well as support the work of both security services and parlia-
mentary control bodies, and has constantly reformed the system. Therefore, fifthly, all the historical and political as 
well as technical developments, all the solutions and ideas that were put forward and discussed and that led to the 
current legal status quo in Germany and the final version of Bill C-22 in Canada are clear indications that this will 
probably not be the end of the story. This chapter will therefore compare, on the one hand, the Canadian and the 
German ways of trying to achieve an effective parliamentary control mechanism. It will, on the other hand, assess 
recent criticism, new ideas, changes to legislation currently proposed in connection with the PKGr in Germany and 
possible lessons that can be learned from the German debate for work on the Committee and Bill C-22 in Canada.  
Because of the limited length of this thesis, not all relevant topics that have been mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2 will 
be revisited more closely here.  
I. Necessity of Intelligence Agencies  
Before turning to the different opinions on a parliamentary control body (in either of the two countries), one has to 
deal with an extreme point of view: some people call into question the existence of intelligence and secret services 
in general. Of course, in both states, a high percentage of the debaters in both states on parliamentary control—
parliamentarians as well as legal experts and scholars—are indeed in favour of the existence of secret services.  
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In Germany, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen as well as Die Linke have publicly announced as well as proposed several bills 
to abolish the secret services—not least because of the difficulties of reviewing their actions and activities.666 Their 
arguments have mostly been focussed on the BfV667, thus, the protection of citizens’ as well as residents’ rights. In 
1994, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen argued: “[t]he secret services in general represent a threat to democracy. They are not 
even effective within their own responsibilities, and even commit, like the Federal Intelligence Service, in some cases 
criminal offences. They must therefore be dissolved.”668 In 2015, Die Linke argued “[...] that it is a democratic task 
and challenge in the long term, to work toward the gradual abolition of the secret services.”669 However, in this 
statement, the problem may be the word “democratic”. In the light of terrorist attacks and the reaction of politicians 
and parts of the media afterwards (demanding even more security, more extensive surveillance etc.), people would 
probably feel unsafe without the secret services. The role of politicians and parts of the media in making people 
accept any new powers of the services and possible violations of fundamental rights to get the level of security that 
they consider necessary, will be discussed below. A recent example of this trend of politicians to emphasise the need 
for security—against any safeguards of the rule of law principle—might be Theresa May’s announcement to increase 
security, even by abolishing fundamental rights laws that would stand in her, and thus she claims security’s, way.670 
Probably, without secret services and agencies, public trust in parliamentarism may be even more weakened if people 
would no longer feel protected, particularly in times where the call for security is so prominent in the political debate. 
To assure the citizens that enough was done to protect them from any—mostly terrorist—harm without the help of 
one’s own secret services, the dependency upon foreign services would grow. Important information would also 
then have to be procured or processed by the police (which in Germany would lead to an infringement of the prin-
ciple of separation) or by any other new institution that would replace the current national agencies. Furthermore, 
foreign agencies would not respect the fundamental rights of the citizens to the same degree as domestic agencies. 
Often, for example currently by the German government, fundamental rights concerning privacy are read in a way 
that only domestic citizens are protected (see above). Therefore, even the parties who have been most critical of 
intelligence and secret services are now arguing in favour of the latter’s work. Just recently, in June 2017, Der Spiegel 
published an article demonstrating the change of the party politics in each party in terms of national security. Even 
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666 Today, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen no longer argue for the general abolition of the intelligence services.  
667 Heinrich Böll Foundation, “Modelle zur Reform und Abschaffung der Geheimdienste” (25 July 2014), online: 
<https://www.boell.de/de/2014/07/25/modelle-zur-reform-und-abschaffung-der-geheimdienste>.   
668 “Die Geheimdienste insgesamt stellen eine Gefahr für die Demokratie dar. Sie sind nicht einmal innerhalb ihrer eigenen 
Aufgabenstellung effektiv und begehen, wie der Bundesnachrichtendienst, zum Teil selbst Straftaten. Sie müssen deshalb aufgelöst 
werden.” (Translation mine). Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen, Manifesto Elections to the Bundestag 1994, “Nur mit uns” (1994) at 60.  
669 “[…], dass es langfristig eine demokratische Aufgabe und Herausforderung ist, auf die schrittweise Abschaffung der Geheimdienste 
hinzuwirken.” (Translation mine). BT-Drucksache 18/6645, supra note 376 at 1. 
670 “Theresa May: Human rights laws could change for terror fight”, BBC.com (07 June 2017), online: <www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-
40181444>.  
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parties such as the FDP (Liberals), Die Linke (to a lesser extent) and Bündnis90/Die Grünen have considerably shifted 
from being highly critical of security services and the encroachment upon fundamental rights to more of a “security”-
focus, tolerating and legitimating many activities that would have been condemned before.671 The ultimately negative 
perspective on intelligence and secret services might thus be less and less prominent, ending the debate on the 
services’ right to exist. It is doubtful that there was even a possibility to just abolish the agencies. A country such as 
Canada, being a member of the Five Eyes, or Germany, as a third party to the agreement (and many others) would 
not be able to just shut down its services without provoking international tensions with its agreement partners. Alt-
hough secret services in both countries, Germany and Canada, and probably in every other country, have—to some 
extent—disrespected fundamental rights, exceeded limitations to their powers and created an ominous network of 
collaborations and interdependencies, the time to abolish the agencies has probably long passed.  
II. Access to Information 
Therefore, one may start the discussion with the structure and the rights of the Canadian Committee of Parliamen-
tarians (NSICOPS) and the German Parliamentary Control Panel (PKGr) since these bodies are ultimately the attempt 
to not only concentrate on the security aspects but also on the protection of fundamental rights in times of an in-
creasing amount of data collection, information and intelligence sharing and growing powers of secret services. 
To start the discussion on the German Parliamentary Control Panel and the new Canadian Committee, one might 
turn to the bodies’ access to information. One prominent way to describe the German Panel has been coined by 
Gusy, calling the parliamentarians “blind guardians” (blinde Wächter)672, with the word ‘blind’ referring to the lack 
of information of the control panel. Indeed, it is easy to determine that no control is possible without knowing what 
is to be controlled. Therefore, one may argue that the most crucial point for an effective review and/or oversight 
body is the amount of information it can get from the government itself, from the agencies, or through rights that 
make it possible to get informed without being dependent on the government, by, for example, subpoenas of wit-
nesses (without a needed consent of the government/agencies). Without a proper and sufficient access to infor-
mation, no parliamentary control body of Parliament can fulfil the obligations of its mandate. Rather, the debate is 
concentrating on what can be considered as a ‘sufficient’ amount of information.  
In the current version of the PKGr Act in Germany, § 4 sets out the “Obligation of the Federal Government to in-
form”673 in terms of the general activities and special occurrences.674 The provision has therefore been worded in the 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
671 Florian Gathmann, Kevin Hagen, Annett Meiritz & Michel Winde, “Neue deutsche Härte”, Spiegel Online (15 June 2017), online: 
<www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/terror-und-innere-sicherheit-die-neue-deutsche-haerte-a-1152113.html>.  
672 Gusy, “Grundrechte”, supra note 30 at 132. 
673 “Pflicht der Bundesregierung zur Unterrichtung” (Translation mine).  
674 Other obligations of the government to inform the PKGr can be found in the Acts on the respective services.     
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passive (in the sense that the PKGr is the recipient on information on which another party has the active obligation 
to provide); no active claim has been formulated. However, if the Control Panel wants to be informed about other 
occurrences, it needs itself to claim information from the government. As mentioned above in the section on the 
German law, the problem with the latter is the fact that the members of the Panel would need to know what they 
were looking for, for example, with the help of media reports. This explains MP Ströbele’s judgement that the Panel 
often only gets its information from the media. To summarise the Panel’s rights quickly, the Panel may request files 
and electronic data. It furthermore has the right to access the localities of the agencies (see below). Additionally, the 
Panel may question employees of agencies, departments and the government or request written information. The 
government needs to comply “immediately” (§ 5).  
In contrast, the Canadian version does not differentiate between different “occurrences”; instead, the Canadian pro-
vision on access to information is very broad (s 13), giving the Committee the right to have access to any information 
it needs to fulfil its duties (if the information is not exempted in another provision). That said, the ability of the 
government to block committee scrutiny and thus, by definition, access to information when a matter is deemed 
"operational" cuts back on the initial breadth of the Committee's right of access. The access to information is called 
a right, making it sound more active than passive (being dependent on another's obligation that is not expressed in 
terms of your own right), and thus also more powerful. The Committee does, however, not have the right to sub-
poena witnesses and documents (see below). As just mentioned, the specific amount of information depends on the 
respective mandate of the control body (the PKGr and the NSICOP), as the body “should have an unlimited access 
to the information necessary for discharging its duties.”675  
The PKGr’s mandate is defined in rather broad terms: “The Federal Government shall be subject to the control of 
the Parliamentary Control Panel with regard to the activities of the [BND, MAD and BfV].”676 Bill C-22 on the contrary 
lists the specific tasks of the Committee, does not specifically only refer to the government but also the agencies and 
departments conducting national security activities and makes it possible for the Committee to review “any matter 
relating to national security or intelligence that a minister of the Crown refers to the Committee.”677 The Committee’s 
mandate is therefore somehow more extensive, since it also includes possible topics that do not involve activities of 
the services but concerns national security. It is striking, that the mandate of the Committee is partly subject to 
limitations. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, a minister may hinder the oversight for the time of “ongoing 
operations” if it would be—in his opinion— “injurious to national security.”678 This limitation therefore applies to a 
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675 Hans Born & Ian Leigh, “Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services”, Policy Paper No. 19 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces, 2007) at 12. 
676 “[…] [d]ie Bundesregierung unterliegt hinsichtlich der Tätigkeit des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz, des Militärischen 
Abschirmdienstes und des Bundesnachrichtendienstes der Kontrolle durch das Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium.” (Translation mine). 
677 Bill C-22 (final version), s 8 (1). 
678 Ibid, s 8 (2). 
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level before those of the access of information. It therefore seems reasonable to ask whether this assessment may 
not be used by the government as a means of “leading” the Committee according to the government’s own interests. 
The reasons the minister has to give for his decision are—with the Committee having no access to information—
probably rather difficult to assess by the parliamentarians. Furthermore, it needs to be mentioned that neither SIRC 
nor the Commissioner of CSEC have a comparable limitation to their mandate.  
The Bill C-22 committee mandate is at least trying to close the accountability gaps in the sense that it covers all 
activities in the realm of national security. In Germany, due to its limited mandate (and the principle of separation), 
the PKGr cannot control activities of the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, “BKA”), although it is, 
according to § 4 a of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act (“BKA Act”)679, dealing with the defence of the dangers 
constituted by international terrorism. Even when institutions cooperate, the PKGr can only review that part of the 
activity that is carried out by one of the three agencies mentioned in its mandate. These kinds of accountability gaps 
have been prevented by the broader mandate in Canada, learning from the difficulties of the current review bodies, 
for example SIRC, whose mandate is too limited to effectively control activities if there is any kind of information 
sharing between agencies involved.  
In general, the rights of the Committee and the Panel must be sufficient to enable their members to fulfil their man-
dates. The first possible problem with the Canadian limitations to the mandate has already been mentioned. Another 
problem may be its limited right to self-information. Whereas in Germany the Panel nowadays has the right to hear 
employees of the agencies/the government (however, not just any witness and without them being formal witnesses 
according to the Criminal Procedure Code, see below) and request (electronic) files, the Canadian committee does 
not get any of those rights. Indeed, the rights were explicitly deleted from the Bill before the report stage.  
In a judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court (concerning—once again—the rights of a Committee of 
Inquiry), the Court highlighted the importance of the right to inspection of records: “Files are a particular important 
piece of evidence in the investigation of political events. As a rule, they have a higher probative value than testimonies, 
because the memory of witnesses can become unfruitful in many respects.”680 This statement only makes sense if the 
agencies are indeed obliged to compile files to a sufficient level, because otherwise, it would basically be possible to 
undermine this right of the review body. It is up to the minister to decide on the exact data to be disclosed.681 The 
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679 Gesetz über das Bundeskriminalamt und die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Länder in kriminalpolizeilichen Angelegenheiten 
(Federal Criminal Police Office Act), Federal Law Gazette I, 1997 at 6159 as last amended by Article 2 of the Act of 1 June 2017, Federal 
Law Gazette I, 2017 at 1354 [BKA Gesetz].  
680 “Akten sind bei der Untersuchung politischer Vorgänge ein besonders wichtiges Beweismittel. Sie haben gegenüber Zeugenaussagen in 
der Regel einen höheren Beweiswert, weil das Gedächtnis von Zeugen aus mancherlei Hinsicht unergiebig werden kann.” (Translation 
mine). Untersuchungsausschuss Geheimgefängnisse, supra note 126 at 113; Flick-Untersuchungsausschuss, supra note 128 at 132; Neue 
Heimat, BVErfGE 77, 1 at 48.  
681 According to his/her competence, Art. 65 of the Basic Law. 
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disclosure is subject to the general limitations and to restrictions such as competency, core area of executive auton-
omy, welfare of the state as well as protection of secrets and fundamental rights of third parties. However, in the 
words of the Constitutional Court,   
The importance of Parliament's right of scrutiny, both for parliamentary democracy and for the prestige of the state, does not 
generally allow a shortening of the claim to the issuing of files in the interests of the protection of the general right of privacy and 
the protection of property if parliament and government have made provisions for the protection of secrets that ensure the undis-
turbed co-operation between the two constitutional bodies in this field and if the principle of proportionality is respected.682 
From the perspective of the German Constitutional Court, the provisions of Bill C-22 that result in the Committee 
lacking the right to demand and receive files would thus be considered too limited in terms of access to information. 
Another power of the control bodies would be the right to subpoena witnesses. Again, the right was not adopted in 
Bill C-22 at the report stage. The PKGr may question employees or personnel of the agencies or the government—
these are, however, not witnesses in the sense of the Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozessordnung, “StPO”) and 
the Commission of Inquiry Act (Untersuchungsausschussgesetz, “PUAG”), which refers to the StPO. Thus, the people 
who are being heard by the PKGr are not criminally liable for false testimonies. An authorised expert of the Panel had 
especially called for a new provision that would refer to the StPO in terms of the hearing of evidence in the PKGr, but 
this proposal was not acted upon.683 Some critics are, however, against the application of the StPO. In Germany, 
increasing the powers of the Panel to the extent of the powers of a Committee of Inquiry (that does refer to the StPO) 
would contradict the principle of the separation of powers, as the Committee of Inquiry is only granted those special 
powers because they are “limited thematically and in time.”684 
History has, however, shown the Panel’s weakness of not being able to compel the “witnesses” to tell the truth or 
sanction them through criminal law proceedings (only through disciplinary penalties),685 a fact that a former member 
of the PKGr (of the parliamentary group Die Linke) and former judge at the Federal Court of Justice in Germany 
(Nešković) called a “licence to lie”.686 If Bill C-22 was to be amended again with a right to subpoena witnesses, to 
bypass this “licence to lie”, one might thus argue in line with Nešković that the right should contain criminal law 
sanctions in order to be effective and truly increase the actual level of information.  
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682 “Die Bedeutung, die das Kontrollrecht des Parlaments sowohl für die parlamentarische Demokratie als auch für das Ansehen des 
Staates hat, gestattet in der Regel dann keine Verkürzung des Aktenherausgabeanspruchs zugunsten des Schutzes des allgemeinen 
Persönlichkeitsrechts und des Eigentumsschutzes, wenn Parlament und Regierung Vorkehrungen für den Geheimschutz getroffen haben, 
die das ungestörte Zusammenwirken beider Verfassungsorgane auf diesem Gebiete gewährleisten, und wenn der Grundsatz der 
Verhältnismäßigkeit gewahrt ist.” (Translation mine). Flick-Untersuchungsausschuss, supra note 128, headnote 5c).  
683 BT-Drucksache 16/7540, supra note 351 at 179, cited in Singer, supra note 38 at 105. 
684 “thematisch und zeitlich begrenzt” (Translation mine). Peitsch & Polzin, supra note 132 at 391.  
685 Markus C. Schulte von Drach, “Mit der Lizenz zum Lügen” (Interview with Wolfgang Nešković), Süddeutsche Zeitung (28 April 2015), 
online: <www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bnd-affaere-mit-der-lizenz-zum-luegen-1.2455346>.  
686 “Lizenz zum Lügen” (Translation mine). Gerd Breker, “Ein klarer Gesetzesverstoß durch den BND” (Interview with Wolfgang Nešković), 
Deutschlandfunk (24 April 2015), online: <www.deutschlandfunk.de/kooperation-mit-der-nsa-ein-klarer-gesetzesverstoss-
durch.694.de.html?dram:article_id=318045&dram:audio_id=362303&dram:play=1>. 
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As mentioned, since 2009, the PKGr has also been allowed to make use of its right of access to the premises of the 
agencies. Again, a similar approach was not taken in Canada. Therefore, one might argue that it will be difficult for 
the Canadian Committee to have access to sufficient information. The Committee does not have any powers to get 
information on its own initiative without having to consult the government and request it from it. According to Singer, 
those “self-information rights” are a “prerequisite for effective parliamentary control of intelligence activities.”687 Seen 
from this perspective, the new Canadian Committee will very likely not succeed in effectively controlling the govern-
ment in the realm of national security.  
This is surprising as the question of having sufficient access to information has been dealt with before in Canada. One 
of those situations was the already mentioned: the ‘Afghan detainee’ case that led the former Speaker of the House, 
Peter Milliken, to give a speech on the importance of parliamentary privilege and access to information. However, 
the effect of the speaker’s ruling was quite the opposite of a strengthened Parliament in Canada. Unlike the NDP, the 
Liberal Party as well as the Bloc Québécois (both in the opposition to the Harper government back in 2010) agreed 
that the government should still have the power to withhold the documents because of Cabinet confidence as well 
as solicitor-client privileges. The panel, made up of MPs of the Liberals, the Bloc Québécois and the Conservatives, 
was not granted full access to the documents that the parliamentarians might have needed to assess the Canadian 
officials’ role and their knowledge of torture of transferred Afghan detainees.688 Because of several new allegations of 
torture as well as the fact that the whole ‘scandal’ has not been properly investigated, especially because of the with-
holding of information, the NDP is still pressing for a public inquiry into the matter.689 One may therefore argue that 
the right to get wide access to information is indispensable for any kind of (parliamentary) control. It is, however, 
easy for the government to accept that claim and nevertheless argue for limitations to that kind of information or, 
with justifications, for not being able to disclose this information—and thereby, possibly also to prevent the reveal-
ment of compromising material.   
The German Constitutional Court has also dealt with the problem of vague legal terms (“unbestimmte Rechtsbe-
griffe”) used as a broad justification for a limitation to the access to information. In one case, ruling on the importance 
of parliamentary control (in this case regarding a committee of inquiry), the government had withheld information 
from the committee, justifying it with the importance of national security, the core area of executive autonomy and 
internal decision-making (“interne Willensbildung”). The Court ruled that it was not sufficient to only broadly rely on 
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687 “[…] Selbstinformationsrechte; unverzichtbare Voraussetzung für eine effektive parlamentarische Kontrolle nachrichtendienstlicher 
Tätigkeit.” (Translation mine). Singer, supra note 38 at 99.  
688 “Afghan detainee panel a 'charade': NDP”, CBC news (09 December 2010), online: https://ca.news.yahoo.com/afghan-detainee-panel-
charade-ndp.html. 
689 Amanda Connolly, “NDP renews call for inquiry into Afghan detainee abuses”, ipolitics, online: https://ipolitics.ca/2016/06/15/ndp-
renew-call-for-inquiry-into-afghan-detainee-abuse/. 
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notions such as core area of executive autonomy. Instead, there needed to be a balance between those secrecy in-
terests and the interest of the Parliament to get access to information. Particularly in the case of completed opera-
tions, the parliamentary claim to information weighed heavily, even in areas of internal decision-making of the gov-
ernment. In the eyes of the Court, a detailed and in-depth explanation of the reasons was needed to withhold any 
information from Parliament.690 
In Germany, the problem of vague legal terms does not only exist with regards to possible limitations to the access 
to information but also, in the first place, with regards to the obligation to share information. One of those vague 
terms is, for example, the term “occurrences of special importance”. Wetzling argues that “[i]f the Federal Govern-
ment's obligations to inform the Panel remain so vaguely conceptualised, this allows for the maintenance of areas 
free of control.”691 A positive effect of those broad terms may, however, be their complete reviewability before the 
courts. One needs to remember though that going to court is always a long process; during that time, the government 
does have the right to rely on its subjective interpretation of the broad terms in the specific situation. Another positive 
effect of the vague terms such as core area of executive autonomy and the welfare of the state may be that they are 
not too rigid, making it possible to balance security interests with the interest of publicity and claims to get access to 
information.    
As for the Canadian current version of Bill C-22, the bill does, for example, not define what a formula such as “injuri-
ous to national security” in, for example, s 16 (refusal of information) exactly means and implies. One may therefore 
argue that the danger of “areas free of control” might indeed also exist here. What is particularly alarming when it 
comes to those broad legal terms in Canada is that the Committee would not be allowed to go to Court against the 
government’s decisions of non-disclosure and the application of those concepts.  
Furthermore, the new Committee may very well not be able to oversee a situation for as long as the government 
would consider it as “ongoing” and “injurious”. A case such as the Afghan detainee-case could then possibly not be 
reviewed since at that time the deployment of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan was still ongoing. In addition, rendi-
tions such as in the Arar case and, for example, interrogations of prisoners, for example, Omar Khadr in Guantanamo, 
may indeed also be labelled as non-disclosable due to close international ties, and their investigation may be pre-
sented as a danger to national security. The major scandals of the past would probably not have been reviewed if the 
new Committee had already existed.  
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690 BND-Untersuchungsausschuss, BVerfG, Beschluss des Zweiten Senats vom 17. Juni 2009 - 2 BvE 3/07. 
691 “Wenn die Unterrichtungspflichten der Bundesregierung gegenüber dem Gremium weiter so vage gefasst bleiben, ermöglicht dies das 
Beibehalten kontrollfreier Räume.” (Translation mine). Thorsten Wetzling, Aufklärung ohne Aufsicht – Über die Leistungsfähigkeit der 
Nachrichtendienstkontrolle in Deutschland (Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2016) at 22, online: 
https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/aufklaerung-ohne-aufsicht.pdf.  
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To elaborate further on the implications of the new “globalised intelligence”, one may return to one of the major 
decisions of the Constitutional Court in Germany mentioned in chapter 1, the NSA selectors list decision. It allowed 
the government to withhold the selectors lists from the Committee of Inquiry. It may be one of the best examples 
for the difficulties to find the ‘right’ balance between the government’s interest in secrecy and the parliament’s inter-
est in effective control—with both government and parliament invoking the welfare of the state. The judgement of 
the Court emphasised that in the case of a full disclosure of the lists, the United States might not be as willing as 
before to cooperate with the German intelligence services, which might lead to a threat to the security of the German 
state. In times of increasing intelligence-sharing between states, the reference to foreign intelligence services and 
collaboration agreements makes it very difficult to have any kind of effective control in the sense of allowing parlia-
mentarians of either of the respective control panels or committees of inquiry the access to information necessary 
for even conducting that control. This is problematic because those control bodies were precisely established to 
make it possible to disclose information to parliamentarians. Indeed, even the fact that not all parliamentarians are 
granted access, always constitutes a limitation to the “principle of public access to information, the right of deputies 
to formal equality and the right to effective protection of the rights of the persons affected.”692 The limitations to the 
access to information therefore “must be handled restrictively”.693 Nees, who wrote an article on the selectors lists 
before the judgement of the Court was released, came to a conclusion contrary to that of the Court, arguing that it 
was dangerous to acquit the government “of any parliamentary control by means of a simple reference to cooperation 
with another intelligence agency.”694 Whitaker remarks that it was alarming that intelligence agencies might indeed 
share information internationally to an extent that no review body may be able to hold them accountable as those 
bodies are bound to the national sphere.695 Therefore, the agencies may bypass control by collaboration, willingly 
(“information laundering”)696 or coincidentally. Whitaker mentions the Arar case in Canada as an example; the El-
Masri Commission of Inquiry in Germany may very well be mentioned as another example.  
With respect to Bill C-22, it becomes apparent that international relations are only mentioned once in the bill in s 21 
on the annual report. However, due to the broad veto power of the minister to the Committee’s mandate (“injurious 
to national security”), it will be easy to argue that any information that might be problematic because of the allies’ 
intelligence and secret services’ interests cannot be part of the Committee’s mandate (see above). Therefore, the 
vague legal terms may also make it difficult here to close accountability gaps. In view of the fact that firstly, the 
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692 “[…] Öffentlichkeitsprinzip, dem Recht der Abgeordneten auf formale Gleichheit und dem Recht auf effektiven Rechsschutz der 
Betroffenen.” (Translation mine). Nees, supra note 22 at 680.    
693 “[…] müssen restriktiv gehandhabt werden.” (Translation mine). Ibid at 680. 
694 “[…] mittels eines einfachen Verweises auf die Kooperation mit einem anderen Geheimdienst von jeglicher parlamentarischer[n] 
Kontrolle frei[zu]zeichnen.” (Translation mine). Ibid at 680. 
695 Reg Whitaker, “The Failure of Official Accountability and the Rise of Guerilla Accountability” in Michael Geist, ed, Law, Privacy and 
Surveillance in the Post-Snowden Era (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2015) at 211-214 [Whitaker, “Guerilla”]. 
696 Ibid at 215 
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activities of the BND, although illegal, would be considered as ongoing and, secondly, that the US have their own 
interest in the secrecy of the lists there is much to suggest that a similar case in Canada would be decided in the same 
way as in Germany (plus, the Committee would not even have the right to go to Court against the government’s 
decision of non-disclosure). From Nees’ perspective, this means that there will be big accountability gaps in Canada 
at the discretion of the government that may very easily stop parliamentary control from happening. Furthermore, 
in Canada, there may be a lot more official collaboration with foreign intelligence services due to the country’s mem-
bership in the Five Eyes. So, the danger of misusing and bypassing the national limitations as well as control mecha-
nisms may even be greater in Canada. A reference to the Five Eyes agreements and thus international cooperation as 
well as the dependence of the relatively small Canadian agencies on their “big” partners, particularly the US, may be 
considered sufficient grounds to withhold certain if not most of the information necessary to evaluate the activities 
of the agencies and the government.   
So far, I have talked about the problem of vague legal concepts/terms and international cooperation and their con-
nection to the limitations to access to information. Whitaker defines two more basic categories of secret information 
that need to be re-evaluated; not in a way that abolishes one of the categories but in a way that redefines the inter-
pretation of the following rules, “[n]o disclosure of the identification of secret sources of intelligence [and] [n]o 
disclosure of methods and techniques of covert operations.”697 He argues that rule one is “interpreted in a manner 
so expansive as to lose much of its legitimate force”, making “public accountability […] impossible” 698; in Whitaker’s 
view, the same is true for rule two, where he takes as an example the Maher Arar inquiry, by also referring to a Federal 
Court judgement where the Court—after the government had wanted to not disclose most of the report—declassified 
most of the information that the Inquiry sought to disclose.699 The judgement should also be kept in mind when 
evaluating the sections on the annual report of the NSICP (see below).  
Back to the selectors lists in Germany. Since the committee of inquiry was not granted access by the government, a 
compromise was found and a so-called Independent Counsel or Special Agent (Sonderermittler) was asked to con-
sider the lists and report on them (in a rather broad sense). In this case, Kurt Graulich, a former judge of the Federal 
Administrative Court was chosen. He has been assessed critically, not the least because he was indeed paid and 
“appointed” by the government, although he was working “on the authority” of the committee of inquiry.700 In 2015, 
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697 Ibid at 211.  
698 Whitaker, “Guerilla”, supra note 695 at 211. 
699 Ibid at 212, referring to Attorney General of Canada v. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to 
Maher Arar, Federal Court of Canada, 2007 FC 766, 24 July 2007.  
700 Thorsten Denkler, “Zweifel an der Unabhängigkeit”, Süddeutsche Zeitung (04 November 2015), online: 
<www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/nsa-zweifel-an-der-unabhaengigkeit-1.2722406>. 
 
 110
the Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that Graulich had (more or less literally) copied big parts of the BND’s own as-
sessment including legal evaluations for his own assessment for the committee.701 He was later questioned by the 
committee of inquiry. Furthermore, he was criticised for his lack of technical knowledge and consequential “mis-
judgements”.702  
The appointment of an expert is also possible in the PKGr Act. According to § 7, the Panel may with a “majority of 
two-thirds of its members and after consulting the Federal Government, commission an expert to carry out investi-
gations in order to exercise its control.”703 His/her specific rights are mentioned in chapter 1. More important at this 
stage is that the right to “commission an expert” is another “possibility of self-information” and “of making the work 
[of the Panel] easier and more effective.”704 The Panel itself publicly reported it had made use of its right for the first 
time: “The appointment of an expert has proved to be a particularly effective control instrument with which a con-
structive and relevant result can be achieved in a relatively short time. The extensive report provides the Panel with 
a lot of important insights for its further control activity beyond the actual facts.”705 
The Canadian Bill C-22 does not provide for a commissioning of an expert in a specific matter. It has, however, in s 
29 the following clause: “The executive director may enter into contracts, memoranda of understanding or other 
arrangements, including contracts to engage the services of legal counsel or other persons having professional, tech-
nical or specialized knowledge to advise or assist the Committee or any of its members.”706 This provision may help 
the Committee to increase its understanding of specific questions. However, it will not lead to the same degree of 
facilitation as the possibility to authorise an expert to conduct a proper investigation into a matter instead of focusing 
on specific, for example, legal questions. Once again, the rights to self-information of the Committee still lag behind 
what is possible. The introduction of an expert might have helped the Committee to cope with the amount of infor-
mation it will receive due to its broad mandate.  
Another idea for how to relieve the Panel and deal with the dilemma of, on the one hand, granting the access to 
information to parliamentarians and, on the other hand, preventing the danger of leaked information is the new 
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701 Ibid.  
702 Anna Biselli, “IMSI, IMEI, SIP: Selektoren-Gutachter Graulich verheddert sich im Technik-Dschungel”, netzpolitik.org (04 November 
2015), online: <https://netzpolitik.org/2015/imsi-imei-sip-selektoren-gutachter-graulich-verheddert-sich-im-technik-dschungel/>.  
703 “[…] Mehrheit von zwei Dritteln seiner Mitglieder nach Anhörung der Bundesregierung im Einzelfall einen Sachverständigen 
beauftragen, zur Wahrnehmung seiner Kontrollaufgaben Untersuchungen durchzuführen.” (Translation mine). § 7 PKGr Act 2016.  
704 “[…] Möglichkeit zur Selbstinformation; Erleichterung und Effektivierung [der] Arbeit [des Gremiums].” (Translation mine). Singer, 
supra note 38 at 130-131-  
705 “Die Beauftragung eines Sachverständigen hat sich dabei als ein besonders effektives Kontrollinstrument bewährt, mit dem in relativ 
kurzer Zeit ein konstruktives und sachdienliches Ergebnis erzielt werden kann. Der umfangreiche Bericht ermöglicht dem Gremium über 
den eigentlichen Sachverhalt hinaus viele wichtige Erkenntnisse für seine weitere Kontrolltätigkeit.” (Translation mine). Germany, 
Deutscher Bundestag, Unterrichtung durch das Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium, 15 Parl, BT-Drucksache 15/5989 (8 September 
2005) at 7 [BT-Drucksache 15/5989]. 
706 Bill C-22 (final version).  
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position of the so-called Permanent Representative. The office was introduced in Germany to deal with the men-
tioned tension. He/she is somehow thought to execute “regular and case-specific investigations” and to “prepare the 
meetings of the Parliamentary Control Panel and its reports to the plenum of the German Bundestag. He or she 
regularly attends the meetings of the Parliamentary Control Panel, the G10 Commission and of the Parliamentary 
Trust Body.”707 It will be interesting to see which tasks the new office is going to take over. On the one hand, the 
establishment of this office might be a helpful link between Executive and Parliament, increasing the Executive’s 
willingness to share information, decreasing the chance of possible leaks. There are, however, several questions to 
ask: Is one single person (even assuming a large staff) enough to deal with such an amount of data, such significant 
information and its possible implications? Will he/she see his/her role in supporting the Panel or will he/she be under 
too much influence of the secret services, in the end being an “agent” of the Executive? Will there not be a massive 
concentration of power in the hand of this one single person only, a person, by the way, who is not elected and thus 
not directly democratically legitimised? Will the execution of rights of the Panel itself actually shrink? It is interesting 
that in 2009, even the CDU/CSU, which has now proposed the position of a Permanent Representative and voted in 
favour of the new office, expressed the following doubts in a bill concerning the establishment of a Representative 
for the National Security Agencies (and/or the introduction of an independent new control body): “This would give 
up the existing, well-balanced system without reaching a recognisable gain. The Bundestag would thereby dispose of 
its own fundamental parliamentary tasks by delegating parts of its control functions to quasi-autonomous supervisory 
bodies outside Parliament.”708 Thus, the Office has yet to show its effectiveness as well as its integration into the 
Panel’s and the Parliament’s work before one could make a recommendation for the Canadian system including a 
recommendation that would relate the Permanent Representative's role to the proposal in Canada at several points 
in time for some kind of Officer of Parliament to be added to the control scheme. In the first report of the PKGr after 
the Permanent Representative had investigated possible mistakes of the services concerning the terror attack in Ber-
lin in December 2016, PKGr member Hahn wrote in a dissenting opinion: “The wording [contained in the Public 
Assessment of the Permanent Representative] ‘The work of the Permanent Representative was monitored by the 
following MPs: Schuster, Grötsch, Dr. Hahn and Ströbele’ is indicative of the problematic functioning of the Panel. 
The fact is that the Permanent Representative has consulted various persons concerned with the Amri case. Minutes 
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707 “[…] regelmäßige und einzelfallbezogene Untersuchungen; bereitet die Sitzungen des Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremiums und 
dessen Berichte an das Plenum des Deutschen Bundestages vor. Sie oder er nimmt regelmäßig an den Sitzungen des Parlamentarischen 
Kontrollgremiums, der Kommission nach dem Artikel 10-Gesetz und des Vertrauensgremiums nach § 10a der Bundeshaushaltsordnung 
teil.” (Translation mine). § 5a of the PKGr Act 2016.  
708 “Hierdurch würde das bestehende, gut austarierte System aufgegeben, ohne einen erkennbaren Mehrgewinn zu erreichen. Der 
Bundestag würde sich dadurch zudem ureigenster parlamentarischer Aufgaben entledigen, indem er Teile seiner Kontrollfunktionen an 
quasi autonome Kontrollinstanzen außerhalb des Parlaments delegiert.” (Translation mine). Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf 
eines Gesetzes zur Fortentwicklung der parlamentarischen Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste des Bundes, 16th Parl, BT-Drucksache 
16/12411 (24 March 2009) at 2 [BT-Drucksache 16/12411].  
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or at least summaries of these interviews were never presented to the MPs. [...].”709 If his assessment is correct, it 
might be doubtful that the Office—at least in its current form—should be considered a positive example of parlia-
mentary control.  
Before the establishment of the Permanent Representative, Holzner had already suggested that in order to manage 
the risk of having a Representative who takes on the role of the Parliament, he/she should be a Member of Parliament 
himself/herself— “belonging to one of the opposition parties”.710 This proposal might indeed help to increase his/her 
democratic legitimacy. But once again—as for the Panel or the Canadian Committee—we would need rules on how 
and particularly by whom this person should be elected. In Germany, where the so-called “big coalitions” are forming 
the government and where therefore the opposition is very small—with currently two opposition parties—, it would 
come as a surprise if the big parties would be willing to grant the position of a Permanent Representative to a member 
of the opposition parties—currently Bündnis90/Die Grünen and Die Linke (which had itself been under observation 
by the secret services for a long time). With the possibility of a new right-wing party in Parliament after the election 
in September 2017, there will probably be even more arguments against an election of the Representative amongst 
the opposition parties’ members.  
Holzner also mentions another possible procedure for Germany (with regards to Committees of Inquiries though), 
the so-called “Chair-procedure” (Vorsitzenden-Verfahren). If the government does not want to disclose certain in-
formation, “the refused information [in the article on grounds of the welfare of the state] should be made available 
to the chair and his deputy so that they can convince themselves that the refusal is lawful.”711 The positive effect 
would be that Parliament may at least somehow control “the decision of the government on the disclosure of infor-
mation”, either only by being able to find out whether they agree with the government on the necessary secrecy of 
the information or by actually having the right to use the information in the work of the committee712 (Panel).  
Since the establishment of the Office of the Permanent Representative has created a lot of criticism, particularly from 
the opposition parties, its activities and influence need to be observed in the nearby future in order to be able to 
assess whether the introduction of a similar office would make sense in Canada. It might be a relief on the Panel’s 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
709 “Die [in der Öffentlichen Bewertung des Permanent Representative enthaltene] Formulierung „Die Arbeit des Ständigen 
Bevollmächtigten wurde von den Abgeordneten Schuster, Grötsch, Dr. Hahn und Ströbele begleitet“ ist bezeichnend für die 
problematische Arbeitsweise des Gremiums. Fakt ist: Der Ständige Bevollmächtigte hat diverse mit dem Fall Amri befasste Personen 
befragt. Protokolle oder zumindest Zusammenfassungen dieser Befragungen wurden den Abgeordneten niemals vorgelegt. […].” 
(Translation mine). Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Unterrichtung durch das Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium [im Fall Anis Amri], 
18 Parl, BT-Drucksache 18/12585 (31 May 2017) at 22 (preliminary version of report) [BT-Drucksache 18/12585].  
710 Thomas Holzner, “Parlamentarische Informationsansprüche im Spannungsfeld zwischen demokratischer Kontrolle und 
Staatswohlinteressen” (2016) DÖV 688. 
711 “[…] sollen dem Vorsitzenden und seinem Stellvertreter die verweigerten Informationen [im Artikel aus Gründen des Staatswohls] 
zugänglich gemacht werden, damit diese sich davon überzeugen können, dass die Verweigerung rechtmäßig ist.” (Translation mine). Ibid 
at 673. 
712 “[…] die Entscheidung der Regierung über die Preisgabe von Informationen.” (Translation mine). Ibid.  
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workload in Germany and also on that of the Committee in Canada, if it indeed does not decrease the level of dem-
ocratic legitimacy by “undermining” the rights of the Panel.  
The Chair-procedure (Vorsitzenden-Verfahren) might indeed be another possible solution. It is, however, doubtful 
that a parliament with a strong government would introduce such a provision if members of the opposition held 
either the chair or the vice-chair. If, however, the chair was from the government party, the possible advantage of 
this procedure would probably be illusory since no independence would be guaranteed at all. Thus, the chair and 
the vice-chair would possibly have to come from both the governmental party and the opposition. Again, this might 
lead to the problem of having a political stalemate to which a new and effective solution would have to be found.  
As regards access to information, the last issue that needs to be addressed becomes apparent if one recalls the criti-
cism directed at the expert Graulich in Germany that he lacked the necessary knowledge and expertise to understand 
the technical problems connected with the NSA selectors list correctly. Indeed, the pure access to information is not 
the only thing that matters; it is also of great significance that the parliamentarians are able to understand the infor-
mation correctly. Therefore, Hirsch concluded in 1996 that it should be possible for the Panel to consult experts in 
certain contexts, a fact that Bill C-22 provides for when it allows the Executive Director of the Secretariat to, for 
example, consult experts. For example, the expedience of the activities of the secret and intelligence services is diffi-
cult to assess by a control body if it does not have access to experts’ assessments and opinions on these matters.713 
Understanding information correctly or not is, however, not only an issue in cases of legal or technical problems. It 
may also be difficult to understand information correctly if the motivation behind certain decisions, the analysis of 
arguments or, for example, the fact that there was no other possible way to act in certain situations, do not come 
with it.  
In Germany, due to the core area of executive autonomy, the Bundestag has a right to ask questions in any matter; 
it does, however, not have the right to information concerning the “[d]eliberations and decision-making process”714 
of the government. Nevertheless, it is not only difficult to understand the amount of (in our digital times, highly 
technical) information in general, it is—as just mentioned—also difficult for a committee or panel to understand the 
government’s decisions and activities without being informed about the reasons why it decided to act in a certain 
way. The motives behind decisions might have a greater influence on the ability to understand information (correctly) 
than any knowledge or guidance of experts, who—in those cases—are often as in the dark as the parliamentarians of 
the panel. Section 14 of Bill C-22 excludes, inter alia, Cabinet confidences from the Committee’s right to get access 
to information. Cabinet confidences are considered confidential and important because “[i]n order to reach final 
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713 Dietrich, supra note 368 at 206.  
714 Rüstungsexport, supra note 178 headnote 2a. 
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decisions, ministers must be able to express their views freely during the discussions held in Cabinet. To allow the 
exchange of views to be disclosed publicly would result in the erosion of the collective responsibility of ministers.”715 
The understanding of Cabinet confidences is therefore comparable to the core area of executive autonomy that pro-
tects the freedom to form an opinion. Therefore, the same problems may arise for the Committee when trying to 
fully understand the information provided by the government. There is probably no way to tackle this problem with-
out interfering with the current understanding of the separation of powers and the responsibility of the government 
for its activities in either of the two countries. Concluding this paragraph on access to information, one may argue 
that the Canadian Committee lags behind when it comes to rights to self-information and might have problems when 
trying to not be fully dependent upon the ones who are the objects of control.  
III. Information to the Public 
The following paragraph will assess rights of the Panel and the Committee that are not directly connected to the 
access of information and have thus not been discussed above. They are, however, concerned with increasing the 
transparency of the review and thus, democratic legitimacy. 
1. Dissenting Opinion (Sondervotum) in Special Reports 
According to § 10 I of the PKGr Act 2016, “the discussions of the Parliamentary Control Panel are confidential.”716 
However, according to § 10 II of the same Act, “Paragraph 1 shall not apply to assessments of certain transactions 
where a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Parliamentary Control Panel present have given their prior 
consent. In this case, each individual member of the Panel is allowed to publish a dissenting opinion (special vote).”717 
This right may be considered as a particularly important right for the opposition or individual parliamentarians of the 
PKGr (see below). It is, however, already restricted by the high quorum that needs to vote in favour of giving a briefing 
according to § 10 II PKGr Act. Furthermore, although it is not stated in the Act itself, the implementation of this right 
states that the parliamentarian who wants to give a dissenting opinion has to “submit (that opinion) to the Panel 
before publication for scrutiny” which then publishes it.718 Singer critically assesses this procedure as “constitutionally 
problematic with regard to [...] the constitutional rights of a free and independent Member of Parliament [...].”719 
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715 Canada, Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-
secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/privacy/confidences-queen-privy-council-canada-cabinet-confidences.html>.  
716 “Die Beratungen des Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremiums sind geheim.” (Translation mine). PKGr Act 2016.  
717 “Absatz 1 gilt nicht für Bewertungen bestimmter Vorgänge, wenn eine Mehrheit von zwei Dritteln der anwesenden Mitglieder des 
Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremiums ihre vorherige Zustimmung erteilt hat. In diesem Fall ist es jedem einzelnen Mitglied des Gremiums 
erlaubt, eine abweichende Bewertung (Sondervotum) zu veröffentlichen.” (Translation mine). Ibid.   
718 “[…] dem Gremium vor Veröffentlichung zur Prüfung vor[zu]legen.” (Translation mine). Singer, supra note 38 at 159.  
719 “[…] mit Blick auf […] die statuierten Rechte eines freien und unabhängigen Abgeordneten [..] verfassungsrechtlich problematisch.” 
(Translation mine). Ibid. 
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Several dissenting opinions have been published so far, the latest being the above-mentioned one of Hahn, a member 
of the PKGr (Die Linke), who criticised the report of the Permanent Representative as well as the briefing of the PKGr 
on the potential mistakes made by the secret services in the case of Anis Amri, the assassin in the attack on a Christmas 
market in Berlin in December 2016. (Hahn criticised the incompleteness of information, the lack of documents that 
were handed over to the Panel as well as the high degree of sympathy of the Panel with the services).720 Whereas the 
Canadian Bill C-22 does refer to so-called special reports that may be conducted (s 21 (2)), it does not include the 
right for anyone to publish a dissenting opinion, either in such a report or exclusively. This will be further discussed 
in the paragraph on the annual report.  
2. (Bi-) Annual Reports  
The German Panel tables a report in Parliament at least every two years (in the middle and at the end of each legisla-
tive period).721In those reports, the Panel does also report on the fulfilment of the government’s obligations vis-à-vis 
the Panel. However, the Law does not provide for dissenting opinions such as in the special reports according to § 
10 II of the PKGr Act (they are, however, also not prohibited). Singer argues that “especially [...] minority votes would 
be desirable in terms of legal policy, for it is hardly to be expected by the opposition members in the Panel to go 
along with a public statement which they have resisted on the committee. In this respect ‘equality of arms’ is urgently 
required, especially since aspects of confidentiality do not necessarily require unanimity.”722 
In Canada, the Committee will write a report every year. Bill C-22 also lists the minimum content of such a report, 
thereby possibly enhancing its meaning and significance. Bill C-22 does also not include any rights of opposition 
members to give dissenting opinions—neither in the special nor in the annual reports. The arguments of Singer are, 
however, globally applicable. If one looks at the content that a report must contain, Bill C-22 also lists headings such 
as “findings” and “recommendations”. Both keywords may provide for new reforms and ideas or for public pressure 
if all members (also those of the opposition) could include their (potentially helpful) findings or recommendations. 
Since the Committee consists of parliamentarians of different parliamentary groups, dissenting opinions of (opposi-
tion) members would be very interesting for voters who do not agree with the majority view. However, it does also 
help to see reports without dissenting opinions; this would increase the public effect of the Committee’s decisions 
or findings.  
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
720 Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremium, Erläuternde Sachverhaltsdarstellung zur öffentlichen 
Bewertung des Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremiums nach § 10 Absatz 2 des Kontrollgremiumgesetzes zum Fall Anis Amri vom 29. 
März 2017, 18 Parl, BT-Drucksache 18/12585 (31 March 2017) (preliminary version of report).  
721 § 13 of the PKGr Act 2016.  
722 “Gerade […] Minderheitenvoten wären rechtspolitisch wünschenswert, denn es ist den oppositionellen Mitgliedern im Gremium kaum 
zuzumuten, eine öffentliche Stellungnahme mitzutragen, gegen die sie sich im Gremium gewehrt haben. Hier ist ‚Waffengleichheit‘ 
dringend erforderlich, zumal Gesichtspunkte des Geheimschutzes eine einstimmige Stellungnahme nicht zwingend erfordern.” 
(Translation mine). Singer, supra note 38 at 178.  
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In the final version of Bill C-22, each annual report must be handed over to the Prime Minister first, who may (after 
“consulting the Chair of the Committee”) request a revised version of the report if he holds it to be necessary because 
of secret information included in the report. The reasons brought forward by the Prime Minister may again include 
examples of very broad and vague legal concepts/terms that can easily be misused (“injurious to national security, 
national defence or international relations […]”).723 To support this claim, one may cite Whitaker, who remarked 
(not with respect to Bill C-22 but in general), “[o]fficial review bodies, always concerned about their ongoing working 
relationship with the agencies they review and deeply concerned to maintain their own legitimacy as placers in the 
national security world, rarely contest the application of the government’s expansive interpretation of non-disclosure 
in public reports of information deemed to fall under national security confidentiality.”724 The report of the Commit-
tee may therefore not be considered as a tool effective enough to sufficiently inform the public. The criticism that a 
“censored” report may diminish transparency, democratic legitimacy as well as public trust in the Committee’s work 
has already been addressed at length in the paragraph on the parliamentary debates on Bill C-22 and will not be 
further discussed at this point. It remains to be explained, however, why there are no opposition rights or rights for 
any parliamentarian in the Committee to give a dissenting vote if the Prime Minister decided that a report included 
secret information and requested a revision.  
Borg-Maciejewski postulated that the Panel should publish “success stories” of the intelligence agencies to “build up 
trust of the citizens” in those institutions725 (the importance thereof is given in detail below). Through the annual 
reports, the parliamentary control bodies may help to increase the reputation of the intelligence services. This pos-
sible content is generally not part of the German reports, neither is it mentioned as mandatory in Bill C-22. The 
function of a control body is, however, indeed not to support the good reputation of the institutions to be controlled. 
The bodies would become involved in unnecessary sideline activities.  
3. Annual Public Official Hearings  
In the last reform of the PKGr Act, an annual public official hearing of the heads of the secret services was introduced 
as a new right of the Panel,726 similar to the US, where the fact that the director of national intelligence lied to Congress 
was one of the triggers for the revelations of Snowden.727 However, so far, the right has not been implemented. 
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723 S 21 (5) of Bill C-22 (final version).  
724 Whitaker, “Guerilla”, supra note 695 at 213.  
725 Borgs-Maciejewski, supra note 34 at 43. 
726 § 10 III of the PKGr Act 2016.  
727 Brian Fung, “Darrell Issa: James Clapper lied to Congress about NSA and should be fired”, Washington Post (27 January 2014), online: 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/01/27/darrell-issa-james-clapper-lied-to-congress-about-nsa-and-should-be-
fired/?utm_term=.8eebc4a29be0>, cited in Andre Meister, “Große Koalition verhindert öffentliche Befragung der Geheimdienst-Chefs 
vor der Bundestagswahl”, netzpolitik.org (31 March 2017), online: <https://netzpolitik.org/2017/grosse-koalition-verhindert-oeffentliche-
befragung-der-geheimdienst-chefs-vor-der-bundestagswahl/>.  
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Despite protests from the opposition members of the PKGr and of the Bundestag, the first hearing will most likely 
take place after the next general elections in September 2017.728 Since there is a high probability that not all members 
of the current PKGr will be elected as members for the next PKGr (Hans-Christian Ströbele, for example, the PKGr 
member of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen will not run for election to the Bundestag again), the chance that well-informed 
parliamentarians may question the presidents in an effective way is quite limited. This is also due to the fact that the 
new members of the PKGr will not be able to read reports or watch debates of the PKGr’s current sessions, as no 
kind of record keeping takes place. It may also be taken as an example of partisan acts of the Executive (see below). 
Nonetheless, the right to publicly hold a meeting and question the presidents of the secret services might help to 
increase public interest in the Panel’s (GER) or Committee’s (CA) work. Since the hearings are publicly recorded, 
this may also be used as a right to sanction the presidents in a certain way by publicly criticising their actions.  
Bill C-22 does not provide for a hearing of the presidents of the secret services or ministers. It does, however, also 
not regulate that all meetings of the Committee need to be held in private. Section 18 reads: “Meetings of the Com-
mittee are to be held in private if any information that a department is taking measures to protect is likely to be 
disclosed during the course of the meeting or if the Chair considers it to be otherwise necessary.”729 Whereas most 
of the meetings will probably be held in private (with good reasons), it is nevertheless possible to meet in public—
possibly also in order to increase pressure upon the actors in the realm of national security.  
IV. Digital World  
In 2016, and before Bill C-22 was discussed in Parliament, Roy harshly criticised the non-existence of an effective 
parliamentary control of the security agencies in Canada in an article.730 He particularly discussed the changes that 
needed to be made in the debate on privacy and national security in the light of the technological developments of 
the last years. He wrote,  
[…] the virtualization of security activity massively expands the potential for both innovative and positive government action […] 
and misinformation, breached protocols and harmful incidents […]. What the Snowden affair reminds us that there is much ongo-
ing – underwritten by public resources and potentially affecting the public – that requires analysis and oversight and political dia-
logue […]. Whether such oversight and dialogue exist are central to democratic accountability in a digital environment and the 
ability to navigate escalating tensions between openness and secrecy.731   
Although the critique is formulated rather broadly, it is, from this perspective, questionable whether the Panel in 
Germany or the Committee in Canada fulfil the requirements of “analysis and oversight and political dialogue”. A 
positive feature of Bill C-22 is the fact that it provides for a right of the executive director to conclude contracts or 
the like with, for example, technical experts to support the Committee or a member of the Committee. The fact that 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
728 Ibid (Meister).   
729 S 18 of Bill C-22 (final version).  
730 Roy, supra note 527.   
731 Ibid at 100.  
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the German expert who was consulted to deal with the selectors lists was unable to comprehend the technological 
background of the illegalities, can be seen as an example of how ineffective oversight may be when it comes to digital 
agendas. There are also claims that even the G10 Commission members in Germany are not effectively trained. 
In Canada, the possibility to consult technical experts may be seen as an advantage of Bill C-22. However, the mandate 
of the new Committee is so broad and the fact that there is no body comparable to the G10 Commission raises doubts 
as to whether the Committee will be able to deal with the projected amount of information and will still have time to 
cope with the new developments in the digital age. Since the intelligence and secret services are staffed with IT-
experts, it might be necessary to consider having experts in the permanent staff who are able to deal with the digital 
e-governance that is becoming increasingly important. In addition, corporate firms such as Google, Facebook, etc., 
but also smaller (international) companies might not only have great influence on issues such as privacy and also on 
laws governing national security issues. Possible collaborations of intelligence agencies with firms that gather millions 
of (meta) data may also become an issue for the control bodies. And even if the agencies do not themselves collect 
the information necessary to get a comprehensive image of an individual, they might very well get access (in one way 
or another) to the databases of those companies.  
Therefore, the scope of the data the services and departments are getting access to is growing increasingly fast. The 
parliamentary control bodies do need the knowledge and the time to deal with those developments that will continue 
and even accelerate in the future in times of microtechnology and artificial intelligence. So far, the only step that the 
Canadian Committee can take is the possible consultation with experts. Thus, one might conclude that neither Bill 
C-22 nor the PKGr Act or G10 Commission Act explicitly provide answers to the new problems of the digital age. I 
will come back to those problems my conclusion.  
V. Review and Oversight 
The difference between oversight and review has already been described in both chapter 1 and chapter 2. Since this 
topic has also been brought up by almost every scholar and in every report that has (been) written on (parliamentary) 
control of the secret services, this thesis will only broadly address a few points. In general, a few arguments that were 
brought up against oversight mechanisms (this time with regards to the RCMP) were mentioned in the Arar Inquiry. 
Apart from the possible threat to the independence of the police (the only point very specific to the RCMP), O’Connor 
mentioned “a risk that an oversight mechanism could confuse or even diminish the accountability of the RCMP to 
government and, correspondingly, the responsibility of government for the RCMP. Finally, there is a danger that an 
oversight body’s review function would be compromised by its active involvement in the activity being reviewed. This 
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could occur where the oversight body approved or, alternatively, failed to veto or prevent an activity by the agency 
subject to oversight.”732  
In 2014, Dietrich, mentioned the following prerequisite for an effective control of both the secret services’ activities 
and their efficiency: the control “has to accompany the perception of the task of the intelligence services perma-
nently—in the sense of a real, concurrent control—, and it has to free itself from an event control.”733 In Canada, Bill 
C-22 will establish a review Committee. It does, however, not prohibit to oversee certain activities and, indeed, in-
cludes them by necessarily implication: in s 8 (2), the limitations to the mandate of the Committee, it is stated that 
in order to be excluded from the mandate, the activity has to be ongoing and considered to be injurious to national 
security by the Minister. Therefore, it seems to be possible for the Committee to oversee certain activities if they are 
not considered to be injurious. It is unclear though whether the Committee would actually receive the necessary 
information and be able to report on it; firstly because of the rather broad limitations to the access to information 
and to the public report, and secondly, because of the missing rights to self-information (see above). From the per-
spective of Dietrich, the possible oversight role of the Committee might, therefore, not be sufficient as the Committee 
does not provide for a permanent “concurrent control”. However, that kind of control would possibly interfere with 
the principle of the separation of powers to an extent that might not be considered constitutionally legitimate.     
Oversight and review do, however, not need to be mutually exclusive. In terms of efficiency and to prevent account-
ability gaps, it would not be a question anymore if the control panel/review committee was allowed to also oversee 
certain activities of the agencies, but the question is rather how much information it would receive in certain in-
stances. As for the core area of executive autonomy, Nees postulated: “Although the core area [...] also covers infor-
mation relating to the decision-making process of completed operations, the interest in protection is not to be over-
estimated, given the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny, since the danger of influencing government decisions 
by third parties is much higher in ongoing matters.”734 One may therefore argue that the interest is just to be weighted 
the other way around for ongoing activities. Nees continues to argue, seizing on judgements of the Constitutional 
Court (with regard to review), that “the interest in information must be given a particularly high weight when ‘it 
comes to detecting possible legal violations and similar grievances within the government’”.735 This interest is, how-
ever, particularly high while the activities are going on. Should statutory violations and (severe) illegalities only be 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
732 Arar Commission, supra note 588 at 500.  
733 “[…] dauerhaft – im Sinne einer echten mitlaufenden Kontrolle – die Wahrnehmung des nachrichtendienstlichen Auftrags begleiten 
und sich von der Anlasskontrolle lösen.” (Translation mine). Dietrich, supra note 368 at 208. 
734 “Informationen, die sich auf die Entscheidungsvorbereitung abgeschlossener Vorgänge beziehen, sind zwar auch vom Kernbereich […] 
umfasst, das Schutzinteresse ist vor dem Hintergrund effektiver parlamentarischer Kontrolle aber nicht mehr so hoch anzusetzen, denn 
die Gefahr der Beeinflussung von Regierungsentscheidungen durch Dritte ist bei laufenden Angelegenheiten deutlich höher.” (Translation 
mine). Nees, supra note 22 at 677.  
735 “[…] dem Informationsinteresse besonders hohes Gewicht beizumessen ist, wenn ‘es um die Aufdeckung möglicher Rechtsverstöße 
und vergleichbarer Missstände innerhalb der Regierung geht’.” (Translation mine). Ibid at 677, citing Untersuchungsausschuss 
Geheimgefängnisse, supra note 126 at 123 and Rüstungsexport, supra note 178 at 231f. 
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discovered ex post instead of preventing them before or ending them while they are occurring (with regards to highly 
problematic illegalities, for example, the encroachment upon the fundamental rights of many innocent citizens)? The 
autonomy of the government is considered necessary in order to protect the separation of powers and to leave the 
government to decide upon the necessary actions to be taken. Therefore, it makes sense in general to not disclose 
information on whether the government was at variance when making that decision or on which governmental au-
thority had which opinion. It is also surely reasonable for the government to not simultaneously report to the Panel 
or Committee while it is still deliberating, so that the Panel or Committee may not exercise too much influence on 
the decision. However, the question arises if the effectiveness of parliamentary control should not be established 
and/or preserved as well. Likewise, when overseeing the departments and agencies, it is still up to the Executive to 
disclose information, possibly even a lot less information than in closed cases. Therefore, there is still a safeguard in 
place, as there is the dependency on the Executive’s assessment and in some form a discretion to disclose infor-
mation.  
In addition, one needs to remember that judicial review of encroachments upon fundamental rights by the depart-
ments or agencies is always something that happens when the interventions have already occurred. Parliamentary 
control of the agencies does mostly not even aim at protecting individuals (apart from the G10 Commission in Ger-
many in some way) but is nonetheless the only way of preventing those encroachments—possibly not in each indi-
vidual case but at least for extensive mass interventions that have taken place in the past. To give the parliament only 
review power might forego that possibility and leave the protection of fundamental rights in these cases to an ex post 
settlement—a kind of protection that is surely not the one that was aimed at when the Basic Law or the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms were adopted.   
In Germany, the fact that the government is the institution in charge of all decisions—even if the Panel knows about 
certain activities before or during their enforcement—is declared in the PKGr Act (§ 4 II): “The political responsibility 
of the Federal Government for the authorities referred to in § 1 shall remain unaffected.”736A similar provision is 
missing in the Canadian Bill C-22, to make sure that the core area of the principle of the separation of powers is not 
breached. In this regard, it only has the legal role to control the Executive, not that to make decisions. These thoughts 
on review and oversight powers will be considered again in my conclusion.  
VI. Minority Rights  
To distinguish parliamentary from judicial control, Gusy states: “Parliament is vigilant about the concerns of the po-
litical majority, the courts the perception of the minorities concerned.” 737 Within Parliament, however, parliamentary 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
736 “Die politische Verantwortung der Bundesregierung für die in § 1 genannten Behörden bleibt unberührt.” (Translation mine).  
737 “Das Parlament überwacht die Belange der politischen Mehrheit; die Gerichte die Wahrnehmung der betroffenen Minderheiten.” 
(Translation mine). Gusy, “Grundrechte”, supra note 30 at IX.  
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control is indeed rather some kind of “minority control” since the MPs of the governmental parties are often reluctant 
to efficiently exercise it. Therefore, the decisive relationship is the one between the parliamentary groups that form 
the government and those of the opposition rather than that between the parliament in general and the govern-
ment.738 Consequently, the rights for the minority groups and the individual MPs might be one of the main factors to 
determine the efficiency of parliamentary control bodies.  
In Germany, the first obstacle for the minority to get members elected to the Panel is the fact that every single mem-
ber of the Panel has to be elected by an absolute majority of the MPs (the so-called Chancellor majority [Kanzler-
mehrheit]). At the same time, there is no right of any parliamentary opposition group to have members in the Panel. 
Instead, even the Constitutional Court held that “status rights of the MPs” could be limited, if necessary, because of 
“compelling reasons relating to the welfare of the State [confidentiality]”.739 However, election to the Panel has to be 
based upon expertise instead of trying to obstruct the minority, in particular, since “the participation of all political 
groups in parliamentary bodies is fundamentally a constitutionally required procedure.”740 A minority right of partic-
ular importance is the “right to convocation and information”.741 Thus, a single parliamentarian in the Panel can re-
quest a meeting of the Panel and information, both of which cannot be denied. Another major right of the opposition 
was abolished in the course of the latest reform; for the first time, the PKGr Act specifically mandates that the Chair 
and Vice-Chair of the Panel are elected among its members. Beforehand, there was no rule on this in the Act itself. 
This new provision led to a further change in the rules of procedure of the PKGr, which beforehand mandated a 
rotating Chair/Vice-Chair position for the opposition and the majority. Now, it only states that either Vice-Chair or 
Chair needs to come from the opposition—and it is to be expected that the Chair will always come from the majority 
groups. With that, a regulation and minority right got abolished that was internationally praised, inter alia in the 
legislative process of Bill C-22.742 The rights according to § 5 of the PKGr Act are in general not minority rights. § 14 
of the PKGr Act that makes it possible to go to the Constitutional Court is not defined as a minority right (“The 
Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on disputes between the Parliamentary Control Panel and the Federal Gov-
ernment at the request of the Federal Government or at least two-thirds of the members of the Parliamentary Control 
Panel.”743). Additionally, the minority cannot sanction the government (a majority vote is needed) (see below).  
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
738 Ibid.   
739 “Statusrechte der Abgeordneten; zwingende Gründe des Staatswohls.” (Translation mine). Stabilisierungsmechanismusgesetz, supra 
note Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert. at 359.  
740 “Die Beteiligung aller Fraktionen in parlamentarischen Gremien grundsätzlich ein verfassungsrechtlich gebotenes Verfahren darstellt.” 
(Translation mine). Singer, supra note 38 at 65.  
741 “Recht auf Einberufung und Unterrichtung.” (Translation mine). Ibid. 
742 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 82 (27 September 2016) at 5138 (MP Murray Rankin). 
743 “Das Bundesverfassungsgericht entscheidet über Streitigkeiten zwischen dem Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremium und der 
Bundesregierung auf Antrag der Bundesregierung oder von mindestens zwei Dritteln der Mitglieder des Parlamentarischen 
Kontrollgremiums.” (Translation mine). § 14 PKGr Act. 
 122
Bill C-22 provides for members of the opposition to be granted seats in the Committee. It does not, however, say 
that each parliamentary group needs to be represented. Whereas the Governor in Council designates the Chair (upon 
the Prime Minister’s recommendation), it cannot be expected that the position will ever be hold by a member of the 
opposition. Additional explicit minority rights are not provided for in the Bill. Since the Committee will consist of 
Senators as well as members of the House of Commons (of a maximum of eight parliamentarians, only five may come 
from the majority group), the minority will in most cases be dependent on the Senators. If one accepts the perspec-
tive that parliamentary control needs a strong minority, this would be one of the major problems of the new Com-
mittee in terms of efficiency. Since there are—as mentioned above—not many possibilities to get information apart 
from the formal request, the new Committee might be quite dependent on the government. This is not always con-
sidered as problematic. Indeed, to call parliamentary control a minority right also has its opponents. In the German 
context, Hirsch criticised the growing number of parliamentarians of different parliamentary groups in the Panel 
already in the 1990s. With regards to Bündnis90/Die Grünen’s first involvement in the PKK, he noted: “The services 
are very sceptical about representatives who are not members of the traditional parties.”744 He also concluded that 
there was a growing reluctance of the agencies to disclose information, and additionally argued: “Security experts 
from the traditional parties are more likely to be able to inquire more deeply at certain points because of their greater 
experience.”745 Hirsch does not explain why he came to this conclusion. Neither in the 1990s nor now must a parlia-
mentarian have a certain background in security matters to become a member of the Panel (although specific exper-
tise would be desirable). From Hirsch’s perspective, Bill C-22 does provide for some rules that may increase the 
agencies’ and departments’ trust in the Committee: the rule, for example, that only parliamentary groups of the 
House of Commons that have at least 12 seats may send members to the Committee, and the fact that there are no 
explicit minority rights or rights to self-information (of the minority). Furthermore, it is argued that “[f]ew members 
of parliament have expertise in national security or intelligence matters at the time they are elected. Those in the 
executive branch, by contrast, have mostly been selected for their position precisely because of their expertise in 
some aspect of national security affairs”.746 
Bill C-22 does also not call for specific requirements the parliamentarians must fulfil in order to be appointed to the 
Committee. This applies to both majority as well as minority groups although it can be expected that the Prime 
Minister (in some cases after consultation with the leader of a minority party) will appoint members to the Committee 
that have some kind of experience in matters of national security or similar matters. It is, furthermore, doubtful that 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
744 “Die Dienste stehen den Vertretern, die nicht den traditionellen Parteien angehören, sehr skeptisch gegenüber.” (Translation mine). 
Hirsch, supra note 102 at 293.  
745 “Sicherheitsexperten aus den traditionellen Parteien sind aufgrund ihrer größeren Erfahrung eher in der Lage, an bestimmten Punkten 
vertieft nachzufragen.” (Translation mine). Hirsch, supra note 102 at 293, Footnote 50.  
746 Fred Schreier, “The Need for Efficient and Legitimate Intelligence” in Hans Born & Marina Caparini, eds, Democratic Control of 
intelligence services: containing rogue elephants (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) at 40.  
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the parliamentarians in the Committee from the majority group would ask more specific questions in certain in-
stances; indeed, they might—differing from the Senators and parliamentarians of the opposition—also be under pres-
sure from their parliamentary groups during the Committee’s work.  
In conclusion, without specific provisions that create minority rights or without rather low quora for the exercise of 
certain rights, and, additionally, without the possibility to give dissenting opinions on matters in the annual report 
(and—in the case of Canada—in special reports), it might be difficult to trust the Committee that its true objective is 
the control of activities in matters of national security, not the support of the government (see below). As for the 
importance of the possibility of the minority to go to Court as well as the difficulties of minorities to prevail, a recent 
judgement of the German Federal Court of Justice will conclude this paragraph. The reader’s assessment of the 
judgement will probably depend on his opinion on the above-mentioned contrasting views.  
In 2016, the NSA-Committee of Inquiry in Germany (the judgement does not talk about the PKGr or its rights) dis-
cussed asking Edward Snowden to come to Berlin to be a witness in the Inquiry. The two members of the opposition 
(one of Bündnis90/Die Grünen and one of Die Linke) submitted the request to ask the government to make it pos-
sible to invite and question Snowden. The parliamentarians of the majority rejected the motion. In November 2016, 
the “investigating judge at the Federal Court of Justice who had been seised” decided that the government would 
indeed have to make it possible to question Snowden.747 The judgement was seen as one of the major rulings, em-
phasising the opposition powers of Parliament.748 In 2017, however, after a complaint/appeal of the Committee of 
Inquiry, the Court decided that the two members did not fulfil the necessary quorum. Contrary to the wording of § 
17 PUAG (one fourth of the members of the Committee of Inquiry), the minority would need to represent at least 
one fourth of the members of parliament (applying the wording of Art. 44 of the Basic Law: The Bundestag shall 
have the right, and on the motion of one quarter of its Members the duty, to establish a committee of inquiry […])749 
in order to have the right to take evidence and to ask an investigating judge to decide on it if the majority rejects the 
motion.750   
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
747 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Germany), 1 BGs 125/16 (1 ARs 1/16) – Beschluss vom 11. November 2016.  
748 Markus Reuter, “Bundesgerichtshof: NSA-Untersuchungsausschuss muss Snowden persönlich einladen”, netzpolitik.org (21 November 
2016), online: <https://netzpolitik.org/2016/bundesgerichtshof-nsa-untersuchungsausschuss-muss-snowden-persoenlich-einladen/>.  
749 Art. 44 I of the Basic Law: “The Bundestag shall have the right, and on the motion of one quarter of its Members the duty, to establish a 
committee of inquiry, which shall take the requisite at public hearings. […].” 
750 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Germany), 3 ARs 20/16 –  Beschluss vom 23. Februar 2017.  
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VII. “Partisan Motivations”? 
One of the major worries of people who are sceptical of parliamentary control (bodies) is that they are afraid of 
parliamentarians misusing the body for partisan reasons, particularly since “parliamentary control is political con-
trol”751. This fear was also brought forward on several occasions on the long path to the new parliamentary control 
committee in Canada (also mentioned in chapter 2), for example, in the aftermath of the MacDonald Commission in 
the Senate752. However, considering this argument, one may also wonder about the intentions and motives of the 
members of government, who are, indeed, parliamentarians themselves. Therefore, the fear of parliamentarians who 
use intelligence information for partisan reasons and who are misusing their influence for their own benefits may 
very much also be true for the parliamentarians who form the government. Therefore, there is no reason to exclude 
parliamentarians from intelligence oversight/review as there would then neither be any parliamentary nor executive 
control. One may also argue that the executive is even more in danger of considering intelligence work as something 
for its own benefit, as a support for its own policy; otherwise, it would ignore its results. Thus, “to be effective […], 
intelligence must be aware of and respond to the policy-maker’s priorities and concerns.”753 According to Caparini, 
“the danger of providing intelligence that confirms policy-makers’ preferred options is that it may lead to ignoring 
danger signals that the policy is misguided, out of touch with developments, or will not have the intended effect.”754 
Therefore, she concludes, “good governance of the intelligence sector in a democratic state relies on a combination 
of factors: the need for effective executive direction of the intelligence and security services under its control, but 
simultaneously a self-conscious exercise of restraint by the executive to avoid over politicisation of the intelligence 
product and to allow sufficient independence to see beyond obvious existing threats and the immediate political 
concerns of the current government.”755 In this case, one may, however, ask the question whether the parliamentar-
ians of the executive are indeed more trustworthy than the parliamentarians in the oversight/review bodies. Both 
may or may not try to misuse the intelligence sector for their own partisan reasons or to gain a political advantage 
from its work. Indeed, one may argue that this problem does exist but should not be used against the idea of a 
parliamentary control body and in favour of executive control, as it is done so often. And indeed, even Smidt, a long-
time employee of the BND in Germany, described in 2007: “[T]he intelligence official is not only interested in a strong 
executive but also in a strong parliamentary control. For him parliamentary control is even more important than 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
751 Peitsch & Polzin, supra note 132 at 388.  
752 Forcese & Roach, supra note 522 at 405. 
753 Marina Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States” in Hans Born & Marina Caparini, eds, 
Democratic Control of intelligence services: containing rogue elephants (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) at 7, citing Glenn P. Hastedt, 
“Controlling Intelligence: Defining the Problem” in Glenn P. Hastedt, ed, Controlling Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1991) at 10.  
754 Ibid (Caparini) at 7.  
755 Ibid at 8.  
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executive control, which is characterised by the viewpoint of the majority of the government and represents corre-
sponding interests.”756 Instead, through including opposition parties, parliamentary control is the only form of control 
that is to “represent the majority of the people. [...] [The intelligence service] needs parliament [for building 
trust/confidence within the population].”757 Smidt, therefore, aims at an increasing legitimising effect of parliamentary 
control.   
Instead of worrying about partisan motivations, one might worry about the “danger […] that such an oversight body 
gets too close to the agencies it is responsible for overseeing”.758 Therefore, one needs to assess the current bodies 
in Canada and in Germany: Do they provide for the necessary safeguards to not only prevent the parliamentarians to 
misuse the bodies for partisan reasons but also to manage the risk of a control body too closely associated with the 
agencies? And what can be learned from the German history of parliamentary control? 
When having a look at chapter 1 and the long story of parliamentary control in Germany, one may indeed not see it 
as a simple success story. In particular, the continuous lack of information and the persistent opposition of the gov-
ernments have caused the problem of control bodies that have often only received information on scandals through 
the media. However, none of the scandals in the realm of national security in Germany has been due to (at least not 
to the knowledge of the public) partisan motivations of members of the control bodies. Nonetheless, when looking 
at the different bills that were proposed during the last years in Germany (see above), the following tendencies are 
noticeable: the willingness of the minority parliamentary groups to drastically enhance and increase the rights of the 
Panel (obviously also with regard to minority rights), and that the bills and reforms that were proposed by the re-
spective governments in the past and in 2016 have often led to controversies if they actually aimed at all at increasing 
the Panel’s powers. This is not only due to the wishes of the parliamentarians of the majority parties; the members 
of the minority groups who—as mentioned above—in the past or even today called or call for the abolition of secret 
services in general, now very much aim at creating a strong and effective parliamentary control body.759 
In Canada, the parliamentarians who will be appointed to the Committee are not elected but appointed by the Gov-
ernor in Council on the recommedation of the Prime Minister. Therefore, the danger of partisan motivations exists 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
756 “[D]er Nachrichtendienstler ist nicht nur an einer starken exekutiven, sondern ganz besonders auch an einer starken parlamentarischen 
Kontrolle interessiert. Die parlamentarische Kontrolle hat für ihn sogar einen noch höheren Stellenwert als die exekutive Kontrolle, die ja 
vom Blickwinkel der Regierungsmehrheit geprägt ist und entsprechende Interessen vertritt.” (Translation mine). Wolbert Smidt, “Kritik 
des mehrpoligen Parlamentarischen Kontrollsystems in Deutschland” in Norbert Röttgen & Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, eds, 
Parlamentarische Kontrolle – Die Nachrichtendienste im demokratischen Rechtsstaat (Sankt Augustin/ Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, 2008) at 46. 
757 “[…] repräsentieren den größten Teil der Bevölkerung. […] [Der Nachrichtendienst] braucht [für die Vertrauensbildung in der 
Bevölkerung] das Parlament.” (Translation mine). Ibid at 46. 
758 Born & Leigh, supra note 675 at 11.  
759 For example: “’Ich möchte, dass künftig ein Tonband mitläuft’” (Interview with Hans-Christian Ströbele), Spiegel Online (16 January 
2014), online: <www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/stroebele-fordert-grosse-reform-des-parlamentarischen-kontrollgremiums-a-
943744.html>.   
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there as much as in Germany including because the PM directly appoints the Chair. And indeed, the fear of parlia-
mentarians leaking information and not respecting the secrecy of information, i.e. the lacking of trust in the MPs in 
security matters, has played a major role in the long delay of the establishment of a parliamentary committee in 
Canada. In Germany, the parliamentarians, as “members of the constitutional bodies of the Federal State”760 are not 
subject to the Security Screening Act (Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz)761, a fact that has not yet been considered 
problematic, whereas Bill C-22 requires such screening. Why would Canada trust its parliamentarians to a lesser 
extent?   
VIII. Whistle-blowers 
In order to talk about whistle-blowers, one has to distinguish between (at least) two different kinds of people who 
expose information. Firstly, one may talk about whistle-blowers when describing former officials or employees of 
officials in the field of national security such as Edward Snowden who leak information to the media or other institu-
tions. One may, secondly, also talk about whistle-blowers when describing the right of the parliamentarians (of a 
control body) to contact, for example, the Attorney General, the whole Parliament or the leaders of the parliamentary 
groups if they are confronted with information that hints at illegal activities of the secret services or departments.    
Concerning the latter, arguments in favour of this kind of whistle-blowing run as follows: having a system for the 
parliamentarians to make the public, the Attorney General or other parliamentarians aware of a situation that, for 
example, involves illegal behaviour of secret services has the great benefit of making leaks to the media unnecessary. 
Indeed, as for the “leaking of classified information by members of [inter alia] the legislature […], many believe that 
leaks are a necessary corrective when there is too much secrecy and the public interest is not being served by a high 
degree of secrecy.”762 A provision as such may, however, not completely diminish the danger of possible leaks as 
“[…] it must be acknowledged that leaks occur for other reason as well, such as efforts to embarrass political and 
bureaucratic rivals.”763 Indeed, whereas official provisions may make certain “leaks” because of illegal behaviour of 
the executive less necessary, leaks because of ‘wrong’ reasons might very well not be prevented by them. However, 
as mentioned above, there are no examples of leaks by parliamentarians of the German PKGr that the public knows 
of. The fact that parliamentarians might feel the need to leak information to the press might furthermore be pre-
vented through sufficient power to report on wrong-doings in special and annual reports and the right to give a 
dissenting opinion. In Canada, as MP Rankin mentioned during the debates on Bill C-22, there is even “a precedent 
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760 § 2 III Nr. 1 Gesetz über die Voraussetzungen und das Verfahren von Sicherheitsüberprüfungen des Bundes, Federal Law Gazette I, 
1994 at 867, as last amended by Article 5 of the Act of 30 June 2017, Federal Law Gazette I, 2017 at 2130.  
761 Ibid.   
762 Caparini, supra note 753 at 20,21.  
763 Ibid.   
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for [such whistle-blower clause for the parliamentarians in the Committee to go to the Prime Minister and the Attor-
ney General]. Section 273.63 of the National Defence Act764 imposes the same whistle-blowing obligations on the 
commissioner responsible for CSEC.”765 In its final version, Bill C-22 also provides for this duty of the Committee as 
a whole. The obligation is once again not developed as a minority right. From the perspective mentioned above that 
sees minority rights as one of the most important pre-conditions for guaranteeing an effective control, the provision 
in Bill C-22 might, however, not be far-reaching enough; it might still be possible that the parliamentarians of the 
majority party that forms the government would argue that there was no reason to inform the Attorney General if it 
was not concerning activities or events that were quite undeniably incompatible with the law.  
The former type of whistle-blower is also controversial, especially since the revelations of Snowden have led to a 
global scandal, especially in the press. At first, a whistle-blower needs to be distinguished from a spy.766 Whereas spies 
leak “state secrets to other states or hostile non-state actors to provide them with a competitive advantage; whistle-
blowers reveal state secrets to the public at large according to some (self-defined) concept of serving the public 
interest and/or following their own conscience.”767 Indeed, Edward Snowden stated as his motivation in The Guard-
ian: 
This is something that’s not our place to decide, the public needs to decide whether these programs and policies are right or wrong. 
And I’m willing to go on the record to defend the authenticity of them and say, ‘I didn’t change these, I didn’t modify the story. This 
is the truth; this is what’s happening. You should decide whether we need to be doing this.’ 
It is problematic that the revelations of a whistle-blower, who is committing a crime in many jurisdictions with these 
revelations, may have a negative effect on the whistle-blower (criminal punishment) but a positive one on the state 
in terms of improved legal security architecture and ending illegal activities.768 Therefore, many scholars note that 
the improvement and “strenghten[ing of] official accountability mechanisms […] that will reduce or obviate the 
need for more Snowden-like leaks” have often been considered as the answer to the contradiction of the importance 
but also danger of whistle-blowing.769 Caparina argues that “[a]ccountability is especially served when whistleblowers 
are guaranteed protection from legal or disciplinary action, enabling them to draw attention of oversight bodies to 
misconduct.”770 
From this perspective, Bill C-22 is missing a major component of an accountability mechanism without gaps leading 
people to become whistle-blowers: the new Committee will not hear whistle-blowers from the departments or agen-
cies. There is no provision that either makes a hearing possible and/or protects the whistle-blowers from legal or 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
764 National Defence Act, R.S.C. , 1985, c. N-5.  
765 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 82 (27 September 2016) at 5141 (MP Murray Rankin).  
766 Whitaker, “Guerilla”, supra note 695 at 205.  
767 Ibid at 205. 
768 Ibid at 206. 
769 Ibid at 207. 
770 Caparini, supra note 753 at 11.  
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disciplinary action. Therefore, Bill C-22 does not close this particular accountability gap. The Public Servants Disclo-
sure Act is not excluded by Bill C-22. According to s 17 of the Act, however, the relevant provisions of the Act “do not 
apply in respect of any information that is special operational information within the meaning of subsection 8(1) of 
the Security of Information Act.”771 Whereas this subsection defines virtually all information as special operational 
information, the Public Servants Disclosure Act does not apply to the security and intelligence realm. Therefore, the 
members of the Military Police who filed the most recent complaint to the Military Police Complaints Commission re 
treatment of Afghan detainees did so anonymously and have not come out as whistle-blowers.772  
There are, however, voices that argue that not even a more effective and far-reaching oversight/review body can close 
the gap that whistle-blowers try to fill. Whitaker argues that “the very need for, and existence of, whistle-blowers is 
rooted in the inherent limitations and inadequacies of existing mechanisms of accountability.”773 Given the problems 
of information access, the partisan motivations of members of both the executive and the legislative as well as the 
knowledge gaps, this thesis has already mentioned several limitations to parliamentary control. Thus, one may argue 
in line with Whitaker that there are those “inherent limitations” to accountability. Konstantin von Notz, a parliamen-
tarian of Bündnis90/Die Grünen in Germany, who is not a member of the PKGr but of the NSA-Committee of Inquiry, 
recently argued—with regard to the new information that the BND has seemingly spied on institutions such as Euro-
pol and Interpol (according to Der Spiegel)—“[t]hat all these things come out through journalistic research and whis-
tle-blowers like Snowden, reveals the lack of solid legal containment of the work of the services and the ineffective-
ness of parliamentary control.”774 As this cannot be an excuse for not trying to fill the gaps as fully as possible and 
creating the most effective possible oversight/review body, Bill C-22 still displays a certain lack of effort to address 
this important dimension. This becomes particularly obvious when we look at the German problems of illegal activi-
ties of the BND and von Notz’ statement because Germany actually provides for some whistle-blower protection 
(specific to the intelligence/security sector) in § 8 PKGr Act 2016:     
Members of the intelligence services are allowed to turn directly to the Parliamentary Control Panel, without acting through official 
channels, in the case of official affairs or internal malpractice, but not in their own or the interests of other members of these 
authorities. Because of the fact that they passed a concern, they are not allowed to be officially disciplined or to be disadvantaged. 
The Parliamentary Control Panel submits the concerns to the Federal Government for its opinion. The name of the communicating 
person is only known to the extent that this is necessary for the clarification of the facts.775 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
771 Public Servants Disclosure Act, S.C. 2005, c. 46. 
772 Canada, Military Police Complaints Commission, MPCC Determines Scope of Public Interest Investigation Into Anonymous Complaint 
(Treatment of Detainees) (Ottawa, March 2017), online: http://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/03/305/anonym-2015-005-over-2017-03-02-eng.aspx. 
773 Whitaker, “Guerilla”, supra note 695 at 207.  
774 “[D]ass all diese Dinge durch journalistische Recherche und Whistleblower wie Snowden rauskommen, offenbart das Fehlen 
belastbarer rechtlicher Einhegung der Arbeit der Dienste und die Wirkungslosigkeit parlamentarischer Kontrolle.” (Translation mine). 
Simon Rebiger, “BND überwachte jahrelang internationale Polizei-Behörden”, netzpolitik.org (24 April 2017) at 
<https://netzpolitik.org/2017/bnd-ueberwachte-jahrelang-internationale-polizei-behoerden/>.  
775 “Angehörigen der Nachrichtendienste ist es gestattet, sich in dienstlichen Angelegenheiten sowie bei innerdienstlichen Missständen, 
jedoch nicht im eigenen oder Interesse anderer Angehöriger dieser Behörden, ohne Einhaltung des Dienstweges unmittelbar an das 
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Despite the whistle-blowers’ supposed better protection than the non-existent one in Canada’s new bill, the prospect 
that their names might still get disclosed cannot be seen as a sign of the effective official accountability that was called 
for by Whitaker and other scholars. And indeed, so far there have not been many “submissions” in accordance with 
§ 8. In the report of the PKGr for the time from November 2013 to November 2015, only one employee of the agencies 
had complained to the Panel “about the head of a service. However, the allegations could not be confirmed.”776It was 
furthermore proposed several times that whistle-blowers would also need to have the right to not talk to the whole 
Panel but to certain specific parliamentarians whom they would trust. This, however, might lead to a certain kind of 
graduated knowledge within the Panel and strengthen partisan motivations and group interests.  
Concluding and in line with the advocates of accountability through whistle-blower provisions, one may therefore 
argue that if the agencies and departments knew of an effective accountability mechanism that would also protect 
the whistle-blowers, it might lead to a government and to agencies that would be more willing to disclose issues on 
their own initiative, in order to prevent their employees from talking to (certain) parliamentarians. Thus, an addi-
tional pressure would help to increase the executive’s willingness to cooperate with the legislative. This will not be 
the case in either Germany or Canada with their “current” or soon-to-be models of parliamentary control.  
IX. More for More 
The question whether there is also a balance between the agencies’ powers and rights and those of the parliament’s 
control body may furthermore be interesting. Should there be a logic like: the more rights a national security agency 
has, the more rights the review body should get? In Roach’s opinion, a defective balancing might be the origin of 
“accountability gaps” as “governments move to more intense and more integrated ‘whole-of-government’ national 
security activities, but without always ensuring that reviews and overseers have corresponding enhanced whole-of-
government powers and adequate resources to keep pace with what is being reviewed.”777 
Indeed, in the years following 9/11, in both countries, Germany and Canada, the legal rights and powers of the secret 
services have been increased drastically (Bill C-51 and the Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung des 
BND are just two examples). In addition, in Germany, many of the illegalities that the BND conducted in the past are 
now being legitimised in the law. Should the result of illegalities thus indeed be their legitimisation instead of their 
legal sanctioning?  
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium zu wenden. Wegen der Tatsache der Eingabe dürfen sie nicht dienstlich gemaßregelt oder 
benachteiligt werden. Das Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium übermittelt die Eingaben der Bundesregierung zur Stellungnahme. Es gibt 
den Namen der mitteilenden Person nur bekannt, soweit dies für eine Aufklärung des Sachverhalts erforderlich ist.” (Translation mine). 
776 “[…] über die Leitung eines Dienstes. Die Vorwürfe konnten jedoch nicht bestätigt werden.” (Translation mine). Germany, Deutscher 
Bundestag, Unterrichtung durch das Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium, 18th Parl, BT- Drucksache 18/7962 (21 March 2016) at 13.  
777 Kent Roach, “Permanent Accountability Gaps and Partial Remedies” in Michael A. Geist, ed, Law, privacy, and surveillance in Canada 
in the post-Snowden era (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2015) at 168, 169. 
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In Canada, one may see the establishment of the new Parliamentary Committee as the ‘more’ in respect to account-
ability and review, especially as it was promised during the election process as an answer to Bill C-51. However, the 
Committee was no new idea, as was outlined in chapter 2. It does not have any far-reaching rights and powers that 
were not thought of in the years before Bill C-51. In fact, as outlined in chapter 2, older ideas on parliamentary control 
in Canada were more ‘progressive’ in terms of giving the parliamentarians access to information or powers to sanction 
the government. It is therefore doubtful that the new Committee is an adequate response in the sense of ‘more for 
more’ when looking at the broad and wide powers for the agencies conferred upon them by Bill C-51.   
Indeed, one may ask why the ‘more for more’ approach is not the typical answer to the need to increase the agencies’ 
powers—the latter’s powers are increased, either because of an objective necessity or because of a subjective need 
of the public to feel secure, but so could the control bodies’ powers be increased. If it was a ‘one stop shop’ to 
increase both the powers of the agencies and the powers of the review bodies (not oversight bodies that have the 
power to veto activities of the agencies), would this really limit the new powers of the agencies? The question is why 
the general perception of a review body is that it is limiting the agencies’ legal powers and legal behaviour whereas, 
instead, its mandate is to review its activities in terms of, for example, effectiveness, efficiency, propriety or legality—
thus to help, support and possibly improve the agencies’ activities and behaviour. 
With respect to Germany, Dietrich argues: “There is a need for change in mentality among controlled and controllers. 
On the side of the services, parliamentary scrutiny will be better accepted if it proves to be a professional, unspectac-
ular and productive factual criticism. On the part of the PKGr, there should be more understanding of the services’ 
concerns, as long as the Panel sees itself as comprehensively informed.”778 Thus, a ‘more for more’-approach could 
also help to improve the relationship and the cooperation between the controllers and the controlled. So far, this 
approach has not been applied in Canada or Germany.  
X. The Power of Sanctions 
The above-mentioned metaphor of “blind guardians” has a second part. When describing the inefficiency of parlia-
mentary control in Germany, the metaphor reads like this: “The parliamentary supervisory authorities are not only 
blind guardians; they are also guardians without a sword.”779. But what kind of ‘sword’ should the control bodies in 
Germany and in Canada have? Can the history of Germany’s control panel teach any lessons regarding the necessity 
of sanctions? 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
778 “Es bedarf eines Mentalitätswandels bei Kontrollierten und Kontrolleuren. Auf Seiten der Nachrichtendienste wird parlamentarische 
Kontrolle besser akzeptiert werden, wenn sie sich als fachlich fundierte, unspektakuläre und produktive Sachkritik erwiese. Auf Seiten des 
PKGr dürfe mehr Verständnis für die Belange der Dienste vorhanden sein, soweit sich das Gremium umfassend informiert sieht.” 
(Translation mine). Dietrich, supra note 368 at 208.  
779 “Die parlamentarischen Kontrollinstanzen sind nicht nur blinde Wächter; sie sind auch Wächter ohne Schwert.” (Translation mine). 
Gusy, “Grundrechte”, supra note 30 at 132. 
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There are currently only a few possibilities in Germany to—broadly speaking—sanction the government if it is not 
willing to collaborate or if it acts contrary to its obligations, e.g., contrary to the obligation to speak truthfully in 
hearings or to sufficiently inform the Panel. The annual reports as well as special reports (especially those including 
dissenting opinions) may be considered as a method of sanctioning the government. The fact that the reports also 
inform the Bundestag about the cooperation of the government may be of importance,780 especially, as the media 
might get informed about it as well (negative press). Another possibility for the Panel to sanction the government is 
provided by § 14 of the PKGr Act, making it possible to go to the Constitutional Court against the government (and 
vice versa). A two-third majority of the Panel must submit the motion. As mentioned above, there are, however, no 
possibilities to bring criminal charges against people who are not telling the truth at the hearings. And there are no 
other alternative remedies for the Panel.  
Therefore, one may conclude that the Panel’s power to sanction the government if it is not cooperating according to 
the law and is unwilling to provide the control body with (the correct) information is relatively limited. The govern-
ment does not have to fear the Panel—(the fear of the media, if they get notice of governmental misbehaviour, is 
possibly greater). It is no wonder then that the Panel has so far often only heard about scandals through the media781 
(see above). The government has also refused to hand over information on several occasions, a proof of its little 
respect for the possible impending sanctions if it was illegitimately holding back information. In 2009, Bündnis90/Die 
Grünen thus called for the right to “sanction violations of the (in special cases) obligation to notify”782 by allowing 
“any member of the Panel to publicly announce, upon prior notice, unless the Panel objects with a two-thirds majority 
of those present.”783 Further ideas were: “Such a misconduct should be dealt with as a formal official offense with 
disciplinary action, as well as the consequence that for the respective government official the Federal Minister reports 
to the PKGr for a limited time. The misconduct must be taken into account in the event of financial and personnel 
allocations for the intelligence services.”784 These ideas were, however, not implemented in the last reform of the 
PKGr. 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
780 § 13 sentence 2: “Dabei nimmt es auch dazu Stellung, ob die Bundesregierung gegenüber dem Gremium ihren Pflichten, insbesondere 
ihrer Unterrichtungspflicht zu Vorgängen von besonderer Bedeutung, nachgekommen ist.” 
781 For example, Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Gesetzesentwurf i.a. FDP, 16th Parl, BT-Drucksache 16/1163 (5 April 2006) at 4; 
Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag, Für eine wirksamere Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste, 18th Parl, BT-Drucksache 18/8163 (18 
April 2016) at 1. 
782 “[…] Verletzungen dieser [bei besonderen Vorgängen] Unterrichtungspflicht zu sanktionieren.” (Translation mine). Germany, 
Deutscher Bundestag, Gesetzesentwurf i.a. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 16th Parl, BT-Drucksache 16/12189 (04 March 2009) at 1.  
783 “[…] jede[n] Mitglieds unter Nennung des Vorgangs nach vorheriger Ankündigung im Gremium öffentlich Mitteilung machen, sofern 
das Gremium nicht mit Zweidrittelmehrheit der Anwesenden widerspricht.” (Translation mine). Ibid at 3. 
784 “Ein solches Fehlverhalten (solle) als förmliches Dienstvergehen mit disziplinarer sowie der Folge behandelt werden, dass für den 
betreffenden Regierungsvertreter befristetet der vorgesetzte Bundesminister dem PKGr berichtet. Bei anstehenden Finanz- und 
Personalzuweisungen für die Nachrichtendienste ist das Fehlverhalten zu berücksichtigen.” (Translation mine). BT-Drucksache 18/8163, 
supra note 377 at 1.  
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Gusy describes the difficulty to define the sword, in particular since “we so far lack suitable models”785. He does, 
however, mention a possible improvement of the German system if the parliamentarians of the Panel were allowed 
to inform the Chair of the respective parliamentary group or other “appropriate members of the group on grievances 
or control deficits [...] in order to enable the latter to look for remedies. This could be done, for example, by referral 
to other bodies [...] or by the establishment of Committees of Inquiry”.786 The fear of getting exposed can force the 
agencies to work lawfully and not make use of their powers to an unlimited extent. These ideas are, however, also 
sceptically received because the group of people with access to secret information would grow bigger. Therefore, 
the PKGr Act does not include any of these rights. 
In Canada, the most important power of the Committee has been mentioned in the section on the rights of the 
committee itself as a whistle-blower: the right of the Committee to “inform the appropriate Minister and the Attorney 
General of Canada of any activity […] that, in the Committee’s opinion, may not be in compliance with the law.”787 
This power is in general also a great power to sanction the executive. However, as already mentioned above, it has 
two requirements that are probably not easily fulfilled: firstly, the Committee needs to get notice of illegal activities 
that might be going on; thus, it needs sufficient access to information. Secondly, the members of the Committee 
have to agree on the analysis of the information they have, i.e., that illegal activities are going on and that they there-
fore need to report on them.  
Another possible power that the Committee may make use of to “sanction” the government or agencies is its power 
to hold public meetings if no “information is likely to be disclosed” that “a department is taking measures to pro-
tect”.788 Thus, the Committee may hold meetings in public in which it would not be able to disclose information but 
could mention and inform the public about the unwillingness of, for example, the government to cooperate. Sec-
tion 18 of Bill C-22 does, however, have a second limitation to the right to meet in public. “[I]f the Chair considers 
[a meeting in private] to be otherwise necessary”, the Committee may not meet in public. Since the Chair (directly 
appointed by the PM) will likely be a member of the majority and governing party, it is doubtful that he would allow 
a meeting to be held in public in order to penalise the government or executive.  
The right of the Committee to mention in the annual report how often a Minister has withhold information according 
to s 8 and s 16 can hardly be seen as a power to sanction the government. This is especially so as it must not mention 
any details or its own assessment of the withholding. Such an evaluation would also be quite difficult since the Com-
mittee will not know about the content of the information that it has not seen, and the report might then, additionally, 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
785 “[…] es bislang an geeigneten Vorbildern fehlt.” (Translation mine). Gusy, “Grundrechte“, supra note 30 at 135.  
786 “[…] geeignet erscheinende Fraktionsmitglieder über Missstände oder Kontrolldefizite […] um diesen zu ermöglichen, ihrerseits nach 
Abhilfe zu suchen. Dies könnte etwa geschehen durch die Befassung anderer Gremien […] oder aber durch die Einsetzung von 
Untersuchungsausschüssen.” (Translation mine). Ibid at 135. 
787 Bill C-22 (final version), s 31.1. 
788 Bill C-22 (final version), s 18.  
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be revised by the Prime Minister. The list of the withholdings may, however, prevent a Minister from making use of 
this power without any restraints. The same argument may be true for the Prime Minister who has to give reasons 
for the revision of the annual report, which is then also being publicised together with the report.  
A great limitation is that the Committee must not bring the matter of a Minister’s determination to withhold infor-
mation from it under s 8 and s 16 to Court. Considering the amount of cases in Germany of, in particular, committees 
of inquiry against the government that had decided to withhold information, cases that were often decided in favour 
of the committees, the power of the government in Canada to withhold information without being challenged for it 
is extremely far-reaching.  
Gusy, who argued that “we are lacking suitable models”, will likely not change his evaluation once the Canadian 
Committee will have been formally established. Indeed, Canada could have learned from the experiences of other 
countries that a control body without any powers of sanctions is hardly assertive; instead, Bill C-22 does give the 
government almost unlimited power to withhold information without the Committee being in a position to challenge 
its decisions.  
XI. Information Sharing 
In times of terrorism and in the digital age, information sharing is becoming more and more normal. Whereas the 
thesis has already mentioned international information sharing and its problems, there is also a new dimension when 
it comes to information sharing of agencies and departments on a national level. Communication platforms such as 
GTAZ and GETZ in Germany or initiatives such as “Vision 2.0”789 in Canada are just a few examples of this new trend 
that is supposed to enhance security by improving not only the cooperation of the agencies and departments but 
also their coordination.  
In Germany, there is criticism that the parliamentary control is not sufficiently prepared to deal with those—often 
informal—information exchanges, particularly when agencies or departments from both the federal state and the 
federal level are included, considering that each federal state has its own parliamentary control body that is not 
necessarily cooperating with the others or the Federal Parliamentary Control Panel. Whereas the cooperation of the 
police and the intelligence agencies is increasing, the Panel is not allowed to control the police or its institutions, 
such as the BKA (mentioned above), due to the principle of separation.  
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
789 Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Access to Information Act Request by Colin Freeze, published by the Globe and Mail 
(26 July 2016), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/article31788061.ece/BINARY/na-security-web-document.pdf>.  
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Dombert and Räuker concluded that “we need a specific (autonomous) parliamentary control of the cooperation 
with a focus on the structure of the information platforms to ensure compliance with the requirements, which re-
views the efficiency and legality of the inter-agency informal work, the exchange of information and the ways of 
coordination.”790 For Germany, they proposed the establishment a special parliamentary control body that connects 
the federal with the federal state level.791 This would, however, mean that whereas the existing agencies and depart-
ments increasingly converge, new control bodies must be established—leading to an even more interlocked and 
complicated control architecture.792 
In Canada, the new Committee has a broader mandate than the PKGr. It can review all activities conducted in the 
realm of national security and is not limited to certain agencies. It may therefore be in a better position to deal with 
the increasing amount of information sharing. Bill C-22 was indeed a response to the need for improved information 
sharing; not only between the agencies as inquiries (recommended by the Air India Inquiry) but also between the 
control bodies. The Committee should close the accountability gaps that occurred because of the limitations that the 
other control bodies were facing in their mandate—for example, their restriction to one agency only. Therefore, Bill 
C-22 provides a clause that is calling for cooperation between the Committee and the other bodies (also to prevent 
“duplication of work”, see s 9); additionally, it rules that the Minister, in the case that he is withholding information, 
also has to inform the respective body responsible for the agency that controlled the information (s 16.3). Further-
more, the Committee may share information under certain conditions with the other review bodies (s 23).  
It will be of interest to see whether the Committee can fulfil the duty to close the accountability gaps that have been 
created—not least because of the lack of information sharing between the control bodies. Canada may potentially 
become a model for Germany in this respect.  
XII. Sharing of Intelligence 
Intelligence services are increasingly dependent on sharing their findings with foreign intelligence services and—
particularly in the case of smaller countries (by population) like Canada—on relying on foreign intelligence services’ 
information. One of many concerns in terms of parliamentary oversight and review is the willingness of foreign agen-
cies and governments to collaborate with a country, in which many people (including, for example, parliamentarians 
of a parliamentary control body) might get access to confidential information. Although most western democracies 
now have a parliamentary committee for national security in place, their tasks and mandates differ. Thus, foreign 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
790 “[…] es bedarf einer spezifischen […], auf die Struktur der Informationsplattformen ausgerichteten (eigenständigen) 
parlamentarischen Kontrolle der Zusammenarbeit zur Sicherstellung der Einhaltung der Vorgaben, die die behördenübergreifende 
informelle Arbeit, den Informationsaustausch und die Abstimmung auf Effizienz und Rechtmäßigkeit hin überprüft.” (Translation mine). 
Dombert & Räuker, supra note 77 at 420. 
791 Ibid at 420. 
792 Ibid.       
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agencies and governments may be less willing to share their information with countries with parliamentary control 
bodies that have vast powers and “unlimited” (or less limited) access to information. Additionally, whereas trust in 
one’s “own” parliamentarians might be limited, trust in other countries’ parliamentarians might be particularly low.  
This problem is likely to induce the governments of the respective countries to be less willing to increase the powers 
and rights of the parliamentary control bodies. However, it can also lead to a strict limitation or even reduction of 
their powers. Broad legal terms and vague concepts can help the executive to limit the access of information for the 
bodies in order to please and calm foreign executives. Limitations such as “international relations” or the “welfare of 
the state” in Canada and Germany are gateways to the protection or non-disclosure of information that has been 
collected by foreign agencies or transferred by one’s own agencies.  
The increasing amount of intelligence sharing and cooperation has already led to several scandals and problems that 
were mentioned throughout this thesis, such as the limitation to information access, the NSA scandal, the above-
mentioned examples of renditions as well as the secret CIA prisons on European soil. The “Third Party Rule” that has 
been used for argumentation both in the case Charkaoui in Canada793 as well as in the NSA selectors list judgement 
of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany is another example of an increasingly difficult task for national review 
and oversight bodies to fulfil their mandates. In response, several international human rights initiatives have empha-
sised “that the access of the controllers to information must not fail on the veto of foreign authorities.”794 
SIRC, as an example, is consulted before CSIS enters into a written agreement on intelligence sharing795, and possibly 
the new Committee will be as well, whereas the German Panel (and the G10 Commission) are informed about intel-
ligence sharing that is taking place. However, these powers still not enable the review bodies to get later access to all 
information concerning these agreements. The only possible chance to bypass the third-party-rule are therefore rules 
that bypass it by regulating in such a way that those review committees are not seen as Third Parties. They may then 
conduct review and oversight without the limitation that is set by foreign governments and agencies.796 These kinds 
of provisions are neither to be found in Bill C-22 nor in the PKGr Act. Presumably, were such provisions to be con-
templated in the future, they would need to be worked out in tandem with key intelligence partners or the legislation 
will not have its intended effect. 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
793 Charkaoui (Re), 2009 FC 476, [2010] 3 F.C.R. 102 at paras 17 ff. 
794 “[…] dass der Zugang der Kontrolleure zu Informationen nicht am Veto ausländischer Behörden scheitern darf.” (Translation mine). 
European Council, Commissioner for Human Rights, Democratic and effective oversight of national security services, 
CommDH/IssuePaper (2015) at 13f., cited in Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, Stellungnahme, Menschenrechtliche Anforderungen 
an die Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung und ihre Kontrolle (26 September 2016) at 15, online: <www.institut-fuer-
menschenrechte.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Menschenrechtliche_Anforderungen_an_die
_Ausland_Ausland_Fernmeldeaufklaerung_und_ihre_Kontrolle.pdf>. 
795 S 17(2) of the CSIS Act.  
796 Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, supra note 794 at 15.  
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Other problems of transnational intelligence sharing vary depending on the circumstances and structure of the agree-
ments: in the EU, information sharing increases; the EU does, however, still provide for supranational safeguards 
and, for example, the protection of fundamental rights, as the EU-agreement is not one that mainly focusses on 
aspects of security and intelligence. Therefore, not only the existence of the Charter of Fundamental Rights but also 
judgements of the European Court of Justice help to protect fundamental rights of—especially—European citizens, 
also in times of intelligence sharing. Judgements such as the Safe Harbor-Judgement797 of the ECJ have proven that 
the EU may indeed increase the status of civil rights and personal liberties—thereby even limiting national govern-
ments’ powers.  
Agreements that have established and implemented collaborations such as the Five Eyes or other bilateral or multi-
lateral forms of cooperation, however, do not provide for any safeguards for the protection of fundamental rights. 
Their only common aim is the collection, gathering and sharing of a great amount of intelligence information and 
data (thereby preventing, for example, terrorist attacks from happening). If the national control bodies are limited in 
their scope of review because of third parties being involved in the collection process, it becomes almost impossible 
to have any kind of effective control body that oversees intelligence. Therefore, from the perspective of the human 
rights associations mentioned above, both C-22 as well as the PKGr Act do not provide for an adequate protection of 
fundamental rights of both citizens and foreigners.  
A further question is whether states which are the main contributors to intelligence collections will indeed withhold 
information and stop sharing intelligence because of national oversight and review bodies of collaborating states. 
“The state of the art and the rapid speed at which technological innovations are developed, brought to market and 
disseminated, but also the extensive possibilities of modern communication in a now highly digitalised and globalised 
world lead to a data volume which cannot be overlooked, let alone evaluated, from a single state.”798 Nees therefore 
holds that the collaboration of intelligence agencies would not stop despite review bodies that are granted access to 
information. The German government has, however, come to a different conclusion—an assessment that was upheld 
by the Constitutional Court in its selectors list judgement. 
From this perspective, the review of transnational intelligence sharing will only be possible under rare circumstances 
when the Parliament’s right to get access to information exceeds the interests of the government and when the 
government is authorised to have the information at its disposal. Neither Bill C-22 nor the PKGr Act could therefore 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
797 The Court ruled that the EU-US data transfer agreement was invalid, because the level of data protection in the US was not sufficient to 
meet the requirements of Art. 8 ECHR. Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (C-362/14) EU:C:2015:650 (o6 October 2015). 
798 “Der Stand der Technik und die rasante Geschwindigkeit, mit der technische Neuerungen entwickelt, auf den Markt gebracht und 
verbreitet werden, aber auch die weitreichenden Möglichkeiten moderner Kommunikation in einer mittlerweile stark digitalisierten und 
globalisierten Welt führen zu einer Datenmenge, die von einem einzelnen Staat nicht mehr überblickt, geschweige denn ausgewertet 
werden kann.” (Translation mine).   
Nees, supra note 22 at 680. 
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prevent or end the formation and existence of accountability gaps; from Nees’ perspective or the perspective of the 
human rights initiatives mentioned above, their current versions might therefore not be seen as sufficient.  
XIII. Public Information/Publicity/Reputation 
What kind of influence may the new Committee and the reformed Panel have on public perception of the national 
security policy of the respective country? And how important are these perceptions? 
As already cited in the first chapter on page 8, Gusy argues that “state tasks are no longer defined solely by the rule 
of law, but also democratically”.799 Therefore, public opinion on the agencies, the government but also on security 
and privacy issues in general may be more important than ever, especially in the light of the new powers of the 
agencies and the possibilities that come with the digital age.   
Harman states in the introduction of a book on Global Intelligence Oversight that “making oversight work depends 
on developing strong public buy-in. Too much of the debate is shaped by unrealistic caricatures: of the CIA, of NSA, 
and of Congress. Dialogue is routinely undermined by misinformation and the requirements of secrecy.”800 Whereas 
she refers to the US American security architecture, the same may be true for the Canadian and German sphere. In 
the same book, Goldman and Rascoff postulate that one of the two oversight goals “should be to generate and main-
tain public trust in the activities of intelligence agencies […] [and that] some degree of transparency (or at least 
translucency) at a programmatic level is necessary to foster accountability.”801 Borgs-Maciejewski mentions that the 
secret services are also dependent on the participation of the public,802 highlighting the importance of public trust.   
The many quotes and articles concerning public perception and necessary trust in the agencies and departments 
concentrating on national security could easily fill the next couple of pages. However, despite this academic focus, 
the questions are whether the Committee in Canada and the Panel in Germany are helping to increase this trust and 
whether they should actually do so. The citizens’ opinions on and their perception of national security largely depend 
on the reports of the media and the remarks of the politicians. The majority parties therefore have some kind of 
power to lead the discussion about national security. This is particularly so since security and fear in general are 
highly emotional topics, the debate on security and intelligence being always one of the most important themes, for 
example, during election processes (see, for example, the election in the UK in June 2017). However, not least after 
the Snowden revelations, the trust in the intelligence agencies and particularly in their respect for the legal order 
have probably decreased. This thesis has mentioned several arguments and made several proposals that could help 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
799 Gusy, “Grundrechte”, supra note 30 at 5.  
800 Jane Harman, “Why Intelligence Oversight Matters” in Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff, eds, Global Intelligence Oversight, 
Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at xv.  
801 Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff, “Introduction – The new Intelligence Oversight” in Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff, 
eds, Global Intelligence Oversight, Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at xxvi.  
802 Borgs-Maciejewski, supra note 34 at 41. 
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to rebuild the trust, for example, through minority rights in the Committee or Panel, through reports that include 
dissenting opinions as well as through public meetings of the control body and public hearings of the presidents of 
the services. As Smidt, the former employee of the BND, stated: if people do not trust the parliamentary panel (or 
any body of that kind), they will not trust the parliament either, and that will then also increase the mistrust in the 
intelligence services even more.803 Additionally, Borgs-Maciejewski wrote in 2006 that “no other government sector 
is so quickly and often confronted with terms like 'scandal' and 'failure' as that of the intelligence services.”804 And 
indeed, the terror attack in Manchester in May 2017 as well as the attack in Berlin in December 2016 both led to 
speculations whether the secret services made mistakes and might have prevented the incidents, having known about 
the perpetrator beforehand. Whereas in Canada the pure existence of a new Committee might already help to in-
crease public trust in the agencies, in Germany, the new reform of the Panel has been criticised for how small its 
improvements are. It has also been frequently pointed out that most of the scandals had not been uncovered by the 
Panel (because of its limited access to information) but by the media.  
However, the question is whether it should actually be the task of the Panel or the Committee to strengthen public 
trust in the people responsible in the realm of national security. Granted, if the control body is working effectively, 
this has a legitimising effect on the agencies’ or departments’ work, which then correlates with an improved trust of 
the people. However, this route to legitimisation arises from the agencies having to earn the trust through public 
assessment of what oversight and review processes are able to make transparent. This may be an indirect outcome 
of proper control but it riskes distortion of the role of control institutions to expect that legitimation should be one 
of their objectives. As long as the minority rights or rights of single parliamentarians in the Panel or Committee are 
not emphasised in Bill C-22 and the PKGr Act and as long as public sanctions such as, for example, a report without 
revisions, do not exist, one can argue that the public has every right to be critical of the agencies—not only to put 
pressure on the parliament to increase the Committee’s or Panel’s powers but also to somehow play a part in the 
control of the agencies.  
XIV. Effectiveness of the Parliamentary Control Mechanisms  
This chapter has shown problems, opportunities and challenges of parliamentary control that the models in both 
Germany and Canada need to find answers to. A few arguments on what needs to be done to have an effective control 
mechanism have already been assessed and applied to the Committee and the Panel. We shall come back to that in 
chapter 4. In general, there seems to be no easy solution to how to improve parliamentary control mechanisms to 
have the most effective system possible.  
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
803 Smidt, supra note 756.  
804 “[…] kein anderer staatlicher Sektor wird so schnell und so oft mit Begriffen wie ‘Skandal’ und ‘Versagen’ belegt wie der 
nachrichtendienstliche.” (Translation mine). Borgs-Maciejewski, supra note 34 at 42. 
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However, it is not only a problem that the legislature may solve. As Born puts it, parliamentary control particularly 
needs effective executive control to be effective itself. “Parliament can only reliably call ministers to account for the 
actions of the intelligence agencies if the ministers have real powers of control and adequate information about the 
actions taken in their names.”805 And indeed, in practice, the German Control Panel and Committees of Inquiry had 
problems with the (at least alleged) ignorance of the Ministers and even the Chancellor. To mention a few examples: 
Merkel stated in February 2017 in a hearing before the NSA-Committee of Inquiry that she knew “nothing” about the 
BND spying on European and NATO institutions, politicians and foreign partners since it was up to the discretion of 
the Head of the Federal Chancellery to decide what to tell her;806 ministers did not know about certain practices of 
the BND and its collaboration with the US;807and another example in Canada may be—as mentioned in chapter 1—
Stephen Harper’s statement that he did not know about CSEC spying on Brazil’s Ministry of Mines and Energy.808 In 
2016, Bündnis90/Die Grünen also argued in their reasoning for their bill to reform the PKGr Act that “the control of 
the intelligence services, not least through its ministerial technical supervision, was not adequately organised and 
carried out with sufficient efficiency, but abetted unpunished negative developments in the services and their sepa-
rate lives.”809These examples may indeed show that also executive control needs remodelling and revision in order 
to—at least from Born’s perspective—have the chance to support an effective parliamentary control system. The ex-
amples can, however, also be read in a different way and be considered as “plausible denial[s]” (“wilful ignorance”)810. 
According to Shulsky, it constitutes a principle that “even if a nation’s involvement in covert action becomes known, 
the chief of state should be able to deny that he authorised or even knew of the action. He should be able to assert, 
with some plausibility, that it was carried out by subordinates who acted without his knowledge or authority.”811 
What may be learned from these examples? Can the control bodies influence the executive in a way that makes it 
more obligatory for the Ministers to ask the right questions to the intelligence agencies, or are the agencies not 
manageable? This assumption would lead us back to the opinion mentioned in the beginning, the necessity to abolish 
intelligence agencies as democratically illegitimate institutions. Or does the government know about all the activities 
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805 Born & Leigh, supra note 675 at 6.  
806 Robert Birnbaum, Die Kanzlerin weiß, dass sie nichts wusste“, Tagesspiegel (16 February 2017), online: 
<www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/merkel-vor-nsa-untersuchungsauschuss-die-kanzlerin-weiss-dass-sie-nichts-wusste/19403822.html>; Andre 
Meister, “Live-Blog aus dem Geheimdienst-Untersuchungsausschuss: Ich sage, was ich wusste. Und ich wusste nichts.“, netzpolitik.org (16 
February 2017), online: <https://netzpolitik.org/2017/live-blog-aus-dem-geheimdienst-untersuchungsausschuss-wurde-
massenueberwachung-seit-snowden-beendet-frau-merkel/>.  
807 For example: Stefan Krempl, “NSA-Ausschuss: Ex-BND-Chef belastet Innenminister de Maizière”, Heise Online (14 January 2016), 
online: <https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/NSA-Ausschuss-Ex-BND-Chef-belastet-Innenminister-de-Maiziere-3071513.html>.  
808 “Harper ‘very concerned’ by Brazil spy scandal, vows follow up”, The Globe and Mail (8 October 2013), online:  
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/harper-very-concerned-by-canada-brazil-spy-scandal/article14739556/>.  
809 “[…] die Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste v. a. durch deren ministerielle Fachaufsicht nicht angemessen organisiert war und 
wirkungsvoll genug durchgeführt wurde, sondern Fehlentwicklungen in den Diensten und deren Eigenleben ungeahndet Vorschub 
leistete.” (Translation mine). BT-Drucksache 18/8163, supra note 377 at 1.  
810 Caparini, supra note 753 at 18. 
811 Abram N. Shulsky & Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002) at 92, cited in Caparina, supra note 753 at 18.  
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but does not want to act upon them, is not inclined to limit the power of the agencies and departments and is not 
willing to protect the legal order and fundamental rights?  
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Conclusion  
In the three first chapters of the thesis, I tried to give a neutral view of the German and Canadian models of parlia-
mentary control and their historical backgrounds (chapters 1 and 2) as well as a (hopefully) neutral comparison of 
both systems—not least a comparison in the light of statements and evaluations of parliamentary control by various 
scholars from both countries (chapter 3). While writing this conclusion, it occurred to me that no neutral and unbi-
ased final remarks can follow at this point.  
When comparing two different constitutional states, one has to be cautious not to apply too readily rules that may 
be true for one state to another one. Indeed, also in the realm of national security, the constitutional architecture 
and the system of which control bodies form part do differ. Whereas Germany has developed unwritten constitutional 
principles such as the core area of executive autonomy, the protection of cabinet confidences is being highlighted in 
Canada. The constitutional necessity of a parliamentary control body was protected in a new article of the Basic Law 
in Germany. In contrast, Canada is only just about to establish a committee, and the debate has not yet focussed on 
the idea of its constitutional necessity in order to protect the democratic principle. However, unlike other areas of 
law, the realm of national security has given rise to the same political and constitutional tensions, problems and 
solutions in both countries. And the global world of intelligence and information sharing has led to the same debates 
and problems in both countries—and neither Canada’s membership in the Five Eyes nor Germany’s membership in 
the European Union or the Council of Europe prevent a comparative evaluation and assessment of Bill C-22 in the 
light of the German debate.  
However, when comparing and evaluating the rights of the parliamentarians and the control bodies, one needs to 
keep the different constitutions and constitutional rights in mind. Unless one does conclude that certain powers of 
the bodies are exceeding the possibilities offered by the constitution and that these powers are therefore illegitimate, 
those powers and rights as well as those limitations and safeguards can be evaluated differently. In fact, with respect 
to the Constitutions’ possibilities, the evaluation of the Committee and the Panel as well as of the debate in both 
countries very much depends on the political opinion of the reader. If parliamentary control is considered to be 
constitutionally necessary, then there is a wide range of possible rights and powers for the control bodies, both 
constitutionally and in their concrete form. Indeed, someone might think that the minority right to write a dissenting 
opinion in an annual report is sufficient and necessary to have an effective control mechanism, whereas someone 
else might be of the opinion that a dissenting vote endangers the public reputation of the agencies. A third reader 
might come to the conclusion that the minority (and the majority) should be able to publicly announce their opin-
ion(s) whenever they like to do so (however, without disclosing secret information). All opinions can be considered 
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constitutionally legitimate in both countries—and nonetheless, the opinion on what Canada can or should learn from 
the German experience of parliamentary control would differ fundamentally.  
I hope that every reader of this thesis, who has read the chapters 1 and 2 on the constitutional frameworks in both 
countries and their peculiarities and the comparative chapter 3, will be in a position to come to his/her own substan-
tive and well-founded conclusion and evaluation. In the following, I will give my own opinion—with which the reader 
can either agree or disagree.  
I want to start this last chapter by referring to a very recent event in the political history of Germany, an event that 
occurred while I was writing these last remarks: In June 2017, the NSA-Committee of Inquiry published its final report 
after three years’ work—including the dissenting opinion of the opposition parties (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and Die 
Linke). Shortly after the Commission’s announcement to make the report public (in a censored version in order not 
to disclose secret information), the Grand Coalition (CDU, CSU and SPD), which forms the government in Germany 
at the moment and is thus also forming the majority in the committees of inquiry, decided to blacken parts of the 
evaluation of the opposition, referring to information that should not be disclosed. Netzpolitik.org—an online news-
paper on digital rights—has nonetheless published the full report. 812 (They were able to do so, because the Chair had 
used an ineffectual computer program to blacken the report.)813 One of the statements in the introduction of the 
opposition parties’ report shall be my thematic anchor point for this final chapter on parliamentary control—and the 
lessons Canada should (have) learn(ed) from the German experience.     
 Clarification was substantially hindered and de facto hampered by a Federal Government which showed no interest in revealing, 
let alone reappraising and correcting clear objects of investigations, apparently legally problematic practices and co-operations of 
German secret services. Many secret classifications of files and events can only be explained by the degree of political embarrassment 
which a categorization of the classified procedure of the Federal Government would have caused. [...] The Federal Government, 
however, has blackened the files from the outset and most extensively, sweepingly removed them from the transmissions, and at 
the same time drowned the committee in badly processed files, specified classifications of files and meetings, to which the majority 
of the CDU/CSU and the SPD often obediently followed as a “government protection group” (Brocker, DÖV 27 2014), and constantly 
invented new procedures for shifting files to different places outside the Bundestag. There has been an immense number of “top 
secret” meetings, although it was often not clear how the content of the meeting when becoming public would ever have been able 
to jeopardize the continued existence of the Federal Republic. The members of the committee were frequently sweepingly accused 
of revealing secrets. They were threatened with criminal investigations. Representatives of the executive publicly voiced the risk of 
terrorist attacks resulting from the work of the parliamentary Committee of Inquiry. The partners of the German intelligence services 
would withdraw from the co-operations because Parliament fulfilled its mandate to investigate the long-lasting unlawful conduct of 
these services.814 
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812 Andre Meister, “Geheimdienst-Untersuchungsausschuss: Wir veröffentlichen das Fazit, das die Große Koalition geheim halten will 
(Updates)”, netzpolitik.org (21 June 2017), online: <https://netzpolitik.org/2017/geheimdienst-untersuchungsausschuss-wir-
veroeffentlichen-das-fazit-das-die-grosse-koalition-geheim-halten-will/>.  
813 This is another example on the lack of technical expertise on the part of the watchers. 
814 “Wesentlich erschwert und faktisch behindert wurde die Aufklärung durch eine Bundesregierung, die keinerlei Interesse zeigte, klar 
untersuchungsgegenständliche, offenkundig rechtlich problematische Praktiken und Kooperationen deutscher Geheimdienste zu 
offenbaren, geschweige denn sie aufzuarbeiten und zu korrigieren. Viele Geheim-Einstufungen von Akten und Vorgängen lassen sich nur 
durch den Grad der politischen Peinlichkeit erklären, die ein Bekanntwerden des eingestuften Vorgangs der Bundesregierung verursacht 
hätte. […]Die Bundesregierung jedoch hat von Anfang an und umfangreichst Akten geschwärzt bzw. aus den Übersendungen pauschal 
heraus genommen, den Ausschuss gleichzeitig in schlecht aufbereiteten Aktenmassen schier ertränkt, Einstufungen von Akten und 
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In the third chapter of this thesis, one of the main foci was on the right to get access to information. Whereas it is 
obvious that there cannot be any sort of control in the absence of information, the amount of information that would 
need to be disclosed in order to guarantee an effective control has been the subject of debate and disagreement. 
Despite of the importance of the debate, there is not much to add to it that has not been discussed in the last three 
chapters. Therefore, I will not come back to that again, except to say that in the last decades of parliamentary control—
but in particular, in recent years since the NSA scandal (or BND scandal as one might call it in Germany as well)—the 
Panel’s access to information has been scrutinised by politicians, the media as well as the courts. Also, the dissenting 
opinion of the opposition parties in the NSA-Committee of Inquiry focusses on the problematic lack of information 
and the resistant government, unwilling to cooperate to the amount necessary (in the opinion of the opposition) to 
guarantee for an effective control.  
The new Canadian Bill C-22 does not grant any more substantial rights to the Committee’s parliamentarians than the 
PKGr Act grants to the members of the Panel (and even less compared to the parliamentarians of a German commit-
tee of inquiry). The fact that the parliamentarians of the Committee cannot subpoena witnesses and are even more 
dependent on a government and on agencies willing to cooperate and “grant” the Committee the information it 
needs, does not raise hopes of the Committee being better prepared to deal with scandals and illegalities than its 
German counterpart. In fact, broad and vague legal terms, powerful ministers and a dominant prime minister may 
decide on the information the Committee will get access to—despite the broader mandate of the Committee than 
that of the Panel to control the agencies directly (and not only the government itself as it is constitutionally necessary 
in Germany). The greater mandate will not, however, make things easier for the Committee—it will be even more 
dependent on the willingness of the subjects of control to cooperate, and it has an even greater duty to fulfil, i.e. 
more subjects to control. It seems like an impossible task when thinking of the massive amount of information flow 
in the digital age. Bill C-22 does not seem to equip the new Committee with powers that correspond with the Com-
mittee’s mandate, nor does it seem to have found answers that the debate in Germany has not put forward. The 
powers of the German Panel (and the German Committees of Inquiry) have not been extensive enough to enable 
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Sitzungen vorgegeben, denen die Ausschussmehrheit von CDU/CSU und SPD dann oftmals als ‚Schutztruppe der Regierung‘ (Brocker, 
DÖV 27 2014) gehorsam gefolgt ist, und beständig neue Verfahren erfunden, mit denen die Akteneinsicht auf verschiedene Orte 
außerhalb des Bundestages verlegt wurde. Es hat eine Unzahl ‘streng geheim‘ eingestufter Ausschusssitzungen gegeben, obwohl oftmals 
nicht zu erkennen war, wie durch das öffentlich werden des Inhaltes der Sitzung das Fortbestehen der Bundesrepublik jemals in Gefahr 
hätte geraten können. Den Ausschussmitgliedern wurde mehrfach pauschal unterstellt, Geheimnisse zu verraten. Es wurde ihnen mit 
strafrechtlichen Ermittlungen gedroht. Dabei beschworen Vertreter_innen der Exekutive öffentlich die Gefahr von aus der 
parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschussarbeit resultierenden Terroranschlägen, die die Folge davon wären, dass sich die Partner der 
deutschen Geheimdienste aus den Kooperationen zurückzögen, weil das Parlament seinem Auftrag nachkam, jahrelanges rechtswidriges 
Verhalten eben dieser Dienste zu untersuchen.” (Tranlsation mine). Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, 1. Untersuchungsausschuss, Draft of 
the Fourth Part: Joint Dissenting Opinion of Bündnis 90/ Die Grüne and Die Linke, published by netzpolitik.org (June 2017) at 9, online: 
<https://cdn.netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2017/06/2017-06-20_NSAUA-Sondervotum-Opposition-geschwaerzt.pdf>. 
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the bodies to control the activities of the government in the realm of national security. And the BND has been able 
to conduct illegalities for years without anyone noticing. Thus, it is more than doubtful whether the Canadian Com-
mittee is prepared for its exercise of control.  
Additionally, the amount of information the Committee will have to cope with may overstrain the capacities of the 
Committee and its staff. Due to the amount of information, Germany established the new position of the Permanent 
Representative (plus staff) (which has partly been criticised; cf. chapter 3). In Canada, it is as much an absolute ne-
cessity for the Committee to have a staff that is not only high in numbers but also highly trained to deal with issues 
of national security. The necessity for a parliamentary control body to have an adequately funded and trained staff in 
order to work efficiently has been mentioned several times throughout this thesis. I have, however, not gone into 
detail in this regard. It would take a separate study, discussing the rights that staff members have and should have, 
the limitations to their powers, their specific legal positions, how to provide for their security clearances without 
being too dependent upon the agencies, and, in particular, how to get experts that are somehow unbiased and with-
out experience in the agencies and governmental institutions (or would this not be considered as problematic?).  
In my view, the next topic played an unduly minor role in the debates in both Germany and Canada: the minority 
rights of (single) parliamentarians in parliamentary control bodies as a necessary tool to ensure the effectiveness of 
the control activity. The above-mentioned report of the opposition groups of the German NSA-Committee of Inquiry 
can very well serve as an example of effective control in terms of the execution of minority rights. The report shows 
a view of the NSA scandal and the BND’s role in it different from that of any media article or parliamentary debate 
and it particularly differs from the opinion of the majority government parties. Without judging who is right, in order 
to arrive at a position to develop its own point of view and, in the end, an objective picture or solution, the public 
needs to listen to both sides of the story—in particular in the light of upcoming elections and the chance to either 
support the government or penalise it for losing control over the agencies or willingly let them act without controlling 
or supervising them.  
Indeed, in order to have an effective parliamentary control, it has to be ensured that the public gets informed—not 
only by government party members but also by members of the opposition. In Germany, this is even more important 
as many parliamentarians are elected because they are highly ranked on their party’s state lists for the next elections. 
If a parliamentarian of a governmental party thus chooses to (publicly) criticise the government (in terms of national 
security laws, policies and the agencies’ activities), the MP may very well expect that he/she will not be getting enough 
support for a promising place on the state list for the next election; he/she will thus not be re-elected if he/she is not 
elected as a direct candidate in his/her constituency. It is thus quite easy for the parties to execute pressure on the 
parliamentarians. One might call the minorities’ interests “partisan” and parliamentary groups of the opposition may 
also have an interest in publicly “shaming” the government. However, it is as much true that they do not have to be 
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worried about their seats in parliament if they speak out against the government and the agencies’ activities. Thus, 
they may speak more freely and truthfully than the parliamentarians of the majority parties who must fear the conse-
quences of their courage.  
Minority rights may thus very well be one of the few possibilities of providing for an effective parliamentary control 
in the realm of national security. The NSA report mentioned above is one example of this kind of “opposition control” 
that would also be an important factor in Canada to establish an effective parliamentary control—something that is 
far from being reached if one has already granted the Prime Minister the power to veto or revise the annual report of 
the Committee. Bill C-22 nearly renounces all rights of the opposition or of single parliamentarians in the Committee. 
Whereas the members of the Committee do have to come from different parties, the Committee’s work will very 
much be dependent upon the work and opinion of the Senators who are not members of one specific party. It is, 
however, doubtful that the role of unelected politicians can be considered as effective minority rights in terms of 
democratic aspirations in the realm of national security control.  
One might thus call for more minority rights, such as the possibility to go to court (as a minority) against the govern-
ment (for example if it does not provide the Panel/the Committee with sufficient information; a power that is explic-
itly excluded in Bill C-22) and other rights that were partly mentioned in chapter 3. However, it is indeed problematic 
that the minority (even if including the Senators in Canada) might have even more difficulties to deal with the amount 
of information that is being collected in the digital age due to their independence from the government and the low 
number of their parliamentarians (and of independent senators). A control that starts to take effect on the lowest 
possible level, thus a control that may also protect individual citizens’ rights, seems impossible considering how easy 
it has become particularly for the agencies to access personal information in the digital world. Whereas this problem 
is dealt with by the G10 Commission in Germany, the Committee in Canada might soon after its establishment be 
overwhelmed by the amount of information that is being collected and that—in general—is considered as falling 
within the scope of the new mandate of the Committee.  
A more reasonable approach might therefore be an attempt to establish control that takes effect on a level that is 
much more abstract than the focus on individual rights. One example might be to make the Committee or Panel 
decide on which method should be adopted by, for example, the agencies to collect information. Indeed, as men-
tioned in chapter 3, private companies are nowadays able to collect digital information of all users—thereby making 
it possible to draw a complete picture of each individual client. Therefore, every kind of co-operation or collaboration 
of the agencies or the government with those companies should need a permission from the Panel or the Committee. 
The same obligation should be necessary for collaborations with foreign agencies—although it would lead to further 
problems if the Panel/Committee had only to agree on a collaboration once for an indefinite amount of time. As this 
would constitute a “carte blanche” for the government, a regular half year review of the agreement or the like would 
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be needed as well. However, even then, the question how to deal with old agreements that were not signed under 
those conditions would remain. The Five Eyes agreement is an arrangement that seems to make any form of review 
or oversight control nowadays nearly impossible. In Germany, the selectors list judgement of the Constitutional Court 
has shown that there is no effective control possible when it comes to foreign agencies and the collaboration of 
national and international secret services. Bill C-22 does not seem to provide any solution to this problem. This may 
very well make the work of the new Committee impossible in the nearest future. It does not seem to have found 
answers that Germany has been missing and will thus stumble over the same problems as the German parliamentary 
control bodies did in the past. A depressing outlook on a Committee that has not even been established …  
As just mentioned, the amount of information the intelligence services might have access to (by illegal or legal means) 
has grown significantly through private companies that gather information on the electronic behaviour of their users. 
Even if one excludes individual control and focusses on general control, it is not illusory that in the near future, 
artificial intelligence will be able to fully analyse the information and create a full picture of the respective human 
being. This may lead to a power of the intelligence and secret services to get information on an individual that has 
never been conceivable before. How should an abstract and general control by a single body then still be effective—
or even possible? Since artificial intelligence will not only use specific algorithms but in the future is supposed to 
even “think” on its own, parliamentary control of anything but results will not be possible the way it is executed at 
the moment. Neither the debate on the Committee nor that on the Panel nor any other (academic) debate that has 
been led in the last years in either country has concentrated on this problem. However, it will—sooner than later—
complicate the (already doubtful) efficiency of parliamentary control even more. The public, a leading force—as chap-
ter 3 emphasised—for changes in the realm of national security, does currently not seem to force the political insti-
tutions in either Canada or Germany to address these issues and the new problems of the digital age.  
Another layer of protection of fundamental rights in Germany is being provided for by the European Union, particu-
larly the ECJ. The latter has, especially in recent years, focussed on the fundamental right of privacy and has thus 
brought some limitations to mass surveillance and unlimited governmental access to individual data, for example, 
through the prohibition of unfounded retention of data.815 These kinds of additional safeguards are missing on the 
Canadian side. One may thus argue that fundamental minority rights in Canada are of even bigger importance than 
in Germany.  
In my opinion, to concentrate on the dangers of mass surveillance and the future threats to privacy and individual 
rights by artificial intelligence should be a task for both the Panel and the Committee. Why can’t this be part of the 
mandate of the control body? The bodies should also have the duty to make the citizens aware of the consequences 
of the increasing data collections and the encroachments upon fundamental rights. The governments seem reluctant 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
815 Tele2 and Watson, European Court of Justice, Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 (Grand Chamber). 
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to do so in order to (also) be able to cooperate with foreign services and governments without limitations. But cannot 
one argue that it is the duty of a body to highlight its importance—to, in a way, conduct marketing for its own work? 
Only the public and the pressure of concerned citizens can lead to a change in terms of parliamentary control. In my 
opinion, any future debate should thus also focus on the role of the parliamentary control bodies by making sure 
that the public understands their work and the necessity of their work. The bodies themselves need to elaborate on 
and evaluate the role they can and need to play in times of digitality and artificial intelligence.  
Another point that I want to address is the lack of sanction possibilities in both Bill C-22 and the PKGr Act. As men-
tioned in chapter 3, the Canadian Committee will likely not have any sanction powers apart from the whistle-blower 
clause (that is not drafted as a minority right). In Germany, due to the lack of sanction powers, the government has 
long been in a position to not even fear the withholding of information. This offense had no consequences (apart 
from a few admonitions in reports) and was part of every major scandal and process of political investigation in the 
realm of national security in the last years. The German reform has recently made a few changes to the PKGr Act to 
increase the powers to sanction, such as the possibility of the Panel to question the presidents of the intelligence and 
secret services. However, there are—in my opinion—not enough possibilities to sanction a government that goes 
beyond its constitutional competences.  
A further possibility to increase the democratic accountability of the services could be the rule that the presidents of 
the services need to be elected or at least confirmed by a high parliamentary majority (to make sure that they work 
impartially and independently). Additionally, it should be possible to remove the presidents from office. This may, 
however, be difficult for two reasons. Firstly, it may be constitutionally illegitimate in Germany as the government 
has to be the subject of control and not the agencies themselves, and secondly, —this is true for both Canada and 
Germany—this power of the parliament might be considered as an encroachment upon the core area of executive 
autonomy, the principle of the separation of powers or the powers of the cabinet. But why are there so many excep-
tions to the general constitutional rules in the realm of national security, but no exception when it comes to the 
executives’ respective powers? Fundamental rights are limited because of the “threat of terrorism”, broad excuses 
with respect to terrorism and security are brought forward and the powers of the parliament and the public are 
severely limited in the realm of national security. 
In general, the parliament is considered responsible for the control of the executive, the parliamentarians are sup-
posed to have an equal access to information, and the public is meant to be informed transparently and openly. But 
all this does not apply to the realm of national security. Instead, small committees or panels, which may only receive 
information after occurrences and only on the “discretion” of the government without any true powers to sanction 
it, are trying to effectively control a whole “state” and an “administration” of various agencies with different powers, 
mandates and (illegal) activities. The parliamentarians of the Committee or Panel get to know information that no 
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other parliamentarian is granted access to, but they are not able to make use of their “normal” parliamentarian rights. 
As for equality between parliamentary groups and parliamentarians, it is unsettling that not even all parliamentary 
groups of the Bundestag or the House of Commons need to be represented in the Panel or the Committee. What 
about the equality of parliamentarians and parliamentary groups and, in particular, the election principles for the 
parliaments? Why is it apparently impossible to take on a ‘more for more’ approach? If the agencies or the government 
receive rights that—in general—contradict major constitutional rights and principles that form the basis of a demo-
cratic state that is governed by the rule of law, is it then sensible to strictly ensure that the executives’ powers are not 
limited or restricted somehow?  
Reflecting on the last decades of (parliamentary) control in the realm of national security in both Germany and Can-
ada, it becomes obvious that the period was accompanied by major scandals and illegalities by the agencies, by the 
unwillingness of the governments to cooperate with the control bodies and by new digital possibilities that made the 
control not only harder and more difficult but also poses questions that no one is yet willing to address or answer. 
Looking at the current reform in Germany with its new limitations to parliamentary control816 and analysing the new 
Committee in Canada817 the question I am posing is whether the reform or the establishment of a new institution are 
actually trying to address the problems that parliamentary control faces or whether their true aim is different: to 
increase the impression of legitimacy of the agencies and the government and, thus, the powers of the government 
in the realm of national security.  
Currently, Bill C-22 does not seem to have found answers that Germany had not implemented before. Instead, the 
German lesson that no parliamentary control can be effective without a proper access to information and the possi-
bility to sanction the government (as it became apparent in the BND/NSA scandal) has not yet shaped Canadian 
attempts to create a new control body. The new model has not taken over the ideas and proposals in this regard that 
were already put forward in Canada forty years ago and has also not learned from the experiences of parliamentary 
control of other countries in the last decades.  
Bill C-22 does not address the issues of international information sharing and the lack of control thereof, as well as 
the problems of the new digital era but sticks to proposals that were made forty years ago. And, Bill C-22 does not 
provide for any ideas on how to protect the citizens’ rights. If there is indeed a lesson to learn from the German 
experience: it lacked effectiveness. Instead, most scandals and illegalities have originally not been under scrutiny of 
the parliament—due to its ignorance. Additionally, the rights and powers of the Panel would probably also not be 
quoted as an example for sufficient control powers—the minority is calling for more rights, the government is trying 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
816 Such as the fact that the Chair will likely not rotate anymore between the opposition and the majority, the unwillingness of the 
government to cooperate and the illegalities committed by the BND that only led to an increase of its powers. 
817 (with its limited powers and access to information and the leading powers of the Prime Minister). 
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to keep the powers limited with the help of tactical political manoeuvres (such as not publishing dissenting opinions 
and adjourning the hearing of the presidents of the agencies). The shaping of the Panel that does not need to inte-
grate all parties in the Bundestag and that, for example, will not provide for a rotating minority and majority chair 
anymore should also not be taken as a model without hesitation. Thus, the main lesson to learn from the German 
experience is probably something that Canada can still vote for: to be open and willing to hold the debate over years, 
to be open and willing to reform the Committee time and again—in the light of new developments—and—last but 
not least—to not lose sight of the aim to protect and provide for democratic legitimacy in the realm of national 
security. Parliamentary control may be one of the key solutions for an adequate protection of everyone’s fundamental 
rights even in the digital age:  
Anyone who is afraid that his/her communications are being monitored may also be afraid to express his/her opinions openly, to 
seek free access to information, to visit a political meeting, to seek medical, legal or pastoral advice or to contact the press to draw 
attention to grievances. If the human right to privacy is at risk, the right to freedom of opinion and information, the right to freedom 
of assembly and association, the right to health, the right to freedom of religion and the right to a fair trial may also be threatened.818 
 
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
818 “Wer fürchtet, dass seine Kommunikation überwacht wird, fürchtet vielleicht auch, seine Meinung offen zu äußern, freien Zugang zu 
Informationen zu suchen, eine politische Versammlung zu besuchen, ärztlichen, anwaltlichen oder seelsorgerischen Rat einzuholen oder 
sich an Vertreter der Presse zu wenden, um auf Missstände aufmerksam zu machen. Ist das Menschenrecht auf Privatsphäre in Gefahr, 
können auch das Recht auf Meinungs- und Informationsfreiheit, das Recht auf Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit, das Recht auf 
Gesundheit, das Recht auf Religionsfreiheit und das Recht auf ein faires Verfahren bedroht sein.” 
(Translation mine). Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, supra note 794 at 4. 
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